Could a South Carolina beer wholesaler give a retailer a refrigerator just for juice or water?

Plain-English summary

Representative Ronald Fulmer asked whether beer wholesalers could supply refrigerators or coolers to retail permit holders when the equipment would hold juice or water rather than beer. In April 1995, Assistant Attorney General Robert Cook said the practice was prohibited by the then-current South Carolina beer law. He read its bar on providing “any equipment” to a retailer as covering cooling equipment regardless of the drinks placed inside.

The statute quoted in the letter also listed narrow exceptions, including certain draft equipment parts of nominal value, temporary party wagons, advertising specialties, and specified services. Cook noted that refrigerators and coolers were absent from that list. He rejected the proposed distinction based on the equipment's use for nonbeer products.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Beer wholesalers and retailers

Under the 1995 provision the writer interpreted, the bar applied on both sides of the transaction: wholesalers could not supply prohibited equipment, and retail permit holders could not accept it. A purpose of storing juice or water did not create an exception for a cooler.

Lawmakers and regulators

The opinion treated the law's listed exceptions as deliberate. It did not identify a general exception for any equipment used outside beer sales, and its conclusion concerned the specific wholesaler-to-retailer arrangement described.

Common questions

Did using a cooler for water or juice avoid the equipment restriction? No, according to the 1995 opinion. The writer said the statute did not make the ban depend on what the equipment stored.

Were all wholesaler services and items forbidden?
The letter quoted a list of particular exceptions for small parts, temporary equipment, advertising items, and services. It concluded that cooling and refrigerated equipment was not among them.

Could a retailer accept a cooler if the wholesaler supplied it indirectly? The provision the writer discussed prohibited both direct and indirect furnishing by a wholesaler, and it separately barred the retailer from accepting prohibited equipment.

Background and statutory framework

The letter examined Section 61-9-315's prohibition, listed exceptions, and matching retailer restriction. It applied statutory wording and an inference that express exceptions exclude unlisted ones. The opinion was informal, written by the signing assistant without the Attorney General's personal review or formal publication.

Citations and references

• Section 61-9-315: the beer equipment provision applied to the cooling equipment question.
• State v. Martin and Little v. Town of Conway: cases the writer cited in interpreting statutory language and exceptions.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/april-3-1995/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1995apr3fulmer.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

April 3, 1995

The Honorable Ronald C. Fulmer
Member, House of Representatives
320C Blatt Building

• Columbia, South Carolina 29211
  Informal Opinion

Re:

Dear Representative Fulmer:
Attorney General Condon has referred your recent letter to me for reply. You reference South Carolina's so-called "three tier" beer law, see, S.C. Code Ann. Section 619-315, which prohibits the giving, renting, lending or selling of any equipment between the three tiers of the beer industry (brewer, wholesaler, retailer). You further note that there
... has been an outbreak in what I consider to be violations of this law. Some wholesalers are giving cooling and refrigerated equipment for the purpose of placing juices and or waters in them. The law did not provide any exceptions. My feeling is that if they are licensed beer wholesalers, any equipment is prohibited regardless of what it is used for. Section 61-9-315 specifies in pertinent part:
... (B) A manufacturer, brewer, importer, or wholesaler of beer, of anyone acting on their behalf, shall not furnish, give, rent, lend, or sell, directly or indirectly, to the holder of a retail permit any equipment, fixtures, free beer or service.

