Would a council member’s assault conviction or earlier indictment require suspension or forfeiture of office?

Plain-English summary

The Attorney General said assault of a high and aggravated nature was not always a crime of moral turpitude; the answer depended on the facts of the council member's conviction, which the office did not determine. It said an earlier indictment for assault with intent to kill could support suspension by the Governor under the state constitution. If a court found the conviction involved moral turpitude, the council member would forfeit office under § 5-7-200 and the vacancy would be filled as provided by law.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2003. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Town officials

The office distinguished indictment from conviction. The constitution authorized gubernatorial suspension for an indictment involving moral turpitude, while the cited municipal statute addressed forfeiture after conviction.

Residents seeking a court ruling

The AG said it lacked the facts needed to classify this particular conviction. It identified an action under § 15-63-60, with circuit-court leave, as one way to resolve office forfeiture.

Common questions

Did the AG decide that this conviction was a moral-turpitude crime?
No. It said that classification depended on the facts.

Would refusal to resign preserve the seat after a qualifying conviction?
The opinion said a council member forfeited the office upon conviction if the offense was determined to involve moral turpitude.

Background and statutory framework

A town attorney asked about a council member who pleaded guilty to assault of a high and aggravated nature after an assault-with-intent-to-kill indictment. The office applied the municipal forfeiture statute and Article VI, Section 8 of the state constitution.

Citations and references

The opinion cited S.C. Code Ann. §§ 5-7-200 and 15-63-60; South Carolina Constitution Article VI, Section 8; In the Matter of J. Archie Lee; and State v. Spinks.

Official title

Regarding a town council member, Mr. Glenn Ross, who pled guilty to assault of a high and aggravated nature.

Requester

Brian M. Gibbons, Esquire, Great Falls Town Attorney

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-20-2003/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/03aug-20-Gibbons.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY MCMASTER
ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 20, 2003

Brian M. Gibbons, Esquire
Great Falls Town Attorney
Post Office Drawe1 808
Chester, South Carolina 29706-0808
Dear Mr. Gibbons:
In a letter to this office you raised questions regarding Mr. Glenn Ross, a town council member, who pled guilty to assault of a high and aggravated nature. Mr. Ross received a suspended sentence with probation. You indicated that Mr. Ross had been indicted for assault with intent to kill. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. Section 5-7-200(1977), a councilman shall forfeit his office ifconvicted of a crime of moral turpitude. In your first question you asked whether the offense of assault of a high and aggravated nature is a crime of moral turpitude. In its decision in In the Matter of J. Archie Lee, 313 S.C. 142, 143, 437 S.E.2d 85, 86 (1993), the state supreme court determined that while the offense of assault of a high and aggravated nature is not always a crime of moral turpitude, it " ... may be depending on the facts".

As to the situation regarding Mr. Ross, this office cannot make factual conclusions in an opinion. Moreover, this office is unaware of the factual circumstances surrounding Mr. Ross' conviction. However, one method of resolving the question as to whether the offense constitutes a crime of moral turpitude would be to bring an action pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. Section 15-63-60 (1977) which provides for actions governing the forfeiture of an office by any private party upon leave of the circuit court. You also asked whether the fact that Mr. Ross was indicted for assault with intent to kill
<lisqualifies him from serving as a council memht"T. A prior opinion cf t!lis office dated December 29, 1980 determined that the offense of assault with intent to kill is a crime of moral turpitude. See also: State v. Spinks, 260 S.C. 404, 196 S.E.2d 313 (1973). Pursuant to Article VI, Section 8 of the South Carolina Constitution,

1/'.J..o~~~BUil.DING. PosT0FFICEBoxll549. COWMBIA,S.C.29211-1549. TELEPHONE:803-734-3970. fACSIMILE:803-253-6283

Mr. Gibbons
Page2
August 20, 2003

(a)ny officer of the State or its political subdivisions, except members and officers of the Legislative and Judicial Branches, who has been indicted by a grand jury for a crime involving moral turpitude or who has waived such indictment if permitted by law may be suspended by the Governor, until he shall have been acquitted. In case of conviction the office shall be declared vacant and the vacancy filled as may be provided by law. Therefore, pursuant to such provision, suspension would have been in order for an indictment for assault with intent to kill. In your last question, referencing Section 5-7-200 and its provfaion for forfeiture of ari ollfoe upon conviction of a crime of moral turpitude, you asked what happens if Mr. Ross refuses to resign and who is authorized or required to take action against him to remove him from office. Assuming a court determines the offense is a crime of moral turpitude, pursuant to Section 5-7-200, a councilman forfeits his office upon conviction of a crime ofmoral turpitude. Consistent with Article VI, Section 8 of the Constitution, the office is vacant and the vacancy is to be filled as provided by law. Section 5-7-200(b) provides that any vacancy in a council office '' ... shall be filled for the remainder of the unexpired term at the next regular election or at a special election if the vacancy occurs one hundred eighty days or more prior to the next general election."

If there are any further questions, please advise.
Sincerely,

ci~li~
Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General

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