Did a South Carolina clerk of court control the whole courthouse or only circuit court rooms?

Plain-English summary

A Kershaw County probate judge asked whether the clerk of court’s statutory charge of the “courthouse” covered only circuit-court rooms or the entire building. In April 2002, the South Carolina AG read Section 14-17-210 as covering the whole courthouse building. He relied on the statute’s language about opening the courthouse for public use and keeping it closed otherwise, and on an earlier opinion describing the clerk’s custody and management of the building.

The letter also limited that answer: the clerk’s authority could not override other statutes governing the probate court, including the probate court’s responsibility for its records. It referred to an earlier view that the authority did not reach the parking lot. The source letter twice prints “Section 14-7-210” in its later analysis, although its request, quotation and opening analysis identify Section 14-17-210; this page follows the quoted statute and preserves the source text below.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2002. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Clerks of court

The AG construed the clerk’s charge as extending to the entire courthouse building, including more than circuit-court rooms. The opinion cited prior advice on custody, maintenance and upkeep, while distinguishing alterations or additions and the parking lot.

Probate courts

The AG said courthouse management must be read alongside other laws, expressly mentioning the probate court’s statutory responsibility to maintain its records.

Common questions

Did the clerk’s authority cover the whole courthouse?
A: The AG said yes, as to the building, rather than only the circuit-court courtroom or jury room.

Did that give the clerk control of probate records?
A: No. The opinion said the clerk’s authority could not conflict with the statute governing probate-court records.

Did the opinion include the courthouse parking lot?
A: It cited an earlier opinion concluding the courthouse-control statute did not extend to the parking lot.

Background and statutory framework

The letter quoted Section 14-17-210, which put the clerk in charge of opening and closing the courthouse. It read that provision with the probate court’s separate recordkeeping statute, Section 14-23-1100. The two later references to Section 14-7-210 appear in the source even though the letter introduced and quoted Section 14-17-210.

Citations and references

• Section 14-17-210: courthouse building authority quoted at the start of the letter.
• Section 14-23-1100: probate-court records authority noted as a limit.

Official title

Concerning the interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. Section 14-17-210 which gives the Clerk of Court control of the Courthouse. Specifcally, if the Clerk’s authority applies “to the Circuit Court courtroom, petit jury room, etc., or could it be the entire courthouse?”

Requester

The Honorable Harriett S. Pierce, Probate Judge, Kershaw County

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/april-8-2002/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/02apr8pierce.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M . CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

April 8, 2002

The Honorable Harriett S. Pierce
Probate Judge, Kershaw County
1121 Broad Street
Camden, South Carolina 29020

Re:

Informal Opinion

Dear Judge Pierce:
You have asked for an interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. Section 14-17-210 which gives the Clerk of Court control of the courthouse. You wish to know whether the Clerk's authority applies "to the Circuit Court courtroom, petit jury room, etc., or could it be the entire courthouse?"

Law I Analysis
Section 14-17-210 provides as follows:
[e ]very clerk shall have charge of the courthouse within his county, open the same when required for public use and at all other times keep it closed. For every night any courthouse shall be kept open the clerk shall be liable to a penalty of five dollars for the use of the county, to be recovered by indictment. The statute speaks in terms of the Clerk of Court having control of the courthouse building, providing that the Clerk keep the building "open" for "public use" and "at all other times keep it closed." Recently, in an Informal Opinion dated February 23, 2000 (2000 WL 356787), the following was concluded,
[t]his Office has previously interpreted the phrase "shall have charge of the courthouse" to mean that the Clerk of Court is vested with custody and control over the courthouse and that the Clerk is entrusted by the statute with the management of the building in all respects except where alterations or additions to the courthouse are involved. Op. Atty. Gen. dated December 8, 1961. Therefore, we advised that the

REMBERT

c. DENNIS BUILDING •

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLUMBIA,

s.c. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Harriett S. Pierce
Page2
April 8, 2002

maintenance and upkeep of the courthouse falls within the jurisdiction and authority of the Clerk of Court. Id. That same opinion concluded that the authority bestowed by Section 14-7-210 did not extend to the courthouse parking lot.
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Accordingly, we read Section 14-7-210 as extending to the entire courthouse building. While it is true that the statute was first enacted long ago in 1839, the General Assembly has not seen fit to repeal it. Of course, the Clerk's authority may not be deemed to conflict with other statutes relating to the Probate Court, such as for the Court to maintain its own records pursuant to Section 14-23-1100. See. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 84-90 (July 26, 1984). This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General and not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion.

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Assistant Deputy Attorney General
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