Could South Carolina authorities issue both domestic violence and assault warrants for the same incident?

Plain-English summary

Cayce's city attorney asked whether officers could seek arrest warrants for both criminal domestic violence and assault and battery when both arose from the same incident. In April 1995, Deputy Attorney General Zeb Williams said merely issuing both warrants would not appear to violate the double jeopardy protection or the state rule he cited concerning prosecutions from one incident. He separated the act of issuing warrants from the later decision about which offense to pursue.

Williams said that decision belonged to the prosecutor and depended on the facts. He also cited the then-current domestic violence article's statement that it did not displace other assault or criminal laws. The short letter did not choose a charge for a particular case or decide whether both prosecutions could proceed to judgment.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Police and prosecutors

The 1995 response allowed both warrants to be issued for one set of events. It left the eventual charge selection to prosecutorial discretion in light of the incident's circumstances.

People facing charges and counsel

The opinion distinguished having two warrants from being prosecuted twice. Its answer addressed the warrant stage and did not resolve all later double jeopardy questions in a specific prosecution.

Common questions

Did the opinion prohibit two arrest warrants for one incident? No. The writer said merely issuing domestic violence and assault and battery warrants did not appear to contravene the cited protections.

Who decided which offense to pursue?
The writer placed that choice with the prosecutor, based on the facts and circumstances.

Did the domestic violence provision replace other assault laws? The letter quoted a provision saying the domestic violence article did not repeal, replace, or preclude application of other assault and criminal laws.

Background and statutory framework

The inquiry concerned warrants under the domestic violence statute and assault and battery for the same conduct. The Deputy AG referred to double jeopardy, a state prosecution provision, Jivers v. State, and the domestic violence article's preservation of other criminal laws. The letter expressly described itself as an informal opinion without the Attorney General's personal review or formal publication.

Citations and references

• Sec. 16-25-20: the domestic violence provision identified in the request.
• Section 16-25-80: the provision preserving other assault and criminal laws.
• Jivers v. State: the decision the writer cited concerning prosecutions arising from one incident.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/april-6-1995/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1995apr6aaron.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

April 6, 1995

Donald D. Aaron, Esquire
City Attorney, City of Cayce
P. 0. Box 184
-columbia, South Carolina 29202-0184
Re:

Informal Opinion

Dear Mr. Aaron:
Thank you for your recent letter inquiring whether arrest warrants should be issued against an individual for criminal domestic violence (S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 16-25-20) as well as assault and battery even though the same events may form the basis for both warrants. Attorney General Charles M. Condon has asked me to respond. As you know, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy and Section 223-740, S.C. Code Ann. (1993 Supp.) bar prosecutions for certain criminal offenses that arise out of the same incident. See Jivers v. State, 304 S.C. 556, 406 S.E.2d 154 (1991). Therefore, merely issuing arrest warrants for both criminal domestic violence and assault and battery would not appear to contravene either of the provisions noted above. Instead, the ultimate choice as to which offense to pursue is a matter within the discretion of the prosecutor and would depend upon all of the attendant facts and circumstances. In fact, Section 16-25-80 provides in part, "[n]othing in this article may be construed to repeal, replace, or preclude application of any other provisions of law pertaining to assault, assault and battery, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, or other criminal offenses." This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. REMBERT C. DENNIS BUILDING

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLL'MBJA. s.c. 292 ll-1549

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TELEPHONE:

803- 734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Mr. Aaron
Page 2
April 6, 1995
Again, thank you for your letter. If I can be of assistance to you in the future, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely,

Id, uill~
Zeb C. Williams, III
Deputy Attorney General
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