Could a police officer write a ticket solely for South Carolina's general traffic misdemeanor provision?
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This page answers the general question as of 2008. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.
Plain-English summary
A Rock Hill municipal judge asked whether S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-730 itself made conduct a crime. The question mattered because an officer might otherwise write a citation under that section alone, or a solicitor might use it as an alternative plea charge. The AG said neither use fit the provision. It supplied a general misdemeanor classification for acts forbidden or required elsewhere in the traffic chapter, unless a different rule applied, but it did not define a stand-alone criminal offense.
The opinion compared another general traffic penalty provision and earlier AG opinions applying such provisions to specific traffic duties. The distinction was between the section defining prohibited conduct and the general rule classifying or penalizing its violation.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 2008. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Common questions
Q: Could an officer issue a ticket citing only the general misdemeanor section? A: The AG said it did not appear that a ticket could cite S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-730 alone for a violation, because that provision did not create a separate offense.
Q: Could a prosecutor use that section as a lesser substitute charge in a plea bargain? A: The AG said no. Since it was not a separate offense, it could not serve as an alternative offense for plea bargaining.
Q: Did the provision have any effect on actual traffic violations? A: Yes. The AG read it as establishing that violations of the traffic chapter were misdemeanors unless the chapter specifically provided otherwise.
Background and statutory framework
The AG quoted § 56-5-730 and compared it with § 56-5-6190, which set a penalty when another traffic-chapter violation lacked a specific one. Earlier office opinions had used those general provisions in connection with particular driving duties. The municipal judge's question concerned whether the general language, standing alone, could support a charge; the AG answered no.
Citations and references
Statutes discussed: S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-5-730 and 56-5-6190.
Source
- Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/april-7-2008-3/
- Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/modla-j-p-os-8576-4-7-08-section-56-5-730-does-not-establish-separate-criminal-offense.pdf
Original opinion text
April 7, 2008
The Honorable Jane Pittman Modla
Judge, Rock Hill Municipal Court
120 East Black Street
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730
Dear Judge Modla:
In a letter to this office you referenced S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-730 and questioned whether such provision establishes a criminal offense. You particularly asked whether a police officer could issue a ticket under this provision and whether a solicitor could use this statute for plea bargaining. You indicated that if such was used, a violation of such provision would carry no points on a driving record. Section 56-5-730 states that
[i]t is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in this chapter with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or to fail to perform any act required in this chapter. Such provision is similar to another provision, S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-6190 which states:
[i]t is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this chapter unless such violation is by this chapter or other law of this State declared to be a felony. Every person convicted of a misdemeanor for a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter for which another penalty is not provided shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days. Such penalty provision was cited in an opinion of this office dated June 28, 2004 which stated that inasmuch as S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-1240 which requires the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident with an unattended vehicle to take certain actions does not have a specific penalty, Section 56-5-6190 would provide the penalty for such a violation. But see: Op. Atty. Gen. dated
The Honorable Jane Pittman Modla
Page 2
April 7, 2008
February 10, 1994 (Section 56-5-6190 would not pertain to a violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-51520 which establishes the offense of speeding inasmuch as a specific penalty is provided.) Section 56-5-730 was originally enacted as part of Act No. 281 of 1949 which was a comprehensive act regulating traffic on the highways of this State. In an opinion of this office dated September 5, 1989, such provision was also cited along with S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-740 which states:
[n]o person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer, fireman or uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. It was stated that Section 56-5-730 would be applicable to Section 56-5-740. Another prior opinion of this office dated July 25, 1977 citing Section 56-5-730 states that consistent with such provision, “...unless otherwise indicated, violations of traffic laws are misdemeanors.” In the opinion of this office, Section 56-5-730 does not establish a separate criminal offense but is a penalty provision establishing that violations of provisions of Chapter 5 of Title 56 of the State Code are misdemeanors unless otherwise specifically provided. It does not appear that a ticket could be issued citing that provision itself for a violation and, therefore, such provision would similarly not serve as an alternative offense for plea bargaining purposes. With kind regards, I am, Very truly yours, Henry McMaster Attorney General
By:
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:
______
Robert D. Cook
Deputy Attorney General
Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General
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