Did being a veterinarian automatically exempt someone from South Carolina animal-cruelty prosecution?

Short answer No. The Attorney General read the statutory exception for “the practice of veterinary medicine” as referring to acceptable or ordinarily recognized veterinary practice, and said it did not exempt veterinarians from prosecution over alleged intentional abuse or mistreatment.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
2009-august-26-2009
Issued
August 26, 2009
Issued by
Office of the South Carolina Attorney General
Requested by
Tiffany B. Raines, Staff Attorney, South Carolina Court Administration

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 2009. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

In 2009, the South Carolina Attorney General clarified a prior opinion about the animal-cruelty statute’s exception for “the practice of veterinary medicine.” It said that phrase referred to acceptable or ordinarily recognized standards of veterinary practice. The exception did not automatically protect a veterinarian from prosecution after allegations of intentional abuse or mistreatment of an animal.

The question arose after a magistrate had reportedly dismissed a charge against a veterinarian. Court Administration had replied to a request that magistrates be told veterinarians were not immune merely because of their occupation, and its letter suggested the 2008 opinion supported the dismissal. The office said it had quoted the statutory exception in 2008 but had not defined the scope of veterinary practice then. This 2009 letter addressed that distinction; it did not decide the facts of the earlier charge.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2009. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the law exempt every act by a licensed veterinarian? A: No. The Attorney General said the veterinary exception did not prevent prosecution based solely on a person’s occupation when intentional abuse or mistreatment was alleged.

Q: What did the AG say “practice of veterinary medicine” meant? A: It read the phrase as referring to acceptable or ordinarily recognized standards of veterinary practice.

Q: Did the opinion decide whether the veterinarian in the earlier case was guilty? A: No. It addressed the meaning of the statutory exception and did not determine facts or guilt in that case.

Q: Why was the 2008 opinion being clarified?
A: Its discussion of subsection (C)’s exclusions had raised a concern that the veterinary exception might be read as blanket immunity from animal-cruelty prosecution.

Background and statutory framework

Section 47-1-40 imposed penalties for specified forms of animal cruelty, while subsection (C) excluded fowl and various accepted agricultural, veterinary, forestry, and wildlife practices. The Attorney General’s 2008 opinion had discussed the agricultural exception and the rearing of livestock. Its broad statement that penalties were inapplicable to listed practices prompted questions about whether any act by a veterinarian was exempt.

The 2009 letter explained that the earlier opinion did not define “the practice of veterinary medicine.” The office declined to read a detailed new standard into the statute but said the phrase must refer to acceptable or ordinarily recognized veterinary practice, leaving alleged intentional abuse or mistreatment outside an automatic occupational exemption.

Citations and references

Statute discussed: Section 47-1-40 of the South Carolina Code, especially subsection (C)’s exceptions. The 2009 letter quotes both the penalty provisions and the exceptions.

Source

Original opinion text

August 26, 2009

Tiffany B. Raines, Staff Attorney

«

South Carolina Court Administration

1015 Sumter Street, Suite 200
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Dear Ms. Raines:

As I indicated in our telephone conversation on Tuesday, this office has received inquiries as to a prior opinion ofthis office dated August 28,2008 regarding S.C. Code Ann.§47-1-40 which states;

(A)Whoever knowingly or intentionally overloads,overdrives,overworks,ill-treats any animal, deprives any animal of necessary sustenance or shelter, inflicts unnecessary pain or suffering upon any animal, or by omission or commission knowingly or intentionally causes these things to be done,for every offense is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be punished by imprisonment not exceeding sixty days or by a fine ofnot less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or both, for a first offense; by imprisomnent not exceeding ninety days or by a fine not exceeding eight hundred dollars, or both, for a second offense; or by imprisonment not exceeding two years or by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, or both, for a third or subsequent offense. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a first offense under this subsection shall be tried in magistrate's or municipal court.

(B) Whoever tortures, torments, needlessly mutilates, cruelly kills, or inflicts excessive or repeated unnecessary pain or suffering upon any animal or by omission or commission causes the acts to be done for any ofthe offenses is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be punished by imprisonment of not less than one hundred eighty days and not to exceed five years and by a fme of five thousand dollars.

