How did South Carolina’s 2015 law count the tax-sale redemption period?

Plain-English summary

Mr. Caldwell questioned an earlier Attorney General opinion on how to count the twelve-month redemption period after a South Carolina delinquent tax sale. The AG reaffirmed its earlier calculation: exclude the date of sale itself, include the final day, and extend the final day if it falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or state or federal holiday. The opinion used an earlier sale on October 6, 2003 to illustrate its view that redemption on October 7, 2004 was at least on the last available day under the statute as then interpreted.

The AG traced the same method through its 1967, 1990, and 2004 opinions and cited general time-computation principles. It also reasoned that tax-sale redemption laws were remedial and should be read liberally in favor of redemption. The letter rejected the proposed calculation that would have ended the example period on October 6, 2004. This is a historical interpretation of the 2015 law, not a present-day deadline calculator.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2015. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Was the sale date counted as the first day?
A: The 2015 AG said no; that day was excluded from the computation.

Q: Was the final day included?
A: Yes. The AG reaffirmed inclusion of the final day of the twelve-month period.

Q: What if the final day fell on a weekend or holiday?
A: The AG said the period continued until the end of the next day that was neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor state or federal holiday.

Q: Did the AG reverse its 2004 opinion?
A: No. It expressly stood by the earlier reading.

Background and statutory framework

The 2015 opinion interpreted S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-90 (2014) and responded to a competing month-by-month count. It emphasized a longstanding South Carolina method of excluding the event day and including the terminal day. The AG also linked that reading to the remedial purpose of redemption rights.

Citations and references

• The AG said the calculation “excludes the first day of the period and includes the last.”
• It wrote that the final day should be included unless it was “a Saturday, Sunday or a State or Federal holiday.”

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-21-2015/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/00732743.pdf

Original opinion text

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Alan Wilson
attorney General

August 21, 2015
Mr. William B. Caldwell
3781 Boston Theta Road
Columbia, IN 38401
Dear Mr. Caldwell:
1 am writing in response to your letter dated August 6, 2015, in which you question this

Office's interpretation of how to compute the amount of time a defaulting taxpayer has to redeem property subsequent to a tax sale.

S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-90 (2014), the applicable

provision to our analysis, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[t]he defaulting taxpayer, any grantee from the owner, or any mortgage or judgment creditor may within twelve months from the date of the delinquent tax

sale redeem each item of real estate by paying to the person officially charged

with the collection of delinquent taxes, assessments, penalties, and costs, together with interest as provided in subsection (B) of this section. (emphasis added). Your letter specifically finds fault with an opinion dated December 17, 2004. See Op. S.C. Att'v Gen.. 2004 WL 3058233 (Dec. 1 7, 2004). In that opinion, we concluded that the phrase "within twelve months from the date of the delinquent tax sale" required exclusion of

the date of the tax sale and inclusion of the last dale in the twelve month period. Thus, in regards to the taxpayer's property sold on October 6, 2003 that was the subject of that opinion, we opined that "the first day of the twelve month period - October 6, 2003 - would not be counted and the twelve month period would begin on October 7, 2003. Thus, at the very least, the property was redeemed on the last day available under the statutory period - October 7, 2004." Id. at *2.

Upon review of prior opinions of this Office, applicable case law, and the rules of

statutory construction, it remains our opinion that the proper manner in which to compute a taxpayer's time for redemption pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-90 (2014) excludes the first day of the period and includes the last.

It is the policy of this office that we will not overrule a prior opinion unless it is clearly erroneous or unless there has been a change to the law applied. See, e.g.. 2013 WL 6516330 (Nov. 25, 2013). While you mention our 2004 opinion, and the 1990 opinion on which it relies, opinions on this subject written by our Office dale back as far as 1967. See Op. S.C. Att'v Gen.. 2004 WL 3058233 (Dec. 17, 2004); Op. S.C. Atfv Gen.. 1990 WL 599365 (Nov. 30, 1990); Op. S.C. Att'v Gen.. 1967 WL 8619 (Aug. 25, 1967). Consistent with the conclusions reached in our 2004 and 1990 opinions, our 1967 opinion also provides that computation of a taxpayer's time to redeem property subsequent to a tax sale should be exclusive of the date of the sale and inclusive of the final date in the computation period. Op. S.C. Att'v Gen.. 1967 WL 8619 (Aug. 25, 1967). In reaching this conclusion, we provided that: REWBERTC. DENNIS BUILDING

• POST OFFICE BOX 1 1 549

. COLUMBIA. SC 292 1 1-1549

.

TELEPHONE 803-734-3970

.

FACSIMILE 803-253-6283

Mr. William B. Caldwell
Page 2

August 21, 2015

[t]he general rule, in computing a period of time, that either the day on which the

period begins or the day on which it expires must be included and the other excluded, and that it is improper to include or exclude both, applies in computing the redemption period and determining the time in which such period expires. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Further, we cited former Section 10-2 of the South Carolina

Code, providing that in South Carolina, "[t]he time within which an act is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. . . ." Id. at *1.

