Was impersonating a police officer a crime of moral turpitude in South Carolina?

Plain-English summary

In 2015, the South Carolina Attorney General predicted that a court would regard impersonating a law enforcement officer as a crime of moral turpitude. The office reasoned that the offense involved dishonest misrepresentation to other people, fitting the state cases’ focus on a breach of duty to society and fellow citizens. It framed this as a prediction, rather than a court holding directly deciding the moral turpitude question.

The opinion relied heavily on a South Carolina Supreme Court decision that treated a prior impersonation conviction as a crime of dishonesty for witness impeachment under an evidence rule. It explained that the evidence rule’s dishonesty standard was distinct from the older moral turpitude standard, while treating the finding of dishonesty as a strong indicator. It also cited out of state impersonation cases as support.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2015. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the South Carolina Supreme Court already call this offense moral turpitude?
A: The opinion did not identify a direct holding to that effect. It predicted how a court would decide, using the court’s finding that impersonation involved dishonesty and other authorities.

Q: Why did impersonation matter under the opinion’s test?
A: Pretending to exercise an officer’s authority involved misrepresentation, which the office linked to the breach of duty and dishonest conduct often found in moral turpitude offenses.

Q: Was every crime treated as moral turpitude?
A: No. The opinion expressly said that not every crime met the moral turpitude standard.

Background and legal framework

The Department of Insurance asked for a classification of the officer impersonation offense. The office quoted the statute describing unauthorized representation as a law enforcement officer and reviewed cases defining moral turpitude. It then distinguished the evidence rule’s test for a dishonest conviction from the classification question it had been asked to answer.

Citations and references

The opinion quoted S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-720 and discussed the South Carolina Supreme Court’s impersonation and witness impeachment decision.

Official title

On what is considered a crime of moral turpitude.

Requester

Michael Beauford Jr., Chief Investigator, South Carolina Department of Insurance.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/april-24-2015/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Beauford-M.-OS-9863-FINAL-Opinion-4-24-2015-00623661xD2C78.pdf

Original opinion text

"'So,
Alan Wilson
Attorney General

April 24. 2015
Mr. Michael Beauford Jr.
Chief Investigator
South Carolina Department of Insurance

Post Office Box 100105

Columbia. South Carolina 29202-3105
Dear Mr. Beauford:
You have requested the opinion of this Office as to whether the crime of impersonating a

law enforcement officer1 would be considered a crime of moral turpitude. Based on the analysis below, we believe that a court would likely find that it would. Law/Analvsis

Our Supreme Court has defined a crime of moral turpitude as "an act of baseness,

vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties that man owes to his fellow man or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man." Smith v. Smith. 194 S.C. 247. 9 S.E.2d 584. 589 (1940); see also State v. Drakeford. 290 S.C. 338. 340, 350 S.E.2d 391. 392 (1986): State v. Morris. 289 S.C. 294. 296. 345 S.E.2d 477, 478 (1986); State v. Yates. 280 S.C. 29, 37. 310 S.E.2d 805, 810 (1982). overruled by State v. Torrence. S.C.. 280 S.C. 29. 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982); State v. Morton. 271 S.C. 413. 414. 248 S.E.2d 263, 263

(1978).

Opinions of our Office on the subject of moral turpitude have

consistently recognized the same. See, e.g.. Op. S.C. Att'v Gen.. 2014 WL 2538230 (May 12, 2014); Op. S.C. Atfv Gen.. 2007 WL 655616 (Feb. 5. 2007): Op. S.C. Atfv Gen.. 1998 WL

61843 (Jan. 27, 1998).

Moreover, "moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself,

regardless of whether it is publishable by law as a crime." State v. Horton. 271 S.C. 413, 414, 248 S.E.2d 263 (1978) (citing 58 C.J.S. Morals at

1203).

Behavior that is primarily self-

destructive typically does not involve moral turpitude, which requires a breach of duty to society

and one's fellowman. State v. Major. 301 S.C. 181, 184, 391 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990). Thus, it

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-720 provides that:
|i]t shall be unlawful for any person other than a duly authorized law-enforcement ofllcer to represent to any
person that he is a law-enforcement officer and. acting upon such representation, to arrest or detain any person, search any building or automobile or in any way impersonate a law-enforcement officer or act in accordance with the authority commonly given to such officers. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a private citizen from making a citizen's arrest in accordance with the laws of this Slate.

Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and. upon conviction, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned for not more than one year.

Rembert C. phnnis building

• PostOffice Box 11549 . Colcmbia,SC 2921 1-1549 . Telephone 803-734-3970 . Facsimile 803-253-6283

Mr. Michael Beauford Jr.
Page 2

April 24, 2015

follows that while all crimes involve some degree of social irresponsibility, not every crime is one that involves moral turpitude. State v. LaBaree. 275 S.C. 168, 172, 268 S.E.2d 278, 280 (1980).

