Which South Carolina court could try driving-under-suspension cases after the 2000 amendment?

Plain-English summary

South Carolina Court Administration asked how a 2000 amendment affected trials for driving under suspension. The new text said covered offenses must be tried “exclusively in magistrate's court.” The 2000 informal opinion read that provision together with the separate statute giving municipal courts the criminal jurisdiction conferred on magistrates. It concluded that municipal courts could hear these cases too, while solicitors should not prosecute them in the court of general sessions.

The AG also said a grand-jury indictment was unnecessary for cases within magistrate jurisdiction. The state constitution's indictment rule exempted crimes under magistrate jurisdiction, and the amendment put the covered driving-under-suspension cases there. The letter addressed jurisdiction and indictment procedure, not the facts or merits of any charge.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did “exclusively in magistrate's court” bar a municipal court trial?
A: The AG said no. It read the amendment with the statute giving municipal courts jurisdiction over state-law crimes assigned to magistrates.

Q: Could a solicitor try the covered charge in general sessions?
A: The opinion advised against that. It said the word “exclusively” still had to limit jurisdictions that otherwise might hear the case.

Q: Did these cases need a grand-jury indictment?
A: The AG said no for the cases placed within magistrate jurisdiction by the amendment, citing the constitution's exception for crimes in that jurisdiction.

Background and statutory framework

The letter interpreted Section 56-1-460, as amended by Act No. 376, alongside Section 14-25-45 on municipal court powers. It used the principle of reading related laws together rather than giving “exclusively” a reading that would silently remove the municipal court's parallel authority.

Citations and references

• Section 56-1-460, the driving-under-suspension amendment; Section 14-25-45, municipal court criminal jurisdiction.
• Fishburne v. Fishburne, on reading related statutes together.

Official title

Concerning the recently amended South Carolina Code of Laws Section 56-1-460, which grants authority to magistrates to dispose of driving under suspension cases.

Requester

Robert L. McCurdy, Staff Attorney, South Carolina Court Administration

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-25-2000/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/00aug25mccurdy.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 25, 2000
iI

fi. ..

Robert L. McCurdy, Staff Attorney
South Carolina Court Administration
1015 Sumter Street, Suite 200
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

RE: Informal Opinion
Dear Mr. McCurdy,
By your letter of August 10, 2000, you have requested an opinion of the Attorney General's Office concerning the recently amended South Carolina Code of Laws Section 56-1-460, which grants authority to magistrates to dispose of driving under suspension [DUS] cases. The amended version of South Carolina Code Section 56-1-460 (Act No. 376) states, in part: Except as provided in subitem (2), a person who drives a motor vehicle on any public highway of this State when his license to drive is canceled, suspended, or revoked must, upon conviction, be punished as follows:
.
(a) for a first offense, fined two hundred dollars or imprisoned for thirty days, or both (b) for a second offense, fined five hundred dollars or imprisoned for sixty consecutive days, or both; and (c) for a third and subsequent offense, imprisoned for not less than ninety days nor m9re than six months, no portion of which may be suspended by the trial judge. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 22-3-540, 22-3-545, and 22-3-550, an offense punishable under this subitem must be tried exclusively in magistrate's court. (Emphasis added). Specifically you are concerned with the emphasized language above. You have several questions, each of which I will answer in turn. 1) Would this Code section grant municipal courts the authority, as conferred upon magistrates by Act No. 376, to dispose of the driving under suspension cases?

t>

REMBERT•(. D~Nr~UILDING

•

-~fY~.

POST OFFICE Box 11549

•

COLUMBIA,

s.c. 29211-1549

•

TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

•

FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Robert McCurdy
August 25, 2000
Page 2of3

L
I

Although a literal interpretation of the terms "tried exclusively" might be read to allow only magistrates' courts to try the cases, this Office has opined consistently that a municipal court has concurrent jurisdiction with a magistrate's court. See Op. Atty. Gen. Sept. 29, 1999; Op. Atty. Gen. Aug. 19, 1998. All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law, and so the meaning and effect of one statute must be determined with reference to that of other statutes in pari materia so as to construe them together into one integrated system of law. Fishburne v. Fishburne, 171 S.C. 408, 172 S.E. 426 (1932). South Carolina Code Section 14-25-45 states that the municipal courts "shall also have all such powers, duties, and jurisdiction in criminal cases made under state law and conferred upon magistrates." We are in agreement with your Office that the General Assembly intended Section 56-1-460 to be read in pari materia with Section 14-25-45 and thus conferred upon municipal courts the authority to hear DUS cases. 2) Can solicitors prosecute these cases in the court of general sessions?

I

As we have noted in the first question above, "tried exclusively" probably should not be interpreted to exclude municipal courts as well, given the grant of concurrent authority in Section 14-25-45. However, the language cannot be devoid of all meaning, and the General Assembly must have intended to limit jurisdictions that might otherwise hear the cases. The context of the statute must be examined as part of the process of determining the intent of the General Assembly. Hancock v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 211 S.C. 432, 45 S.E.2d 850 (1948). Because Section 56-1-460 says "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 22-3-540, 22-3-545, 22-3-550," which grant exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction to magistrates and authorize the transfer of cases from general sessions court, the General Assembly appears to contemplate the court of general sessions in the amendment to the statute. We advise, therefore, that solicitors should not prosecute these cases in the court of general sessions.

I

3) Would the DUS cases, which would have been disposed of in general sessions but will now be heard in magistrate's court, need to be indicted? We are also in agreement with your conclusion. The South Carolina Constitution Article I, Section 11 states "no person may be held to answer for any crime the jurisdiction over which is not within the magistrate's court, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury .... " Because the Constitutional provision exempts crimes within magistrate court jurisdiction and because Section 56-1-460 restricts jurisdiction exclusively to magistrates' courts, subject to question 1 above, the DUS cases now heard in magistrates' courts need not be indicted. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion.

Robert McCurdy
August 25, 2000
Page 3of3

With kind regards, I remain
f

I

L

I

I
I

'\

~

Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General