Could Richland County use an ordinance summons for hauling unsecured refuse on public roads?

Plain-English summary

Richland County's deputy attorney asked whether the county could use a uniform ordinance summons when a vehicle carried refuse on public roads without securing the load against falling, leaking, or blowing away. South Carolina law barred this summons for ordinances regulating the use of motor vehicles on public roads. In 2008, the Attorney General's office concluded that the refuse ordinance addressed the condition of the load rather than driving the vehicle, so it was outside that traffic-offense restriction and could be enforced by ordinance summons.

The opinion distinguished earlier AG opinions about municipal traffic offenses, for which it said a uniform traffic ticket was required. Its conclusion concerned the described Richland County refuse provision and its load-securing requirement.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2008. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could an officer issue a uniform ordinance summons for an unsecured refuse load?

The AG said yes for the cited Richland County provision because it regulated the load's securement rather than the operation of the vehicle.

Why did the public-road setting not make the refuse violation a traffic offense?

The opinion focused on what the ordinance regulated. Although refuse was being transported on a road, the rule concerned material falling, leaking, or blowing from the vehicle, not the safety of the driver's operation.

What kind of ordinance could not use this summons under the cited statute?

The opinion quoted the statutory exclusion for county or municipal ordinances regulating motor-vehicle use on public roads and cited earlier opinions requiring a uniform traffic ticket for traffic offenses.

Background and statutory framework

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-80 authorized county and municipal law-enforcement and code-enforcement officers to use a uniform ordinance summons, but excluded ordinances regulating motor-vehicle use on public roads. Section 12- 19 of Richland County's code required transported refuse to be secured so it would not fall, leak, or blow from a vehicle. Applying the ordinary meaning of the statutory exclusion, the office found that load-securement rule was not a traffic offense.

Citations and references

• S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-80: authorization and traffic-related limit for ordinance summonses.
• Section 12- 19: Richland County refuse-transport rule quoted in the opinion.

Official title

Concerning the interpretation of section 56-7-80 which provides for a county or municipal ordinance summons to be used for the enforcement of county aid and municipal ordinances.

Requester

Bradley T. Farrar, Esquire, Deputy Richland County Attorney

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/december-2-2008-2/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/farrar-b-t-os-8696-12-02-08-county-or-municipal-ordinance-summons.pdf

Original opinion text

H ENRY M CMASTER
AT f ORNEY G ENERAL

December 2, 2008

Bradley T. Fan·ar, Esquire
Deputy Richland County Attorney
P. 0. Box 192
Columbia, South Carolina 29202
Dear Mr. Farrar:
In a letter to this office you referenced the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-80 which provide for a county or municipal ordinance summons to be used for the enforcement of county and municipal ordinances. Such statute further provides that

[u ]pon adoption of the ordinance summons, any county or municipal law enforcement officer or code enforcement officer is authorized to use an ordinance summons...The uniform ordinance summons may not be used to perform a custodial al.Test. No county or municipal ordinance which regulates the use of motor vehicles on the public roads of this State may be enforced using an ordinance summons. (emphasis added). You have referenced Section 12- 19 ofthe Richland County Code ofOrdinances, Chapter 12, Garbage, Trash and Refuse, Transportation of Refuse which provides that (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to haul, convey or cause to be conveyed any refuse upon or along the public streets and roadways except when the material transported is adequately secured in such a manner as to prevent it from falling, leaking or being blown from transporting vehicles. The owner or driver of the offending vehicle shall be personally responsible for any violation of this section. As stated in your letter, "[t]he ordinance pertains to the manner in which the load transported has been secured, and does not have anything to do with bow safely or unsafely a motorist operates the vehicle carrying the load." You have questioned whether or not the county refuse ordinance provisions set forth above can be enforced by use of a uniform ordinance summons. When interpreting the meaning of a statute, certain basic principles must be observed. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). Typically, legislative intent is determined by applying Rt::MBElff c. Df.NNIS B UILDING • POST O FFICE Box 11549 • COLUMBIA. SC 2921J- l549 • T ELEPHONE 803-734-3970 • FACSIMILE 803-253-6283

Mr. Farrar
Page2
December 2, 2008

the words used by the General Assembly in their usual and ordinary significance. Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451 (1971). Resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting or expanding the operation of a statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). Courts must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning and statutes should be given a reasonable and practical construction which is consistent with the policy and purpose expressed therein. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991); Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166 (1966). This office in prior opinions has dealt with the question regarding the use of a uniform ordinance summons in association with municipal ordinance violations dealing with traffic offenses. We have concluded that consistent with Section 56-7-80, a county ordinance summons could not be utilized in such circumstances and a uniform traffic ticket must instead by used. See, e.g., Op. dated November 14, 2006. As stated by you, the Richland County ordinance regulating the transportation of refuse deals with the manner in which the load transported has been secured, and is irrelevant to how safely or unsafely a motorist operates the vehicle itself which carries the load. As a result, in the opinion of this office, the Richland County ordinance provision is not a traffic offense and does not regulate the use of a motor vehicle on the public roads of this State. Therefore, a violation of such transportation of refuse ordinance provision could be cited using a uniform ordinance summons. If there are any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,
Henry McMaster
Attorney General

By:

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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RObertD:Ook
Deputy Attorney General

Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General