Did a South Carolina pardon prevent social services from considering the conduct behind a crime?

Plain-English summary

South Carolina's Department of Social Services asked whether a pardon barred it from considering the acts behind a crime when making licensing and employment decisions. The 2000 informal opinion said the office's earlier view remained in place: a pardon exempted a person from further punishment for the crime, but did not obliterate the underlying acts. The letter did not analyze a particular applicant or licensing standard.

The AG distinguished State v. Baucom, where the South Carolina Supreme Court barred use of a pardoned DUI conviction to enhance a later DUI sentence. The office read that holding narrowly as a sentencing consequence, not as a general erasure of the past conduct for DSS decisions. It noted a separate firearm case, Brunson v. Stewart, was on appeal and said its previous opinions had not yet been superseded.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the AG treat a pardon as erasing the acts underlying a crime?
A: No. It said a pardon stopped further punishment but did not obliterate those acts under its earlier opinions.

Q: What did the Supreme Court decide in the DUI case?
A: The opinion said Baucom barred using a pardoned DUI conviction to enhance a later sentence. The AG did not read it as a broad rule for DSS screening.

Q: Did the letter decide whether DSS should deny a specific license or job?
A: No. It addressed the effect of a pardon on what the agency could consider and did not evaluate an individual decision.

Background and statutory framework

The letter compared prior AG opinions on pardons with a recent Supreme Court sentencing ruling. It also disclosed that the office's narrower reading was being contested in a then-pending appeal. Its advice was given before that appeal was resolved.

Citations and references

• State v. Baucom, on enhancement of a sentence using a pardoned DUI conviction.
• Brunson v. Stewart, the pending appeal mentioned in the letter.

Official title

Asking whether the Department of Social Services “should treat a pardon as precluding this agency from considering the acts that constituted the crime when making licensing and employment decisions.”

Requester

Virginia Williamson, General Counsel, South Carolina Department of Social Services

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-3-2000-2/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/00aug3williamson.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 3, 2000

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Virginia Williamson, General Counsel
South Carolina Department of Social Services
P.O. Box 1520
Columbia, South Carolina 29202-1520
Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Ms. Williamson,
Thank you for your letter of June 6, 2000, requesting an opinion of this Office. You ask whether the Department of Social Services "should treat a pardon as precluding this agency from considering the acts that constituted the crime when making licensing and employment decisions." As you are aware, this Office has consistently opined that although a pardon exempts the individual from any further punishment the law imposes for the crime committed, it does not deem the acts constituting the crime to be obliterated, nor does it wash away their moral stain. See Op. _ Atty. Gen. Apr. 23, 1996; Op. Atty. Gen. 88-8 (Jan. 25, 1988); Op. Atty. Gen. No. 80-68 (June 12, 1980). The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently addressed the issue of a pardon's effect on an enhanced sentencing statute for DUI convictions. See State v. Baucom, 2000 WL 576196, Slip. Op. 25118 (May 8, 2000). The Court ruled that Baucom' s prior pardoned DUI conviction could not be considered in his sentencing for his present conviction because sentence enhancement is a "forbidden collateral legal consequence ofa pardoned conviction." Id. However, this Office recently argued that Baucom should not be extended beyond the sentencing enhancement statute. See Brunson v. Stewart, No.98-CP-40-616 (March 13, 200) appeal filed April 7, 2000 (concerning the possession of a firearm by a person with a prior pardoned conviction of a violent crime). Please be advised that Brunson is currently on appeal. Notwithstanding the decision of the lower court, until further ruling, this Office continues to construe the Court's holding in Baucom narrowly and advises that previous opinions of this Office on the effect of a pardon have not been superceded. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General not officially

PosT OFFICE Box 11549

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COLUMBIA. S.C 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE: 803, 734-3970

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F.-\CSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Virginia Williamson, General Counsel
August 3, 2000
Page 2 of2

published in the manner of a formal opinion.
With kind regards, I remain
Very truly yours,

6-r

Ro6ert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General

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