Could a South Carolina police department recover the cost of optional instructor training when an officer changed agencies in 1998?

Plain-English summary

Santee's police chief asked whether the town could recover two weeks of salary and training expense after an officer took a basic instructor course and then joined a sheriff's department. The Attorney General read § 23-6-405 as creating a reimbursement mechanism for mandatory law enforcement training when a different government employer hired an officer soon afterward. The instructor course described by Santee was voluntary training to prepare the officer to train others, so the AG said the provision did not cover it and doubted it supplied a reimbursement claim.

The letter addressed the type of training, not which county would be the proper venue for a viable suit. It was an informal interpretation of the 1998 statute and facts presented.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the 1998 reimbursement rule cover every course an officer attended?
A: No. The AG emphasized the statute's repeated reference to mandatory training and excluded the voluntary instructor course described in the request.

Q: Did the AG say Santee could recover its two-week instructor-training cost?
A: No. It agreed that this training fell outside the provision and doubted the statute created a claim for that expense.

Q: Did the letter decide where Santee could file a reimbursement lawsuit?
A: It did not reach a venue answer after concluding that the identified statutory claim was doubtful.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion quoted § 23-6-405, which addressed reimbursement between government entities for an officer's mandatory training after a subsequent hire. Its interpretation turned on the statutory word "mandatory" and the request's description of an optional instructor course.

Citations and references

• § 23-6-405, the training reimbursement provision quoted and construed in the letter.

Official title

Asking for an interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 23-6-405.

Requester

Robert L. Williams, Chief of Police, Santee Police Department

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/april-3-1998/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/98april3williams.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

April 3, 1998

1.

Robert L. Williams, Chief of Police
Santee Police Department
Post Office Box 757
Santee, South Carolina 29142
Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Chief Williams:
You have asked for an interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 23-6-405. You set forth the following facts and circumstances relative to your situation: 1.

On August 14, 1997, the Santee Police Department
hired a police officer. On August 25, 1997, the Officer was made a full-time police officer.

2.

On September 8, 1997, the Santee Police Department
sent the officer for two weeks of training as a basic instructor for the training of other officers in the Department.

3.

On January 16, 1997, this officer resigned his position with the Santee Police Department. Following a one ( 1) day notice to the Department, the Chief of Police was informed the officer had gained employment with The Sheriff a neighboring Sheriffs Department. Department did not contact the Santee Police Department until three (3) days afterward asking for a work reference.

;J ~F.MBERT C..:_PE~!?ING
X-1. ~· 1:__;7) <-L-?;[ZL
•

POST OFFICE Box 11549

•

COLUMBIA, S.C. 29211-1549

•

TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Chief Williams
Page 2
April 3, 1998
4.

On March 20, 1998, the Sheriffs Department was
notified by the Chief of the Santee Police Department that, pursuant to§ 23-6-405, Calhoun County owed the Town of Santee two weeks salary for the Officer's attendance of the SCCJA for a basic instruction certification. His response was that the statute covered the eight week mandatory training, but not a course to train an officer to train other officers.

You wish to know whether a civil action can be filed either in Orangeburg or Calhoun County regarding this matter for reimbursement of Santee's cost for the two week training of the officer. Law I Analysis

New Section 23-6-405 provides as follows:
Section 23-6-405. (A) For purposes of this section
"governmental entity" means the State or any of its political subdivisions. (B) After July l, 1997, every governmental entity of this State intending to employ on a permanent basis a law enforcement officer who has satisfactorily completed the mandatory training as required under this article must comply with the provisions of this section. (C) If the law enforcement officer has satisfactorily completed his mandatory training while employed by a governmental entity of this State, and within two years from the date of satisfactory completion of the mandatory training, a subsequent hiring governmental entity shall reimburse the governmental entity with whom the law enforcement officer was employed at the time of attending the mandatory training: ( 1) one hundred percent of the cost of training the officer, which shall include the officer's salary paid during the training period and other training expenses incurred while the officer was attending the mandatory training, if the officer is

Chief Williams
Page 3
April 3, 1998
hired within one year of the date of satisfactory completion of the mandatory training; or (2) fifty percent of the cost of training the officer, which shall include the officer's salary paid during the training period and other training expenses incurred while the officer was attending the mandatory training, if the officer is hired after one year but before the end of the second year after the date of satisfactory completion of the mandatory training. (D) If the law enforcement officer is employed by more than one successive governmental entity within the twoyear period after the date of satisfactory completion of the mandatory training, a governmental entity which reimbursed the governmental entity that employed the officer during the training period may obtain reimbursement from the successive governmental entity employer for:

I

( 1)
one hundred percent of the cost of training the
officer, which shall include the officer's salary paid during the training period and other training expenses incurred while the officer was attending the mandatory training, if the officer is hired within one year of the date of satisfactory completion of the mandatory training; or (2) fifty percent of the cost of training the officer, which shall include the officer's salary paid during the training period and other training expenses incurred while the officer was attending the mandatory training, if the officer is hired after one year but before the end of the second year after the date of satisfactory completion of the mandatory training. (E) Under no circumstances shall the governmental entity that employed the officer during the training period or a governmental entity seeking reimbursement from a successive governmental entity employer be reimbursed for more than one hundred percent of the cost of the officer's salary paid during the training period and other training expenses

Chief Williams
Page 4
April 3, 1998
incurred while the officer was attending the mandatory training. (emphasis added).

I

A number of principles of statutory construction are relevant to your inquiry. First and foremost, in interpreting a statute, the primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). An enactment should be given a reasonable and practical construction, consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the statute. Hay v. S.C. Tax Comm., 273 S.C. 269, 255 S.E.2d 837 (1979). Words used therein should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. First South Sav. Bank, Inc. v. Gold Coast Associates, 301 S.C. 158, 390 S.E.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1990). Applying the foregoing rules of statutory interpretation, I must advise that in my judgment, § 23-6-405 does not cover the type of training referenced in your letter. The Act throughout speaks of the "mandatory training as required under this article." It is apparent from reading the Act in its entirety and in accord with its plain language that the General Assembly intended to create a cause of action for reimbursement where one law enforcement agency hires an officer away from another within a certain period of time after that officer has undergone mandatory training. The type of training which is referenced in your letter, however, is not the "mandatory training" contemplated by the Act, but is, instead a voluntary training of officers to train other officers within that Department. Thus, I must agree with the sheriff in this instance that the Act does not cover the type of training to which you refer and thus it is doubtful whether the Act would create a cause of action for reimbursement of the monies expended by your Department for the type of training of the officer which is referenced in your letter. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am Very truly yours,

Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/an