Did a South Carolina town need sheriff approval to hire outside police support, and could the sheriff direct municipal officers?

Plain-English summary

Ridgeland's police chief asked in 2002 whether the town needed its county sheriff's notice or permission before contracting for outside law-enforcement help; whether the sheriff could bar those officers from the county; and whether the sheriff could direct the town police chief. An Assistant Attorney General answered in an informal opinion that it found no statute requiring sheriff notice or approval for services performed within the municipality. The letter encouraged notice and cooperation but did not treat them as legal prerequisites.

The opinion also said the sheriff had no apparent veto over officers working inside town limits under an authorized contract. The support statute gave the provider's officers the same South Carolina law-enforcement powers as the contracting agency. Within town limits, sheriff and municipal police could both investigate state-law violations, but the AG found no operational hierarchy allowing either to dictate the other's investigation methods. The conclusions addressed the municipal setting described, not activities elsewhere in a county.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2002. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the AG find a duty to notify the sheriff before municipal police-support contracting? A: No. It found no legal notice requirement for the described town services, while encouraging cooperation.

Q: Could the sheriff ban contracted officers working within the town? A: The opinion said no such veto appeared in the statute for officers acting within the municipality under the contract.

Q: Could the sheriff direct the municipal police chief's investigations in town? A: The AG said no operational hierarchy authorized one agency to direct the other's investigation methods there.

Background and legal framework

The request invoked §23-20-30 and the Law Enforcement Assistance and Support Act. The opinion used §23-20-50 (B) for the contracted officers' powers and §5-7-110 for municipal police authority within town limits.

Citations and references

• §23-20-30: law-enforcement support provision raised by the requester.
• §23-20-50 (B): rights and powers of provider officers under a contract.
• §5-7-110: municipal police authority.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/december-20-2002-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/02dec-20-woods.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

December 20, 2002

Richard V. Woods, Chief of Police
Ridgeland Police Department
One Town Square
Ridgeland, South Carolina 29936

Re:

Your Letter of November 12, 2002

Dear Chief Woods:
In your above referenced letter, you ask for this Office's opinion concerning the following questions as they relate to S.C. Code Ann. §23-20-30, the "Law Enforcement Assistance and Support Act." This Act authorizes any state, county, municipal, or local law enforcement authority to enter into a contractual agreement whereby law enforcement services may be provided to the state, county, municipal, or local law enforcement authority by an in-state or out-of-state law enforcement agency.

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REMBERT

1.

Is there any section of the law that requires a police chief or local governing body to notify the county sheriff and obtain permission when entering into a "Law Enforcement Agreement" with an outside agency?

2.

Does the county sheriff have the authority to "ban" outside law enforcement officers from his county when they are working within a municipality under a signed agreement with the local governing body?

3.

Does the county sheriff have authority over a police chief while acting in his official capacity within his corporate limits?

4.

Is there a section oflaw requiring a county sheriff or chief from another county, state, or city to notify the local sheriff that they will be performing law enforcement duties in his county under a "Law Enforcement Agreement" with a municipality?

c. DENNIS BUILDING • POST OFFICE Box I 1549

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COLUMBIA. S.C. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Chief Woods
Page 2
December 20, 2002

LAWI ANALYSIS

It should be noted at the outset that a municipality, in this case, the Town of Ridgeland, is vested with the powers given to them by the Legislature. In this instance, the Legislature, via S.C. Code Ann. §23-20-10 et seq. has specifically given municipal law enforcement authorities the power to contract for the procurement of law enforcement support services. Thus, as long as the municipality is acting within the authority granted by the Legislature, the exercise of that power is presumed valid. In reference to your first and fourth questions, it should be noted that the "Law Enforcement Assistance and Support Act" makes no mention that notice need be given to the county sheriff if a contractual law enforcement agreement is entered into for law enforcement services to be performed within the municipality. Furthermore, we are not aware of any other statute or provision of law in this State requiring notice to the county sheriff if such agreement is entered into for law enforcement services to be performed within the municipality. While we stress that notice and cooperation between law enforcement agencies is encouraged, we are unaware of any statute or provision of law which requires it.

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As to your second question, it does not appear that the county sheriff has the authority to "ban" outside law enforcement officers from his county when they are working within a municipality under a signed agreement with the local governing body. First, the statute is silent as to this sort of veto power by the sheriff, and furthermore, the law enforcement providers are working within the jurisdiction of the municipality. As such, S.C. Code Ann. §23-20-50 (B) provides that "The officers of the law enforcement provider have the same legal rights, powers, and duties to enforce the laws of South Carolina as the law enforcement agency contracting for the services." The powers and duties of municipal police officers are set out in S.C. Code Ann. §5-7-110 which provides in pertinent part: Police officers shall be vested with all the powers and duties conferred by law upon constables, in addition to the special duties imposed upon them by the municipality. Any such police officers shall exercise their powers on all private and public property within the corporate limits of the municipality and on all property owned or controlled by the municipality wheresoever situated.

Accordingly, the officers of the law enforcement provider would possess such powers and duties with regard to the municipal corporation of the Town of Ridgeland.

Chief Woods
Page 3
December 20, 2002

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As to your third question, it does not appear the county sheriff has authority over a police chief while the police chief is acting in his official capacity within his corporate limits. This Office has consistently recognized the status of the Sheriff as the chief law enforcement officer of the county. See, Op. Atty. Gen., May 8, 1989; See, Op. Atty. Gen. No., 92-67 (November 6, 1992.). However, a municipal police department has concurrent jurisdiction over any violation of state law occurring within the limits of the municipality. While the Sheriff and municipal police department may have concurrent jurisdiction over violations of state law occurring within a municipality, there is no statute or other law which sets out an operational hierarchy among the agencies. Both have full authority to investigate, but not to the exclusion of the other. Neither does either have the authority to direct the other as to methods of investigation. See Ops. Atty. Gen. Dated September 28, 2000 & May 17, 2001. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General and not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion.

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David K. Avant
Assistant Attorney General
DKA/jbc