We also referenced

authority stating that "where the statute provides that the owner shall have a certain length of

time after the sale in which to redeem, this period begins to run from the day of the sale" but that

"fractions of days are not recognized in the computation of time in this section." Id. (citing 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 852 (emphasis added); Williams v. Halford. 64 S.C. 369, 42 S.E. 187 (1902)). Accordingly, we reached the conclusion that, for property sold at a tax sale on October 3, 1966, "October 4, 1967, [was] the last day in which the owner, any grantee from the owner or any

mortgage or judgment creditor may redeem property sold at a tax sale. ..." Id

Our 1967

reiterates the longstanding opinion of this Office that computation for redemption of property subsequent to a tax sale is computed by excluding the first day and including the last day of the computation period. This calculation method has been widely adopted and applied when interpreting statutes necessitating a calculation of time within our State. An opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court issued in 1875 and written by Chief Justice Moses, provided that:

Without citing the various cases which have induced the Courts to change the rule

including the day of an act done, or an event happening, it may be enough to say, in the language of Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in Sheets vs. Selden, 2 Wallace, 190:

The general current of modem authorities on the interpretation of

contracts, and also of statutes, where time is to be computed from a particular day or a particular event, where an act is to be performed within a specified period from or after a day named, is to exclude the day thus designated and to include the last day of the specified period.

The illustration of Chief Justice Kenyon in Ex parte Fallon and wife (5 T. R., 287,) shows that any other rule would defeat the intention and diminish the time allowed for the performance of the act. He says: Suppose the direction of the Act had been to enroll the memorial

within one day after the granting of the annuity. Could it be pretended that that meant the same as if it were said that it should be done on the same day on which the act was done? If not, neither can it be constmed inclusively where a greater number of days is allowed.

Mr. William B. Caldwell
Page3

August 21, 2015

So here, if the first day is to be included, the Senate or the House charged with the presentation of the Bill to the Governor might, in fact, restrict him to two days by not causing it to be delivered to him until the hour of midnight.

Corwin v. Comptroller General. 6 S.C. 390, 401 (1875); see also State v. Piatt. 154 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 206, 209 (1930) (stating, in 1930, that "Following the usual rule of computation, we would exclude the first day and include the last"). This "usual rule of computation," documented as far back as 1875, undoubtedly remains

in effect today. See Rule 6(a), SCRCP (providing that "[i]n computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be

included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or a State or Federal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor such holiday. When the period of time prescribed or

allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall be excluded in the computation. A half holiday shall be considered as other days and not as a holiday"); see also Rule 3, SCRCRimP; Rules 3 and 52, SCRAdminLawCt; Rule 263 SCACR (all providing the same rule); S.C. Code Ann. § 11-35-310 (providing, within the definition of "days" in the

South Carolina Procurement Code, that "[i]n computing any period of time prescribed by this code or the ensuing regulations, or by any order of the Procurement Review Panel, the day of the

event from which the designated period of time begins to run is not included. If the final day of the designated period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday for the state or federal government, then the period shall run to the end of the next business day"). In addition to the longstanding application of this computation method within our State, it

is also our opinion that the rules of statutory construction specifically related to redemption statutes further promote the inclusion of the last day of the computation period in the calculation

method. Since statutes governing redemption from tax sales are regarded as remedial in nature and equitable in character, they are construed liberally in favor of the redemptioner and the right to redeem. 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1356 (2015). Liberal construction of redemption statutes is intended to accomplish statutory objectives, including affording property owners ample

opportunity to redeem, and to foster a return of land to the tax rolls of the state. Id. Furthermore, redemption statutes must be given reasonable construction, taken into account the long established policy in the state on such matters. Id.

You have asked us to accept your interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-90 (2014), providing as follows under the factual scenario presented in our 2004 opinion: I would certainly agree that the first day is excluded and if the purchase took place on October 6, 2003 then the first day of the statutory period pursuant to 12 51-90 began on October 7, 2003 and proceeded as follows:

1 51 Month

1 0/07/2003 *BEGAN
1 1/06/2003

Mr. William B. Caldwell
Page 4

August 2 1,2015

2nd Month

11/07/2003
12/06/2003

. . . [providing calculations in the same manner for months 3-11]

12th Month

09/07/2004
10/06/2004 *End - WITHIN 12 MONTHS PURSUANT TO 12

51-90.... up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day

of the next month
In light of the above analysis, we find your interpretation misplaced. We stand by the conclusions reached in the opinions of this Office from 1967, 1990, and 2004 that the final day of the computation period must be included in the calculation. This interpretation is supported by the rules of statutory construction and case law showing centuries of application of the computation of time in this manner as the usual rule of computation. As these opinions were based on sound reasoning and application of the aforementioned law, their conclusions, as you suggest, are not attributable to simple errors ofjudgment or a typo. It remains our belief that the date on which the tax sale takes place begins the period for which computation beings to run, however that particular day is not included in the computation. Accordingly, the last day in the period of computation should be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or a State or Federal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor such holiday.

We do appreciate you bringing this matter to our attention and hope we have clarified that problematic area of the law that has too frequently caused confusion.

Very truly yours,

Anne Marie Crosswell
Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook

Solicitor General