Did Spartanburg school districts need county approval to sell district property in 1996?

Plain-English summary

In a 1996 informal opinion, an assistant deputy attorney general considered whether Spartanburg County school districts still needed county approval before selling district property. He agreed that they did not. The county-specific act allocated powers formerly held by the county board to the local district trustees unless the act expressly retained them. Sale approval was not among the retained county board powers, so the author concluded that board approval was no longer necessary.

The act also gave the districts "total fiscal autonomy." The author read that provision as showing legislative intent to dispense with county council approval as well. His conclusion addressed the consent requirement for these districts under the laws discussed, not every condition governing a school-property transaction.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did Spartanburg districts need the county board's consent to sell school property?
A: The 1996 letter said no. It reasoned that the county-specific act did not retain that approval power for the county board.

Q: Did the district instead need county council consent?
A: The author also said no. He read the act's grant of total fiscal autonomy as exempting the districts from that consent requirement.

Q: Could district trustees sell property under the general statute?
A: The quoted general statute allowed trustees to sell or lease district property and apply proceeds to the district school fund, subject to a county-consent clause. The letter explained why that clause did not apply to the Spartanburg districts under the county-specific act.

Background and statutory framework

The requester asked how Act No. 189, the Spartanburg school-governance act, interacted with §59-19-250, the general school-property sale provision. The author read the act's transfer of county board powers to local boards and its fiscal-autonomy language together with the general consent requirement. He also cited the rule that a specific statute prevails over a conflicting general statute.

This was an informal opinion signed by an assistant deputy attorney general, not a formal opinion personally reviewed by the Attorney General.

Citations and references

• County-specific act: Act No. 189.
• General property-sale provision: §59-19-250.

Official title

Requesting advice as to whether provisions of Act No. 189, 1995 S.C. Acts 1561 exempt Spartanburg County school districts from obtaining the consent of the Spartanburg County Board of Education or County Council pursuant to § 59-19-250 (1990) before selling district property.

Requester

J. Mark Hayes, Esquire

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/december-15-1996-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/96dec15hayes.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M OLONY CONDON

December 15, 1996

ATIORNEY GENERAL

J. Mark Hayes, Esquire

Harrison and Hayes
P.O. Box 5367
Spartanburg, s.c. 29304
Dear Mark:
You have requested the advice of this Office as to the whether provisions of Act No. 189, 1995 s.c. Acts 1561 -exempt Spartanburg County school districts from obtaining the consent of the Spartanburg County Board of Education or County Council pursuant to
§
59-19-250 (1990) before selling· district property. Your conclusion is .that the districts are exempt from obtaining this consent, and I concur for the reasons set forth below. Section 2 of Act 189 provides in part, as follows: The Spartanburg county Board • •. is empowered to [exercise the enumerated powers] • All other powers, if any, formerly possessed by the County Board ••• are devolved and otherwise allocated , upon the seven boards of trustees of the local distri cts of Spartanburg County ••.• Section 1 of the Act states that the boards of trustees for the Spartanburg County school districts " •.. are vested and allocated with total fiscal autonomy." Section 59-19-250 provides, in part, as follows: The school trustees of the several districts may sell or lease school property, real or personal, in their school district whenever they deem it expedient to do so and apply the proceeds of any sue~ sale or lease to the school fund of the district. The consent of the county board of education ~ in those counties which do not have a county board of education, the governing body of the county, shall be first obtained by the trustees desiring to make any such sale or lease ••.. (emphasis added)

~F~~ • POST OFFICE Box 11549 • C OLUMBIA, s.c. 29211- 1549 • TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970 •

F ACSIMILE: 803- 253-6::!83

J. Mark Hayes, Esquire
December 15, 1996
Page 2
None of the powers of the County Board enumerated in Act 189 relate to the sale of district property. Because all other powers are devolved upon or allocated among the districts, the approval of the County Board under 559-19-250 is no longer necessary under a plain reading of these statutes. 1 Given that the school districts "have total fiscal autonomy" under Act 189, the legislature also appears to have intended to exempt the sc.h ool districts from obtaining the approval of the county council under §59-19-250. 2 This letter· is an informal opinion. It has been written by the designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the opinion of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally reviewed by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. I hope that this information is of assistance to you. Yours. very truly,
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Assistant Deputy Attorney General

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The " ..• primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature .... " Where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation, and we must apply them according to their literal meaning. South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation v. Dickinson, 288 s.c. 134, 341 S.E. 2d 134 (1986). 2

"General and specific statues should be read together and harmonized if possible. But to the extent of any confltct between the two, the special statute must prevail. " Criterion Insurance Co. v. Hoffman, 258 s.c. 282, 188 S.E. 2d 459 (1972); Ops. Atty.
·Gen. ( 7-12-85) .