Could Hilton Head use liquor permit revenue to repay debt on land it bought before the funding law?

Plain-English summary

Hilton Head Island asked whether it could use revenue from temporary alcoholic liquor permits to make principal and interest payments on land acquired before the relevant law was passed. The 2004 provision authorized municipalities and counties to use that revenue to acquire interests in land for wildlife, recreation, scenic and related public purposes. The Attorney General read its language about land still available to acquire and land needed in the future as prospective. It concluded that the provision did not support using the revenue to repay debt for an earlier acquisition.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2004. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could the town use this liquor permit revenue to pay old land debt?
A: The AG said the wording did not support principal and interest payments on land bought before the law took effect.

Q: What kinds of acquisitions did the quoted provision describe?
A: It listed interests in land for wildlife preservation, future recreation, scenic easements and other listed purposes, including beaches, marshes and bicycle paths.

Q: Did the opinion decide whether every future land purchase qualified?
A: No. It resolved the narrower timing question about payments for land already acquired.

Background and statutory framework

The office applied its usual rules of statutory interpretation and focused on the provision's future-oriented acquisition language. The requester asked specifically about existing debt on pre-law purchases, and the opinion gave a negative answer for that use of permit revenue.

Citations

• The opinion quotes the temporary alcoholic liquor permit revenue provision; its section number is garbled in the PDF extraction.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/august-10-2004-3/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/04aug-10-DeLoach.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY MCMASTER
ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 10, 2004

Gregory D. DeLoach, Esquire
Legal Department Director I Assistant Town Manager
One Town Center Court
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928
Dear Mr. DeLoach:
ln a letter to this office you referenced the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. Section 61-620 I O(B)(l )(g) which provides that a municipality or county may use the revenue from temporary alcoholic liquor permits for

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... acquiring fee and less than fee interest in land while it is still available to be held in perpetuity as wildlife preserves or believed to be needed by the public in the future for active and passive recreation uses and scenic easements to include the fol1owing types of land: ocean, harbor and pond frontage in the form of beaches, dunes and adjoining backlands; barrier beaches; fresh and saltwater marshes and adjoining uplands; land for bicycle paths; land protecting existing and future public water supply; well fields, highway buffering and aquifer recharge areas; land for wildlife purposes; and land for future public recreational facilities.

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You have asked whether the Town ofHilton Head may use revenue from temporary alcoholic liquor permits to pay principal and interest payments on land acquired before the law was passed. When interpreting the meaning of a statute, certain basic principles must be observed. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). Typically, legislative intent is determined by applying the words used by the General Assembly in their usual and ordinary significance. Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451 (1971). Resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting or expanding the operation of a statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). Courts must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991). Statutes shou]d be given a reasonable and practical construction which is consistent with the policy and purpose expressed therein. Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166 (1966).

~~Y~~G . POST OFFICE Box 11549 •

COWMBlA, S.C. 2921 1- 1549

• TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970 •

FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Mr. DeLoach
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August 10, 2004

As expressed above, a municipality or county may use the revenue from temporary alcoholic liquor permits for "acquiring fee and less than fee interest in land while it is still available to be held in perpetuity as wildlife preserves or believed to be needed by the public in the future". Such language appears to indicate that the revenue may only be used for future endeavors in such regard. Such wording does not support a construction in my opinion that the revenue may be used to pay principal and interest payments on land acquired before the law was passed. With kind regards, I am, Very truly yours,

Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General

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