Could a South Carolina county auditor refuse a treasurer’s list of uncollected taxes?

Plain-English summary

Horry County's treasurer asked what happened when the county auditor refused a report of taxes the treasurer said could not be collected, including items ten years old or older. The Attorney General read Section 12-45-300 as assigning the auditor a mandatory task: accept the treasurer's delinquent list and act under the statute. The auditor had no discretion to reject the treasurer's duplicate in that process. The letter did not separately decide whether each listed tax was actually uncollectible.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2004. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could the auditor send the treasurer's delinquent-tax report back instead of accepting it?
A: The AG said the auditor had no discretion to refuse the duplicate provided by the treasurer and had to act on it under the statute.

Q: What was the auditor supposed to do with the delinquent list?
A: The quoted statute directed the auditor to take a list from the duplicate, note the treasurer's reasons why charges could not be collected, and record the sworn list in a book.

Q: Did the opinion decide that every tax on a ten-year-old list was uncollectible?
A: No. The AG answered the narrower question of the auditor's duty to accept and process the treasurer's list.

Background and statutory framework

Section 12-45-300 described how a treasurer's uncollected taxes, assessments and penalties were listed and recorded. The opinion emphasized the statute's word "shall" and earlier AG opinions treating that word as mandatory. Its conclusion concerned the auditor's role in the statutory process.

Citations

• Section 12-45-300
• State v. Martin
• Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
• Walton v. Walton
• State v. Blackmon
• Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-17-2004/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/04aug-17-Allen.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY MCMASTER
ATIDRNEY GENERAL

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August 17, 2004

The Honorable Johnny C. Allen
Horry County Treasurer
Post Office Box 123 7
Conway, South Carolina 29526
Dear Mr. Allen:
In a letter to this office you requested an opinion regarding S.C. Code Ann. Section 12-45300 (2000) which provides as follows:

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The auditor shall take from the duplicate previously provided to the treasurer for collection a list of all taxes, assessments, and penalties the treasurer has been unable to collect, describing the property as described on the duplicate, and shall note on it in a marginal column the reasons assigned by the treasurer why the taxes or other charges could not be collected. This list is the delinquent list and must be signed and sworn to by the treasurer before the auditor, who shall record it in a book to be provided for the purpose. In making this list, the delinquencies in each taxing entity must be stated separately. After deducting the amount of taxes, assessments, and penalties returned delinquent, the treasurer shall stand charged with the remainder of the taxes, assessments, and penalties charged on the duplicate. You referenced the situation where the Treasurer turns in an uncollectable tax or taxes ten years or older to the Auditor to remove from the receivable files. You indicated that you had delivered a report to your Auditor but received the report back with her refusal to approve it. When interpreting the meaning of a statute, certain basic p1inciples must be observed. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). Typically, legislative intent is determined by applying the words used by the General Assembly in their usual and ordinary significance. Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451 (1971). Resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting or expanding the operation of a statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). Courts must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991 ). Statutes should be given a reasonable and practical construction which

The Honorable Johnny C. Allen
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August 17, 2004

is consistent with the policy and purpose expressed therein. Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166 (1966). Based upon my reading of Section 12-45-300, the auditor's responsibilities with regard to the list provided by the treasurer are mandatory and without discretion on the auditor's part. As provided in the quote provision, "(t)he auditor shall take from the duplicate previously provided to the treasurer for collection a list of all taxes, assessments, and penalties the treasurer has been unable to collect". As referenced in prior opinions of this office dated October 4, 1994 and October 26, 1987, the word "shall" typically means mandatory and therefore, the action referred to is mandatory. In my opinion, the auditor is not given discretion as to accepting the duplicate provided by the treasurer but must accept it and act accordingly.

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If there are any further questions, please advise.

Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General