Could South Carolina car dealers send sales staff to an auto show where vehicle sales were forbidden?

Plain-English summary

A state representative asked whether dealership sales personnel could staff manufacturer-sponsored motor vehicle shows when sales at the show were strictly forbidden. The 2000 informal opinion said South Carolina law did not prohibit their presence by itself. The result depended on what the employees did: supplying information about vehicles was permissible under the AG's reading, while offers, attempts, solicitations or other activity within the statute's broad definition of a sale were not.

The AG explained that dealers ordinarily had to sell from an established business location and that vehicle sales at shows would violate the cited provisions. It declined to read those provisions as banning every dealer employee from an exhibition with no selling. The letter did not decide whether a particular conversation crossed the line into solicitation.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did a salesperson's job title alone violate the show rule?
A: No. The AG said the employees' conduct, rather than their employer or title, determined whether they engaged in prohibited sales activity.

Q: Could staff give visitors information about displayed vehicles?
A: The opinion said yes if they only supplied information and did not offer, attempt or solicit an immediate vehicle purchase.

Q: Was signing a sales contract the only prohibited activity?
A: No. The opinion pointed to a broad statutory definition that also covered offers, attempts and solicitations looking toward a sale.

Background and statutory framework

The letter read the dealer licensing and established-place provisions alongside the statutory definition of “sale.” It distinguished a show with no selling from an off-premises sale and said an information-only role did not defeat the legislature's consumer-protection purpose.

Citations and references

• Section 56-15-310, dealer licensing and temporary-location sales; Section 56-15-330, established place of business.
• Section 56-15-10, the broad definition of a motor vehicle sale.

Official title

“whether South Carolina law prohibits the staffing of dealership sales personnel at manufacturer/promoter sponsored motor vehicle shows, even where the selling of motor vehicles is strictly prohibited.”

Requester

The Honorable James E. Smith, Jr., Member, House of Representatives

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-17-2000/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/00aug17smith.pdf

Original opinion text

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The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

August 17, 2000
The Honorable James E. Smith, Jr.
Member, House of Representatives
P.O. Box 50333
Columbia. South Carolina 29250
RE: Informal Opinion
Dear Representative Smith:
By your letter of May 16, 2000. you have requested an opinion of this Office. You wish to know ··whether South Carolina law prohibits the staffing of dealership sales personnel at manufacturer/promoter sponsored motor vehicle shows. even where the selling of motor vehicles is strictly prohibited.''

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South Carolina's regulation of manufacturer;;, distributers. and dealers of automobiles is codified at Chapter 15 of Title 56 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. Section 56-15-310 requires a dealer to obtain a license before engaging in business and prohibits ··the sale of any type of motor vehicles other than mobile homes at authorized temporary locations." Section 56-15-330 further provides. in part. that a dealer may not receive a license unless: The dealer maintains a bona fide established place of business for conducting the business of selling or exchanging motor vehicles which must be the principal business conducted from the fixed location .... A bona fide established place of business does not mean a residence. tent temporary stand, or other temporary quarters. These provisions have been interpreted as requiring motor vehicle sales to be made only from a fixed location or established place of business. See Op. Atty. Gen. Mar. I 0. 1989. Sales of motor\ ehicles at shows or exhibitions would therefore violate these provisions. You now ask if simply staffing the exhibitions with a dealer's sales personnel would also violate State law. Your question turns not so much on for whom the personnel actually work. but how they conduct themselves at the exhibition. South Carolina Code of Lavvs Section 56-15-10 defines .. sale" as including:

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Representative Smith
August I 7. 2000
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... the issuance. transfer, agreement for transfer, exchange. pledge. hypothecation. mortgage
in any form. whether by transfer in trust or otherwise, of any motor vehicle or interest therein
or of any franchise related thereto; and any option, subscription or other contract. or
solicitation, looking to a safe. or offer or attempt to self in any form. whether spoken or
written. :.\gift or delivery of any motor vehicle or franchise with respect thereto \Vi th. or as,
a bonus on account of the sale of anything shall be deemed a sale of such motor vehicle or
franchise. (Emphasis added)

If the personnel are conducting sales within the meaning of the above definition. then they would
be in violation of S. C. Code Ann. § 56-15-310.
A number of principles of statutory interpretation are relevant. First and foremost. of course.
is the time-honored tenet that all rules are subservient to the one \vhich requires that legislative intent
must prevail. State v. Harris, 268 S.C. 117, 232 S.E.2d 231 ( 1977). Words used must be given their
plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting
or expounding the statute's operation. In other words. the real purpose and intent of the la\imakers
\Vil! prevail over the literal import of the words. Caughman v. Cola. Y.M.C.A .. 212 S.C. 337. -J.7
S.E.1d 788 (1948). Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165. 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). The context of the
statute must be examined as part of the process of determining the intent of the General :.\ssembly.
Hancock v. Southern Cotton Oil Co .. 211 S.C. 432. 45 S.E.2d 850 ( 1948).
This Office has previously opined that nu1!lerous jurisdictions have found analogous
legislation to be sound public policy. See Op Atty. Gen. ivtarch I 0. l 989. The protective nature of
the statutes prevent ··fly by night'" operators from making improvident sales to innocent consumers
and allow the State to better supervise the dealers. See id. While South Carolina· s prohibition of tent
sales and off-premises exhibition sales respond to these concerns. the statutes do not extend so far
as to restrict exhibitions at which sales are strictly forbidden. Consequently. personnel who only
supply information to consumers about the vehicles, without any attempts or offers to sell a vehicle
or to persuade consumers to make an immediate purchase. would neither be prohibited. Reading a
proscription against the mere staffing of the sho\v \Vi th dealer personnel requircs too cxpansi\ c:- a
reading of the statute. and this Office declines to force such a construction. This conclusion is
supported by other jurisdictions \vhich have also enacted protecti\ e kgisLuion regulating automobik
dealers and manufacturers. but have addressed this situation. 0:orth Carolina. for example. limits
displays of vehicles for sale to the dealer's established place of business unless it .. is displayed at a
trade show or cxhibit at which no selling activities relating to the vehicle takc place:· :.C. GE'-..
STA.T. ~ 20-292 (2) Although South Carolina has yet to authorize cxplicitly the su1ffing of personnc!
at cxhibitions whcre sdling is forbidden. the General Assembly has neither explicitly disallO\eJ it.
. \s such. it is the opinion of this Office that the staffing of Jeakr personnel\ h,J Jo nut engage in ;.in;
saks acti\ities at exhibitions where sales are strictly prohibiteJ i:.. not incnnsistcnt \ith the
protcctions of the statute and. therefore. docs not violate State l;,rn.

Representative Smith
August 17. 2000
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This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant
Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question
asked. It has not. however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General not officially
published in the manner of a formal opinion.
With kind regards. I remain
Very truly yours.

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Assistant Deputy Attorney General

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