Could a shared technology-center employee serve on either sponsoring school board?

Short answer The AG said a technology-center employee would likely face a master-servant conflict on the board of the district that employed the person, and could not also sit on the center’s own board. Whether service on the other district’s board created enough indirect control for a conflict was left to a court.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
2007-december-17-2007-1
Issued
December 17, 2007
Issued by
Office of the South Carolina Attorney General
Requested by
Kenneth E. Darr, Jr., Esquire

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 2007. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

Two Spartanburg school districts jointly operated the Daniel Morgan Technology Center, with each district represented on the center’s board and both approving its budget. The AG concluded that a center employee serving on the center’s own board would likely face a master-servant conflict because that board directly supervised employees. A center employee elected to either district board therefore could not also serve on the center’s board through that district position.

The AG drew a distinction between the district boards. Because District Seven then employed the center’s workers, he thought a court would likely find a conflict if a worker served on District Seven’s board. District Three had substantial indirect financial and supervisory influence but did not then directly employ the workers. The AG declined to settle whether that indirect control was enough to bar service on District Three’s board, leaving it for a court. He noted that the employing district could change, affecting the analysis.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2007. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could a center employee sit on the technology center’s own board? A: The AG said a master-servant conflict would likely arise because that board directly supervised center employees.

Q: What did the AG say about serving on the employing district’s board? A: With District Seven acting as employer, he believed a court would likely find a conflict if a center employee served on its board.

Q: Did the AG conclusively allow or bar service on District Three’s board? A: No. District Three had indirect control, but the AG said a court should decide whether that control was enough for a conflict.

Q: Why might the answer change later?
A: The requester said the districts expected to alternate fiscal-agent and employment responsibility. The AG treated the identity of the employing district as significant.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion revisited a February 2007 answer after receiving fuller facts about board composition, budget approval and employment. It distinguished the center board’s direct control from the district boards’ different degrees of direct and indirect control. The cited school-trustee statute addressed pay as a teacher in the trustee’s own district, while the opinion’s central question concerned the broader master-servant conflict.

Citations and references

Statute discussed: section 59-19-300. Earlier AG opinion discussed: February 28, 2007.

Source

Original opinion text

December 17, 2007

Kenneth E. Darr, Jr.
Lyles, Darr & Clark, LLP
Post Office Box 5726
Spartanburg, South Carolina 29304
Dear Mr. Darr:
We understand you represent Spartanburg County School District No. 3 (“District Three”) and wish to request an opinion of this Office on District Three’s behalf concerning whether a technology center employee may serve on the board of trustees for a school district that governs the technology center. You explain as follows: The Daniel Morgan Technology Center (hereafter “DMTC”) is owned and operated jointly by Spartanburg County School District No. 3 and Spartanburg County School District No. 7. DMTC has a board of trustees comprised of six members, with three representatives from each of the two district boards. The board chair alternates between the two school districts annually. The DMTC budget is approved by both Spartanburg County School District No. 3 and Spartanburg County School District No. 7. The DMTC budget covers all fiscal matters relating to the operation of DMTC, including compensation of all employees. For convenience, one school district serves as fiscal agent for employment purposes, although that responsibility is expected to alternate as well. Nevertheless, neither district can act alone in hiring or compensating employees. Based on this information, you ask whether “an employee of DMTC [may] serve as a member of the board of trustees of either Spartanburg County School District No. 3 or Spartanburg County School District No. 7?”

Law/Analysis

Mr. Darr
Page 2
December 17, 2007

In an opinion issued on February 28, 2007, this Office considered the question of whether an employee of the Daniel Morgan Technology Center (“DMTC”) may hold a position on the District Three Board of Trustees (the “District Three Board”). Op. S.C. Atty. Gen., February 28, 2007. In that opinion, we were informed that the employee in question was employed as an employee of Spartanburg County School District Seven (“District Seven”). Id. Further, we were told that he reports to the director of the DMTC, who in turn reports to the superintendents for both districts, as well as, the DMT C’s board (the “DMTC Board”). Id. According to the requester, “This Board controls the employment and financial decisions of Daniel Morgan Technology Center.” Id. First, we considered whether the employee’s service on the District Three Board would violate section 59-19-300 of the South Carolina Code (2004), which makes it unlawful for a school trustee to receive pay as a teacher from a school located in that district. Id. Because the employee informed us that he is an employee of District Seven, rather than District Three, we concluded this provision has not been violated. Id. Second, we considered whether the employee’s service on the District Three Board would create a master-servant conflict of interest. Id. In this regard, we stated as follows: An overlap appears to exist between District Seven and District Three in regard to the Technology Center. Per your letter, you serve under the direction of the director of the Technology Center, who in turn reports not only to the Technology Center’s board, but also to the superintendents of both District Seven and District Three. We presume the superintendent for District Three serves at the pleasure of the District Three Board. Thus, some evidence exists to show the District Three Board could exert influence over the Technology Center and its employees. However, you clarified that although the director of the Technology Center reports to the superintendents of both districts, the Technology Center’s board is charged with authority to make the employment and financial decisions of the Technology Center, thereby placing the ability to supervise and control Technology Center employees in the hands of the board, not the superintendents. Thus, this information indicates that supervision and control over your position rests directly with the director of the Technology Center and indirectly with the Technology Center’s board. In addition, because you are considered an employee of District Seven, you likely receive compensation from District Seven and are subject to its personnel policies. Therefore, District Seven also appears to have some authority over your position and possibly your compensation. Id. Nonetheless, we concluded that based on the information provided by the requester, we were inclined to opine that a master-servant conflict would not arise should an employee of DMTC obtain a position on the District Three Board. Id. We acknowledged in our previous opinion that evidence exists to indicate that District Three has some influence over DMTC’s employees due to the fact its director reports not only to the District

