Were Lake Wateree’s motorboat noise rules too vague to enforce without a decibel limit?

Plain-English summary

A legislator asked whether Lake Wateree's motorboat noise provisions could prohibit certain boats and be enforced without a numeric threshold for excessive sound. The 2000 informal opinion said the provisions were not impermissibly vague. Rather than banning noise by an undefined level, they specified the required exhaust or muffler arrangements for different propulsion systems and supplied penalties for violations.

The AG reasoned that an ordinary operator could identify the prohibited equipment and that the detailed rules limited arbitrary enforcement. It also noted an exception for boats in regattas, parades and tournaments. The opinion addressed a vagueness challenge; it did not declare the statutes immune from every possible challenge, and it said constitutional judgments ultimately belonged to courts.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the law need a decibel limit to be enforceable?
A: The AG said no for the challenge presented. It found the specific equipment requirements clear enough without a numeric noise threshold.

Q: What did the statute regulate?
A: The opinion quoted rules about exhaust direction, cooling and mufflers for specified motorboat propulsion types, with separate penalties for violations.

Q: Did the AG make a final constitutional ruling?
A: No. It gave the office's view that a vagueness challenge would fail, while saying courts alone could declare a statute constitutional or unconstitutional.

Background and statutory framework

The letter applied a due-process vagueness test: whether ordinary people could know what was prohibited and whether enforcement had sufficient limits. It found the Lake Wateree provisions concrete because they described equipment rather than a subjective sound level.

Citations and references

• Sections 50-25-1210 and 50-25-1230, the motorboat equipment requirements and penalties.

Official title

On the validity of South Carolina Code of Laws Sections 50-25-1210 and 50-25-1230, which prohibits certain types of motorboats on Lake Wateree as a method of noise control.

Requester

The Honorable Timothy C. Wilkes, Member, House of Representatives

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-14-2000/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/00aug14wilkes.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

August 14. 2000
The Honorable Timothy C. Wilkes
Member, House of Representatives
Box 127
Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180

I

RE:

Informal Opinion

Dear Representative Wilkes:
By your letter of April 18. 2000. you have asked the Office of the Attorney General for an opinion on the validity of South Carolina Code of Laws Sections 50-25-1210 and 50-25-1230, which prohibits certain types of motorboats on Lake Wateree as a method of noise control. The statutes in question, S.C. Code Ann.§§ 50-25-1210 and 5025-1230 provide as follows: A motorboat operating upon vvaters on Lake Wateree shall comply with the following noise control requirements: ( 1) Motorboats with inboard-outboard propulsion machinery shall exhaust through the propeller. (2) Inboard motorboats with "V"-drives-jets or propeller propulsion machinery with exhaust through the transom must be water-cooled with a steady stream of water or exhaust underwater while under way or exhaust through an automotive sealed. baffle-type muffler for each exhaust stack. with exhaust openings not to exceed two inches in diameter. Boats with original propulsion machinery made before 1970 are exempt from the requirements of this item. (3) Motorboats and their propulsion machinery which exhaust over the transom shall exhaust through an automotive sealed. baffle-type muffler for each exhaust stack. vvith exhaust openings not to exceed two inches in diameter. Glass pack mufflers. resonators. and above-water open exhausts are prohibited for the motorboats. Baffle inserts are prohibited

The Honorable Timothy C. Wilkes
August 14, 2000
Page2of3
on all inboard boats.
(4) Motorboats with outboard propulsion machinery shall exhaust underwater at all times unless designed or modified to exhaust above water and comply with the provisions of item (3). S.C. Code Ann. §50-25-1210. Providing for the penalties of violating these requirements. Section 50-25-1230 reads: The operator of a motorboat who violates any of the provisions of this article is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined for a: ( 1) first offense not less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days; (2) second offense not less than one hundred nor more than tvvo hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days; (3) third or subsequent offense not less than two hundred nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. You have expressed concern that ··there seems to be no threshold established as to when the noise level is excessive .., Specifically you ask: 1) if"Article 12 [can] legally prohibit certain types of boats. as provided in Section 50-25-1210" and 2) ''With regard to noise control. is Section 50-25-1230 enforceable?" There appears to be no South Carolina case law addressing these statutes. But as other courts have noted. ··noise ordinances present a great deal of problems in drafting them and enforcing them because the nature of sound makes resort to broadly stated definitions and prohibitions not only common but difficult to avoid." State v. Tavlor, 495 S.E.2d 413 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). Notwithstanding. in considering the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly. it is presumed that the act is constitutional in all respects. Moreover. such an act will not be considered void unless its unconstitutionality is clear beyond any reasonable doubt. Thomas v. Macklen, 186 S.C. 290. 2 S.E.2d 777 (1939). All doubts ofconstitutionalitv are generallv
. resolved
in favor of constitutionality.

-

~

As Tavlor indicated above. the most likely challenge to regulations imposed for noise control is that they are unconstitutionally vague. An act of the General Assembly is .. void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined ... Gravned v. Citv of Rockford, 408 U.S. I 04 ( l 972) Vague noise control ordinances implicate due process concerns in two ways: they may not give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what exactly he is prohibited from doing and

The Honorable Timothy C. Wilkes
August 14. 2000
Page 3 of 3
they may impermissibly allow law enforcement to apply them in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. See Asquith v. Beaufort, 911 F. Supp. 974 (D.C.S.C. 1995). However, neither of these concerns appear to be a danger here. Although § 50-25-1210 uses the terms "noise control'' as the purpose for the requirements, the requirements themselves are by no means vague. Parts one through four of the statute clearly delineate what kind of machinery is impermissible on a motorboat on Lake Wateree, with the following § 50-25-1220 even providing an exception to these requirements for boats competing in regattas, parades, and tournaments. Rather than use broad terms subject to interpretation by law enforcement, the statutes instead specifically identify the activity prohibited. A person of ordinary intelligence would know with reasonable certainty the conduct rendering them liable to the criminal penalties of S.C. Code Ann.§ 50-25-1230. Based on the foregoing, it is the opinion of this Office that S.C. Code Ann.§§ 50-25-1210 and 50-25-1230 are not impermissibly vague and would withstand a constitutional challenge on those grounds. Of course, while this Office may comment upon any potential due process issues. it is solely within the province of the courts of this State to declare an act constitutional or unconstitutional. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not. however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General not ot1icially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards. I remain

Assistant Deputy Attorney General
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