Could a South Carolina sheriff charge a school district for drug-sniffing dog services?

Short answer The 2000 AG said a sheriff with the resources to provide the service had to do so without a fee because no statute authorized charging for it. It treated the proposed contract-bidding question as moot once the sheriff could not charge.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
2000-august-7-2000-1
Issued
August 7, 2000
Issued by
Office of the South Carolina Attorney General
Requested by
The Honorable Glenn G. Reese, Senator, District No. 11

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 2000. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

A senator asked whether a sheriff could bid against a private security company for a school district's drug-detection dog contract and whether the sheriff could charge for the service. The 2000 informal opinion addressed the fee question first. It said public officer fees had to be expressly authorized and narrowly construed. The AG found no law allowing a sheriff to charge for supplying drug-sniffing dogs to a school district.

The letter therefore said a sheriff who had the resources to provide the service had to do so free of charge. It described the service as falling within general law-enforcement responsibilities, though no statute required sheriffs to use drug-detection dogs. Given the no-fee answer, it treated a paid bidding contest with the private contractor as moot rather than analyzing procurement rules.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could the sheriff set a fee for the dog service?
A: The AG said no. The fee statutes listed authorized sheriff charges, and the letter found no express charge for this service.

Q: Did the opinion order every sheriff to obtain drug-detection dogs?
A: No. It said no statute mandated the use of such dogs and framed the no-fee answer for a sheriff with resources to provide them.

Q: Did the AG decide whether the sheriff could win the private contract?
A: No. Once it concluded the sheriff could not charge, it said the bidding question was moot.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion read the general public-officer fee rule and the sheriff fee schedule narrowly. It distinguished an authorized statutory fee from compensation for an unlisted service and then applied that distinction to the school district's proposed arrangement.

Citations and references

  • § 8-21-10, limits on public officer fees; § 23-19-10, the sheriff fee schedule.

Official title

About a constituent who has a contract to provide the services of his drug-sniffing dogs with several school districts in the state.

Requester

The Honorable Glenn G. Reese, Senator, District No. 11

Source

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 7, 2000

The Honorable Glenn G. Reese
Senator, District No: 11
117 Sun Valley Drive
Boilll1g Springs, South Carolina 29316
Dear Senator Reese,
Thank you for your letter of April 27, 2000, requesting an opinion of this Office. You inquire about a constituent who has a contract to provide the services of his drug-sniffmg dogs with several school districts in the state. You write that a sheriff in one of the counties has now offered to provide the same service to the school district. Specifically you wish to know whether the sheriff can bid against the private security service for the contract. You also ask if the sheriff offering the service must do so free of charge. I will begin by addressing your second question first. Our Supreme Court has consistently recognized that costs and fees "are in the nature of penalties and the statutes granting them have always been strictly construed." State et al. v. Wild0r, 198 S.C. 390, 394, 18 S.E.2d 324 (1941). In other words, "statutes providing for fees are to be strictly constmed against allowing a fee by implication 'vith respect to both the fixing of the fee and the officer entitled thereto." 67 C.J.S. Officers, § 224. Goveming the fees and costs of public officers generally, South Carolina Code of Laws Section 8-21.-10 states, "The several officers named in ... Article 1 of Chapter 19 of Title 23, shall be entitled to receive and recover the fees and costs prescribed by this chapter... and Article 1 of Chapter 19 of Title 23, and none other, for the services herein enumerated." Moreover, § 8-21-30 of the Code requires that if a Sheriff "improperly" charges a fee, he may be liable for "ten times the amount so improperly charged .... " South Carolina Code§ 23-19-10 states the general schedule of fees that asheriWs office may charge for the performance of some of their duties. The statute begins: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by general law, the fees a.nd conm1issions of sheriffs are as follows" (emphasis added). The statute presents a detailed list of the circumstances in which the sheriff is allowed to charge a fee, including for the service of civil process, commission on monies collected, and for

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REMBERT C..DENNIS. BmLDING
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PoST Omce Box 11549

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CoU;~lBIA, S.C. 29211 -1549 • T'ELEl'llONE: 803-734-3970 • FACSJMD..E: 803-253-62.R~

The Honorable Glenn G. Reese
August 7, 2000
Page 2 of2
claim and delivery actions. The statute ends: "The provisions of this section do not apply to criminal processes or cases," which has been interpreted by this Office to a further restrict the sheriff from charging fees in criminal processes. See Op. Atty. Gen. Jan 27, 2000. Only a few additional statutes permit the sheriff to collect fees for other particular services, such as§ 12-59-110 (compensation for serving warrants and talcing possession of forfeited property), §15-17-540 (fee for summoning freeholders of property), and§ 38-57-260 (fee for levy on debtor's property). There appears to be no authorization granted to the sheriff to charge a foe for the use of drug-sniffing dogs. In fact, there is only little statutory authority directly addressing any use of animals by law enforcement officers. Thus, given the rule that fee statutes must be strictly construed against the charging of fees not expressly authorized, the specific prohibition in § 8-21-10 against the charging of fees not enumerated in the statutes, and the absence of any ~xpress authority to charge a fee for the provision of drug-sniffing dogs, it is the opinion of this Office that a sheriff who has the resources to provide such a service to a school district must do so free of charge. Furthermore, simply as a matter of public policy, the sheriff of a county cannot receive remuneration for the performance of a duty imposed on him by law. See Op. Atty. Gen. April 11, 1985. Although no statute mandates the sheriffs use of drug-sniffing dogs, the service certainly falls under his general law enforcement responsibilities.

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Finally, reaching the above conclusion renders your first question moot. A-sheriffwho cannot charge a fee to provide the services of his drug-sniffing dogs to schools should not be involved in any bid competition for a contract with a school district. This Jetter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I remain

Assistant Deputy Attorney General

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