(C)This section does not applv to fowl,accepted animal husbandry practices offarm operations and the training of animals, the practice of veterinarv medicine. Rembert C.Dennis Building • Post Office Box 11549 • Columbia.SC 29211-1549 • Telephone 803-734-3970 • Facsimile 803-253-6283

Ms. Raines
Page 2

August 26, 2009

agricultural practices, forestry and silvacultural practices, wildlife management practices, or activity authorized by Title 50, including an activity authorized by the South Carolina Department ofNatural Resources or an exercise designed for training dogs for hunting, if repeated contact with a dog or dogs and another animal does not occur during this training exercise, (emphasis added). The question raised in the opinion was whether agricultural pursuits and activities involving fowl,

accepted animal husbandry practices of farm operations and the training of animals, the practice of

veterinary medicine, agricultural practices, forestry and silvacultural practices, wildlife management practices, or activity authorized by Title 50 are exempted from prosecution under Section 47-1-40 by the language set forth in subsection (C). The opinion commented that Section 47-1-40 provides for a criminal penalty for the violation of its provisions. However, subsection (C) explicitly provides that the criminal penalties are

inapplicable to ". . .fowl, accepted animal husbandry practices of farm operations and the training of animals, the practice of veterinary medicine, agricultural practices,

forestry and silvacultural practices, wildlife management practices, or activity authorized by Title 50. . . ." Therefore, the penalty provisions are inapplicable to such practices. See: Op. Atty. Gen. dated March 15, 1993.'

'The question was also specifically raised as to whether the rearing oflivestock and ranching businesses which would include but not be limited to cattle, sheep, horses, goats, dairying, hogs, and other similar agricultural pursuits would be included in the term "agricultural practices" as set forth in subsection (C) of Section 47-1-40? The opinion stated that:

In considering your question, it should be noted that also exempted are "accepted animal husbandry practices of farm operations". However, neither that term or the term "agricultural practices" is separately defined in the Code.

The Oregon Court of Appeals in Eugene Sand & Gravel v. Lane County. 74 P.3d

1085 at 1091(2003) noted the definition of the term "accepted farm practice" as set forth in the Oregon statutes as ". . .a mode of operation that is common to farms of a similar nature, necessary for the operation of such farms to obtain a profit in money, and customarily utilized in conjunction with farm use." The term "farm use" was defined as
...the current employment of land for the primary purpose of obtaining a profit in money by raising, harvesting and selling crops or the feeding, breeding, management and sale of, or the produce of, livestock, poultry, fur-bearing animals or honeybees or for dairying and the sale ofdairy products or any other agricultural or horticultural

(continued...)

Ms. Raines
Page 3
August 26, 2009

Reference has been made to a letter from you dated June 23, 2009 which was in response to a request that magistrates be advised that "veterinarians and veterinarian technicians are not immune

from prosecution under... (Section 47-l-40)...strictly by color of their chosen occupation." Apparently, the controversy arises from a case in which a magistrate in 2000 dismissed a charge against a veterinarian which presumably arose from an allegation ofmistreatment ofan animal. You stated in your letter A 2008 Attorney General opinion issued upon a request to define "agricultural practices" seems to indicate that criminal prosecutions are inapplicable to such

practices, and therefore exempt from the prohibitions of Section 47-l-40...The 2008 Opinion seems to support the interpretation of the magistrate who dismissed the

charges at the preliminary hearing. Certainly a plain reading of the statute supports his decision as well. As 1 indicated in our telephone conversation, the 2008 opinion of this office simply quoted the provisions of Section 47-1-40 which provides that criminal penalties are inapplicable to "the practice of veterinary medicine." While the opinion did not go further and attempt to define what is considered "the practice of veterinary medicine", and while this office cannot read specifically

defined standards into a statute as such remains within the discretion ofthe legislature, certainly such phrase must be read to mean what is considered "acceptable" or "ordinarily recognized" standards of veterinary practice. As a result, this office would conclude that the exception from criminal

(...continued)
use or animal husbandry or any combination thereof.

In an opinion dated January 17, 1991, the Vermont Attorney General defined the term "agricultural practice" as "...an activity pertaining to agriculture." The term "agriculture" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, rev'd 4th Ed. as "[t]he art or

science of cultivating the ground, including the harvesting of crops, and in a broad sense, the science or art ofproduction ofplants and animals useful to man, including in a variable degree, the preparation of these products for man's use." The term "agricultural" is defined by that same source as "pertaining to, or dealing with, agriculture; also, characterized by or engaged in farming as the leading pursuit." Consistent with the above, in the opinion of this office, the rearing of livestock and ranching businesses which would include but not be limited to cattle, sheep, horses, goats, dairying, hogs, and other similar agricultural pursuits would be included in the term "agricultural practices" as set forth in subsection (C) of Section 47-1-40.

Therefore, such practices would be exempt from the prohibitions of Section 47-1-40.

Ms. Raines
Page 4
August 26, 2009

penalties for "the practice of veterinary medicine" would not exempt veterinarians from criminal

prosecutions following allegations of intentional abuse or mistreatment of an animal. If there are any questions, please contact me. Very truly yours,

Henry McMaster
Attorney General

v>

By:

Charles H. Richardson

Senior Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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Robert D. Cook
Deputy Attorney General

cc:

The Honorable Larry Grooms
The Honorable Daniel B. Verdin, III

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