Could a judgment creditor seize South Carolina county vehicles or equipment used for public purposes?

Plain-English summary

A Greenville County sheriff asked whether the statutory exemption from attachment for county property covered personal property as well as land and buildings. The 2000 informal opinion answered yes. § 4-17-30 listed public facilities and then exempted “all other public property of every kind or description actually used as such” from attachment, levy and sale on a judgment, lien or claim against the county.

The AG found no South Carolina case directly resolving the real-versus-personal property question. It read the broad wording to include county vehicles and equipment actually used for public purposes, reasoning that the statute protected property available for the public's benefit. Its answer was tied to the statute's public-use condition, not an assertion that every county-owned asset was exempt regardless of use.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Was the exemption limited to county land and buildings?
A: The AG said no. It read “property of every kind or description” to include personal property such as vehicles and equipment.

Q: Did county ownership alone make an item exempt?
A: The opinion emphasized the statutory phrase “actually used as such,” referring to property used for a public purpose. It did not analyze an asset outside that condition.

Q: What collection steps did the statute address?
A: The cited provision exempted covered public property from attachment, levy and sale on a judgment, lien or claim against the county.

Background and statutory framework

The letter applied ordinary statutory-meaning principles to the inclusive language of § 4-17-30. It found no textual exception for personal property and read the exemption as protecting county property already available and used for the public's benefit.

Citations and references

• § 4-17-30, the county public-property exemption from attachment, levy and sale.

Official title

On county property to satisfy a judgment, specifically regarding South Carolina Code of Laws § 4-17-30 exempts from attachment both personal and real property of the county.

Requester

The Honorable Johnny Mack Brown, Sheriff, Greenville County

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-22-2000/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/00aug22brown.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

August 22, 2000

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The Honorable Johnny Mack Brown
Sheriff, Greenville County
4 McGee Street
Greenville, South Carolina 29601

RE: Informal Opinion
Dear Sheriff Brovm:
By your letter ofJune 2. 2000. you have requested an opinion of this Office on the attachment of county property to satisfy a judgment. Specifically you ask if South Carolina Code of Laws Section -J.-17-30 exempts from attachment both personal and real property of the county. S.C. Code§ 4-17-30 states: All county poor farms and poorhouses and hospitals. courthouses and jails and all other public property of every: kind or description actually used as such are forever exempt from attachment. levy and sale on account of any judgment. lien or claim vvhatsoever against the county to which they or any of them belong. (Emphasis added)

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There appears to be no South Carolina case law addressing whether this statute applies to real property only or to both real ::md personal property. such as vehicles and equipment. fn the :.ibscnce of direct authority. we are required to formulate our opinion on the basis of time honored rules of statutory construction. A number of principles of statutory interpretation are relevant to your inquiry. First and foremost. is the long-recognized tenet that in interpreting a statute. the primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. -J.6. 358 S.E.2d 697 ( 1987). The statute's vvords must be given their plain and ordinary meaning \Vithout resort to subtle or fr1rced construction either to limit or expand the statute's operation. State v. Blackmon. 30-.J. S.C. 270. -J.03 S. E.2d 660 (I 991 ). Moreover. it \Vil! be presumed that the General Assembly did not intend to do a futile thing. Gaffnev v. Mallorv. 186 S.C. 33 7. I 95 S.E. 8-.J.O ( 1938 ). and thus. where terms 0L1 statute are positive and unambiguous. exceptions not made by the

Sheriff Johnny Mack Bro\vn
August 22. ::WOO
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Legislature cannot be read in by implication. Vernon v. Harlevsville Mut. Cas. Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841 \ 1964 ). A revie\v of§ 4-17-30 reveals no specific exception for personal property to the grant of exemption for county property. The statute expressly states .. all other public property of every kind or description ... Use of the widely inclusive ·'all other'' coupled with the further expanding "of every kind or description'' suggests that the statute should be construed broadly. The intent of the statute appears to be to protect county property already available and used for the benefit of the public from judgment creditors. An allowance for creditors to take personal property such as vehicles and equipment is simply not permitted by the language of the statute. In light of the foregoing. this Office advises that the exemption in § 4-17-30 includes both personal and real property of the county. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, hovvever. been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards. I remain

Assistant Deputy Attorney General

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