"In determining whether a crime is one involving moral turpitude, the Court focuses primarily on the duty to society and fellow man which is breached by the commission of a

crime." State v. Ball. 292 S.C. 71, 73, 354 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Maior. 301 S.C. 181, 391 S.E.2d 235 (1990). Furthermore, it has been concluded that "[m]ost offenses found to involve moral turpitude . . . seem to include some sort of dishonest behavior . . . ." McAninch and Fairey, The Criminal Law of South Carolina. 45 (3rd ed. 1996); see also State v. Hall. 306 S.C. 293, 295, 411 S.E.2d 441, 442 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting the

above in its analysis of whether first offense driving under the influence and resisting arrest were crimes of moral turpitude).

Applying the aforementioned standards to the crime of impersonating a law enforcement officer, we first point out the case of State v. Cheeseboro. 346 S.C. 526, 552 S.E.2d 300 (2001). In Cheeseboro. our Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a prior conviction of

impersonating a law enforcement officer was correctly admitted by the trial court for purposes of impeachment. State v. Cheeseboro. 346 S.C. 526, 544, 552 S.E.2d 300, 310 (2001). Because the "moral turpitude standard" formerly used by our courts to determine whether prior convictions of

a witness were admissible for purposes of impeachment was replaced with the adoption of Rule

609, SCRE,2 analysis rested on whether impersonating a law enforcement officer involved "dishonesty or false statement" pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE. Id. Finding the conviction was admissible, the Cheeseboro Court reasoned as follows:
[e]vidence of a conviction of a crime involving dishonesty is admissible for impeachment regardless of the punishment. Federal courts applying this rule under the Federal Rules of Evidence have held criminal impersonation is a crime involving dishonesty and therefore admissible. We agree with the approach taken by the federal courts and hold, since impersonating an officer involves a misrepresentation, it is a crime involving dishonesty and therefore admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) regardless of the punishment it carries.

Id. at 544-45, 552 S.E.2d at 310 (internal citations omitted). As crimes of moral turpitude typically involve some sort of dishonesty, we believe the Court's determination in Cheeseboro that a prior conviction for impersonating a law enforcement was properly admitted for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2) as a crime of dishonesty is highly relevant as to whether such crime would also be considered a crime of moral turpitude. We also point out a prior opinion of this Office issued on June 9, 2008 that addressed what crimes would likely be considered crimes of "dishonesty or a breach of trust" as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1033(e)(1)(A) that states:

2 gee State v. Johnson. 363 S.C. 53, 609 S.E.2d 520 (2005) (discussing replacement of moral turpitude standard with Rule 609, SCRE).

Mr. Michael Beauford Jr.
Page 3

April 24, 2015

[a]ny individual who has been convicted of any criminal felony involving

dishonesty or a breach of trust, or who has been convicted of an offense under this section, and who willfully engages in the business of insurance whose activities

affect interstate commerce or participates in such business, shall be fined as provided in this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. On. S.C. Atfv Gen.. 2008 WL 2614984 (June 9, 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1033(e)(1)(A)). We noted that because most offenses involving moral turpitude seem to include dishonest behavior,

"reference to what offenses have been deemed crimes of moral turpitude may be useful in determining whether an offense is within the category of a felony involving dishonesty for purposes of the cited federal statute." Id. at *2. In line with the reasoning of our 2008 opinion,

we believe the inverse to also be true. In other words, crimes deemed to be crimes of dishonesty, such as impersonating a law enforcement officer, would be a useful indicator in determining whether the offense also categorizes as a crime of moral turpitude. Cases outside of our jurisdiction also provide support for the conclusion that the crime of

impersonating a law enforcement officer would be considered a crime of moral turpitude.

In

particular, our research reveals that crimes of impersonation, be it impersonation of a public

official, a licensed professional, or criminal impersonation generally, have been regarded as crimes of moral turpitude. See Beltran-Rubio v. Holder. 565 Fed.Appx. 704 (10th Cir. 2014) (concluding conviction under Colorado's criminal impersonation statute was a crime of moral

turpitude because the statute involves fraud in knowingly assuming a fake identity or capacity to achieve an intended goal); United States v. Bell. 351 F.2d 868, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1965) (finding the trial court's ruling that the crime of impersonating a police officer with intent to defraud

another person of a sum of money was properly admitted for impeachment purposes as the crime was "a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude"); Gamer v. Bureau of ProFl and Occupational Affairs. State Bd. of Optometry. 97 A.3d 437, 440-41 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (holding that because

crimes

of

official

oppression

and

impersonating

a

public

servant

involve

misrepresentation or concealment to induce others to act to their detriment, they include fraudulent conduct and therefore constitute crimes of moral turpitude); Saulmon v. State. 614 P.2d 83, 88 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (stating that "[bjecause the crime of impersonating a medical doctor involves deceit and misrepresentation it would appear to be encompassed by the definitions previously announced by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as involving moral turpitude").

Mr. Michael Beauford Jr.
Page 4

April 24, 2015

Conclusion
As a crime of dishonesty, implying something immoral in and of itself, it is our opinion

that a court would likely conclude that impersonation of a law enforcement officer is a crime of moral turpitude contrary to the customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Should you have any additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact our office.

Very truly yours,

Anne Marie Crosswell

Assistant Attorney General

D AND APPROVED BY:

2rt D. Cook
Solicitor General