Mr. Darr
Page 3
December 17, 2007
Seven superintendent, but also to District Three’s superintendent. But, given the fact that the DMTC Board has direct supervisory authority over its Director and essentially, its employees, we found it unlikely that a master-servant conflict exists. However, we based our opinion purely on the information provided by the requester. In your letter, you provided us with some additional information concerning District Three and District Seven’s interaction with DMTC. You informed us that the DMTC Board is comprised members from each school district’s board of trustees. Furthermore, you explained DMTC’s budget, which includes employee compensation, must be approved by both districts. Finally, you alerted us to the fact that while District Seven currently is acting as the employer for DMTC employees, this is expected to change and the two districts will alternate this responsibility. Based on the information provided to us, it appears undisputed that DMTC’s board has direct supervisory authority over DMTC employees. Thus, a master-servant conflict of interest would likely arise should a DMTC employee serve as a member of the DMTC Board. Therefore, at a minimum, should an employee of DMTC be elected to District Three Board or District Seven Board, he or she could not serve via his or her position on those boards as a member of the DMTC Board. However, you have asked us generally about a DMTC employee’s ability to serve not on the DMTC Board, but on the District Seven and District Three boards. Under the circumstances presented in your letter, the fact that half of the DMTC Board consists of District Three and District Seven board members supports the argument that the District Three Board and District Seven Board have supervisory authority over DMTC employees. However, such supervisory authority only is exercisable by those members who also serve on DMTC’s board. As we concluded above, an employee of DMTC would not be eligible to serve in his or her capacity as a member of the District Three or District Seven boards. Thus, the degree of supervision and control exercisable by members of the DMTC Board would not be inherent in someone solely serving on one of the Districts’ boards. Nonetheless, we also learned from your letter that DMTC’s budget must be approved by both the District Seven Board and the District Three Board. Based upon this fact, both districts appears to have at least indirect control over the finances of DMTC. However, the previous requester informed us that the DMTC Board is charged with making the financial decisions for DMTC including those involving compensation. Thus, direct control over the DMTC budget and employee compensation appears to rest with the DMTC Board. Finally, we understand that DMTC’s employees are considered employees of District Seven. This fact provides further evidence that District Seven has supervisory authority over DMTC employees. You indicated in your letter that at some point responsibility for employment of DMTC employees will alternate between District Three and District Seven. Depending upon which district holds the responsibility of employing DMTC employees, we would presume the employing district would exercise a greater amount of supervision and control over DMTC employees. Considering these additional facts, we find the question as to whether the level of supervision and control exercised by District Three Board and District Seven Board is sufficient to create a masterservant conflict of interest to be closer than as found in our February opinion. Certainly, additional facts have come to our attention indicating that the two boards have more of an indirect impact on DMTC employees than first realized. Because District Seven employs DMTC employees, it appears to have some direct supervisory and thus, we believe a court would likely find a DMTC employee in violation

Mr. Darr
Page 4
December 17, 2007
of master-servant principles should he or she serve on the District Seven Board. However, with regard to such an employee serving on the District Three Board, the District Three Board does not appear to have any direct supervision or control over DMTC employees. Whether or not the significant level of indirect supervision and control the District Three Board has over DMTC employees is sufficient to create a master-servant conflict of interest is difficult for us to opine on, as no clear guidance exists from the courts on this issue. Thus, while certainly the argument could be made that a master-servant conflict exists when a DMT C employee serves on the District Three Board, we find it better for a court to resolve this issue. Conclusion Considering both the information provided to us by a previous requester and the additional information provided by you, we believe a master-servant conflict of interest may arise should an employee of DMTC serve on the District Seven Board. However, whether such a conflict would arise should such an employee of DMTC serve on the District Three Board, is a difficult question. Certainly, evidence of exists to indicate members of the District Three Board have a significant amount of indirect control with regard to DMTC. However, we are unsure as to whether this level of indirect supervision and control is sufficient to create a master-servant conflict of interest and find such a matter better resolved by the courts. Very truly yours, Henry McMaster Attorney General

By:

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

______
Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General

Cydney M. Milling
Assistant Attorney General

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