Would cutting a sheriff’s or other listed county officer’s operating budget reduce state aid to the county?

Plain-English summary

The South Carolina Sheriffs’ Association asked whether a county council’s reduction in the operational budget of specified elected officials required a corresponding reduction in the county’s state-aid distribution. The Assistant Deputy AG quoted Section 8-15-65. It provided state-funded salary supplements for clerks of court, probate judges, sheriffs, registers of mesne conveyances, auditors, and treasurers, and called for a corresponding state-aid reduction when a county reduced their compensation or any other office expenditure.

The author treated the word “any” as comprehensive. He concluded that every reduction in spending for those offices triggered a corresponding cut in money otherwise due the county under the State Aid to Subdivisions Act. He said the AG’s office could not insert an exception into clear statutory language; only the legislature could change it. The letter supplied no calculation method or outcome for a particular county budget.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Was the rule limited to salary cuts?
A: No. The opinion also covered any other reduction in operational expenditures for the listed offices.

Q: Which offices were listed?
A: The statute named clerks of court, probate judges, sheriffs, registers of mesne conveyances, auditors, and treasurers.

Q: Could the AG create an exception for a small budget cut? A: The author said no. He read “any” to include every cut and said only legislation could change the rule.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion interpreted Section 8-15-65(A) and (B) by their plain words and connected the required offset to distributions under Chapter 27 of Title 6. It cited Paschal v. State Election Commission on unambiguous text and Pursley v. Inman on the breadth of “any.”

Citations and references

Statutes discussed: Section 8-15-65(A) and (B); Chapter 27 of Title 6. Cases cited: Paschal v. State Election Commission; Pursley v. Inman.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-27-1997/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/97aug27moore.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY C ONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 27, 1997

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Jeffrey B. Moore, Executive Director
South Carolina Sheriffs' Association
P.O. Box 21428
Columbia, South Carolina 29221-1428
Dear Mr. Moore:
Attorney General Condon has forwarded your opinion request to me for reply. You ask whether "section 8-15-65 of the Code, require[s] a 'corresponding reduction' in the county's appropriations by the state, pursuant to Chapter 27 of Title 6, State Aid to Subdivisions, if a reduction is made in the operational budgets of the specified elected officials by a county council?"

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1.

Section 8-15-65 of the Code provides in pertinent part as follows: (A) The General Assembly shall appropriate annually salary supplements for the following county officers: ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ( 6)

clerks of court;
probate judges;
sheriffs;
registers of mesne conveyances;
auditors;
treasurers.

(B)
The amounts appropriated for salary supplements pursuant to subsection (A) must include both salary and related employer contributions and are in addition to amounts provided as compensation for these officials by counties. To the extent that compensation for these officers is reduced
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POST OFFICE Box 11 549

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COLUMB IA. S.C 292 11 -1549

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T ELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

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FACS IMILE: 803-253-6283

Mr. Moore
Page 2
August 27, 1997

by a county or there is any other reduction of expenditures in the operations
of their offices, a corresponding reduction must be made in the distribution
otherwise due the county pursuant to Chapter 27 of Title 6, the State Aid
to Subdivisions Act. (emphasis added).

If a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite
meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of statutory interpretation and a court
has no right to look for or impose another meaning. Paschal v. State Election
Commission, 317 S.C. 434, 454 S.E.2d 890 (1995). Where the terms of the statute are
clear, the court must apply those terms according to their literal meaning. Id. A court
cannot construe a statute without regard to its plain and ordinary meaning, and may not
resort to subtle or forced construction in an attempt to limit or expand a statute's scope.
Id. As a general rule, the word "any" is a word of comprehensive meaning and is
frequently used in the sense of "all" or "every." Pursley v. Inman, 215 S.C. 243, 54
S.E.2d 800 (1949).

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The relevant portion of Section 8-15-65(B) reads as follows: "[T]o the extent that
compensation for these officers is reduced by a county or there is any other reductions of
expenditures in the operations of their offices, a corresponding reduction must be made
in the distribution otherwise due the county pursuant to Chapter 27 of Title 6, the State
Aid to Subdivisions Act." (emphasis added). The terms of the statute are clear and
unambiguous and must be applied according to their literal meaning. The literal meaning
of the statute is that if there is any reduction whatsoever of expenditures in the operations
of the offices listed in subsection (A), there must also be a corresponding reduction in the
distribution due the county pursuant to the State Aid to Subdivisions Act. The use of the
comprehensive word "any" demonstrates that the corresponding reduction in the money
distributed to the county pursuant to the State Aid to Subdivisions Act is to occur in
response to "all" or "every" reduction of expenditures in the operations of the listed
offices. If the General Assembly had intended a meaning other than what is expressly
stated in the statute, it should have done so.
Only the General Assembly, through the legislative process, can change the statute
as written to provide a meaning other than what is plainly stated here. An opinion of this
Office cannot ascribe or grasp for a different meaning to the statute beyond the present
literal language of the law. We must presume, however, that where a statute is so clearly
worded, the General Assembly intended a result consistent with the words it used.

Mr. Moore
Page 3
August 27, 1997

Accordingly, it is this Office's opinion that if there is any reduction whatsoever in the
funding of the offices listed in Section 8-15-65(A), there must be a corresponding
reduction in the distribution due the county pursuant to the State Aid to Subdivisions Act.
Very truly yours,

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

eb C. Williams, III
eputy Attorney General