REMBERT c. DEt-.:-.:is Bl'lLD!;-.<G

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PosT OFF!CE Box 11549

•

COLCMB!A. S.C. 29211-1549

•

TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

•

FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Ronald C. Fulmer
Page 2
April 3, 1995
(C)
Notwithstanding subsection (B), a wholesaler may
furnish at no charge to the holder of a retail permit draft beer equipment replacement parts of nominal value, including washers, gaskets, hoses, hose connectors, clamps, and tap markers, party wagons for temporary use, and point of sale advertising specialties. A wholesaler may also furnish the following services to a retailer: cleaning draught lines, setting boxes, rotating stock, affixing price tags to beer products and building beer displays. (D) The ho Ider of a retail permit, or anyone acting on his behalf, shall not accept, directly or indirectly, any equipment, fixtures, free beer, or service referred to in subsection (B) from a manufacturer, brewer, importer or wholesaler of beer except as provided in subsection (C). In interpreting any statute, the primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, its terms must be given their literal meaning. Crown Cork and Seal Co., Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm., 302 S.C. 140, 394 S.E.2d 315 (1990). It is the duty of a court to give an unambiguous statute effect according to the clear meaning of its language. Helfrich v. Brasington Sand and Gravel Co., 268 S.C. 236, 233 S.E.2d 291 ( 1977). A statute which is remedial in purpose must be broadly construed to fully effectuate its purpose. South Carolina Dept. of Mental Health v. Hanna, 270 S.C. 210, 241 S.E.2d 563 (1978). Pursuant to the South Carolina Constitution, Art. VIII-A, Sec. 1, the General Assembly possesses plenary power to regulate alcoholic beverages in this State. By enacting the "three tier" law, the Legislature has expressed its desire that the sale and transfer of beer within South Carolina is comprehensively regulated. Moreover, the General Assembly has made it abundantly clear in Section 61-9315(B) that a beer wholesaler "or anyone acting on their behalf' shall not "furnish, give, rent, lend, or sell, directly or indirectly, to the holder of a retail permit any equipment, fixtures, free beer or_service." [emphasis added]. Such may not be done either "djrectly or indirectly." Through its use of the word "shall", the Legislature made this proscription mandatory, in keeping with the fundamental purpose of the comprehensive "three tier" legislation. S.C. Police Officers Retirement System v. Citv of Spartanburg, 301 S.C. 188, 391 S.E.2d 239 (1990). By its use of the word "any", the Legislature meant to make this proscription all-encompassing. Furthermore, so as to leave no doubt, the Legislature

The Honorable Ronald C. Fulmer
Page 3
April 3, 1995
reiterated the identical prohibition in Subpart (D) as applied to the retailer; just as the manufacturer, brewer importer or wholesaler is forbidden from providing equipment, etc. to the retailer, the latter may not accept such. In addition, the Legislature carefully enumerated certain exceptions in subpart (C), including washers, gaskets hoses, hose connectors, champs and tap markers, among others. Nowhere, however, is cooling and refrigerated equipment mentioned in the list of exceptions. As we have stated previously, in construing another statute regarding beer and wme,
... where the General Assembly has expressly authorized a particular course of conduct or activity, this express authorization is intended to exclude activities or conduct that is not expressly mentioned. This rule is commonly referred to as "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Little v. Town of Conway, 171 S.C. 27, 171 S.E. 447 (1933). This rule of statutory construction is applied to statutory provisions, such as Section 61-9-180, that prescribe or authorize a particular form of conduct and the persons and things to which it infers. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 47.23. Further, this rule
... is a product of 'logic and common sense.' It
expresses the learning of common experience that when
people say one thing they do not mean something else.
Id. Sec. 47.24.
Op. Atty. Gen. , July 3, 1991. Likewise, our Court of Appeals has also emphasized the significance of the Legislature's specification of exceptions in a statute: Under the rule, exceptions made in a statute give rise to a strong inference that no other exceptions were intended. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 282 S.C. 546, 320 S.E.2d 458 (G.t. App. 1984). Finally, the argument has been made that the purpose here is not to violate the proscription of the "three tier" law, but simply to provide "water cooler" products or services to a retailer. However, we agree with you that this argument is not persuasive. Section 61-9-315 does not specify nor suggest that the provision of equipment to a retailer

The Honorable Ronald C. Fulmer
Page 4
April 3, 1995
by a brewer, manufacturer or wholesaler is, in certain instances, permissible, depending upon the purpose for which it is done. Instead, the statute proscribes "any" equipment from being given or provided, with certain limited exceptions, not relevant here. Where the statute is clear and unambiguous, as this one is, there can be no room for doubt. In summary, I agree with you that a beer wholesaler's giving or providing of cooling and refrigerated equipment to a retailer for the purpose of placing juices and or waters in them is clearly proscribed by Section 61-9-315. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I remain Very truly yours,

Robert D. Cook
Assistant Attorney General
RDC/an