Did Spartanburg’s local school districts inherit the county board’s tax-levy authority for joint district programs?

Plain-English summary

A lawyer asked whether seven Spartanburg County school districts received the county board’s authority to set separate tax levies for programs approved through multi-district agreements. A 1989 act had given that tax-levy power to the county board. A 1995 act kept only specified powers with the county board and transferred its other powers to the seven local boards.

The Assistant Deputy AG said the separate tax levy was not among the powers retained by the county board and was unrelated to the retained minimum-foundation-program money function. He therefore read the 1995 act as transferring the 1989 tax-levy power to the districts. The letter offered a short textual analysis and did not address a particular levy’s amount or approval. It was informal.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Which body did the opinion say could exercise the joint-program tax power? A: The local Spartanburg school districts, after the 1995 devolution of nonreserved county-board powers.

Q: Was the separate levy one of the powers the 1995 act retained for the county board? A: The author said no; it did not appear in the enumerated retained powers.

Q: Did the AG approve a specific tax rate? A: No. The letter addressed which boards held the authority, not a particular levy.

Background and statutory framework

The letter compared Act No. 299 of 1989, which authorized a county-board separate levy for approved multi-district programs, with Act No. 189 of 1995, which transferred the county board’s other powers to seven local boards. It cited South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation v. Dickinson in a footnote on applying clear statutory text.

Citations and references

Statutes discussed: Act No. 299 of 1989; Act No. 189 of 1995. Case cited: South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation v. Dickinson.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-5-1997/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/97aug5hayes.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 5, 1997

J. Mark Hayes, Esquire
Harrison and Hayes
P.O. Box 5367
Spartanburg, s.c. 29304
Dear Mark:
You have requested advice as to whether the Spartanburg County School Districts have been devolved the power to levy taxes to pay for multi-district agreements. Act No. 189, 1995 s.c. Acts 1561 provides in part, as follows: The Spartanburg County Board ... is empowered to (exercise the enumerated powers which relate to distribution of "minimum foundation program money" to the Spartanburg School Districts and to employ a secretary]. All other powers, if any, ~ formerly possessed by the County Board ... are devolved, and otherwise allocated, upon the seven boards of trustees of the local districts of Spartanburg County .... Also relating to your question is Act No. 299, 1989 s.c. Acts 1700 which states as follows:
... The
Spartanburg County Board of
Education
is
authorized to set separate tax levies to fund school-age educational programs where multi-district agreements are approved by local districts. Specifically, your question is whether the Act 299 powers have been devolved upon the District by Act 189. None of the enumerated powers of the County Board in Act 189 appear to include the matter at issue. The "separate tax levy" of Act 299 does not appear to relate to the "minimum foundation program money" of Act 189. See Act No. 186, 1963 s.c. Acts 218.

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLUMBIA. S.C. 29211-1549

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J. Mark Hayes, Esquire
August 5, 1997
Page 2
Therefore, a plain reading of these statutes 1 indicates that the taxing power of Act 299 has been devolved by Act 189 upon the school districts. This letter is an informal opinion. It has been written by the designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the opinion of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally reviewed by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. I hope that this information is of assistance to you.

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J. EJ5py Smith, Jr.

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The " ... primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature .... " Where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation, and we must apply them according to their literal meaning. South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation v. Dickinson, 288 s.c. 134, 341 S.E. 2d 134 (1986).