Could Spartanburg County use school equalization tax revenue for salaries or property purchases in 1995?

Short answer A 1995 informal opinion said equalizing school funding was the county board’s primary financial objective. Salaries, administration and property purchases were permissible only if consistent with that objective; the opinion did not impose an absolute ban on other spending.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
1995-april-20-1995
Issued
April 20, 1995
Issued by
Office of the South Carolina Attorney General
Requested by
The Honorable G. Ralph Davenport, Jr., Member, House of Representatives

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1995. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an informal South Carolina Attorney General office opinion, not personally reviewed by the Attorney General or formally published. This summary is informational and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

A legislator asked whether Spartanburg County’s board of education could use taxes collected for school-district equalization to pay salaries, administrative expenses or buy land. In April 1995, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Robert Cook said the board had to treat equalization of school operating funds as its primary financial objective. Those other expenses were not categorically forbidden, but had to be consistent with that priority.

Cook relied on the county finance provisions and a 1969 AG opinion. He emphasized that the earlier opinion had called every other financial objective secondary to equalization, while not saying that every expenditure for another purpose was impossible. His answer addressed the consistency of proposed spending with that priority rather than approving any identified salary or real-estate transaction.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

County school board and finance staff

The letter said the board could not treat salaries, overhead or land purchases as independent reasons to divert money from its primary equalization objective. It left room for spending that served or remained consistent with that objective.

School districts

The statutes quoted in the letter described a countywide tax and a formula meant to guarantee a minimum educational funding level for children across the districts. Cook treated that equalization purpose as controlling the board’s financial choices.

Common questions

Were all non-equalization expenses prohibited?
No. Cook said the prior opinion did not reach an absolute ban; other financial objectives were secondary and expenditures had to be consistent with equalization.

Could the board pay administrative salaries from the funds? The letter did not approve a particular salary. It said the expenses named in the request would be impermissible unless consistent with the board’s primary equalization objective.

Why did the office rely on a 1969 opinion?
Cook said its interpretation still guided the office because he saw neither a clear error nor a relevant change in the law.

Background and statutory framework

The letter applied Spartanburg County finance provisions in the 1962 Code, especially Sections 21-4021 and 21-4022, as read by the office in 1969. It was an informal answer by an Assistant Deputy Attorney General; the Attorney General had not personally reviewed or formally published it.

Citations and references

  • Section 21-4021: equalization as the county board’s primary financial objective.
  • Section 21-4022: countywide school tax and funding formula quoted in the letter.

Source

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICEOFTHEATTORNEYGENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

April 20, 1995
The Honorable G. Ralph Davenport, Jr.
Member, House of Representatives
Post Office Box I 30 I
Spartanburg, South Carolina 29304
-=Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Representative Davenport:
You have requested the opinion of this Office as to whether tax monies collected for equalization purposes among the School Districts of Spartanburg County may be used by the County Board of Education (County Board) for any purpose other than equalization. The types of expenses about which you have questions include salaries, administrative expenses and the purchase of real property. Your questions relate to the following provisions of the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina for Spartanburg County which are quoted, in part, as follows: Section 2 I -402 I. In providing for the finances of the school system of Spartanburg County, the county board of education shall have as its primary objective equalization of funds available for the operation of all schools in the county. Section 21-4022 (as amended by Act No. 186, 1963 Acts of Joint Resolutions, 217). There shall be levied a 13 mill tax to be applied uniformly to all property in the county to guarantee a mini!Pum foundation program of public education to all children in the county . . . . The proceeds of this levy shall be credited by the county treasurer to the county board of education. The county board of education shall provide a formula to ensure each child attending public schools a minimum of $225 per pupil. RE\1BERT c. DEN:!S BL'ILDING

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POST OFFICE Box l 1549

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COLL'MBIA. s.c. 292J J.J549

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TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-153-618J

The Honorable G. Ralph Davenport, Jr.
Page 2
April 20, 1995
A previous Opinion of this Office reached the following conclusion about the duties of the County Board under Section 21-4021: " ... in providing for the finances of the school system under its control, [the Board] must make the equalization of funds for the operation of all of its schools the most important end toward which the Board's efforts are to be directed. Every other financial objective is secondary thereto. . . . " Ops. M!Y- Gen. (July I, 1969). The Opinion further concluded, with reference to whether §21-4022 funds could be used for equalization, that the " . . . County Board ... may bring about further equalization through appropriate utilization of all funds at its complete disposal. . . . " This Opinion continues to guide this Office because it is neither clearly erroneous nor has the applicable law changed in a way that would affect its conclusions. Ops. M:tY. Gen. (October 3, 1986). Although the 1969 Opinion did not conclude that no expenditures could be made other than for equalization, the Opinion strongly emphasized that the primary objective in providing for finances for the school system was equalization. Other financial objective are "secondary" to equalization. Ops. ~ Gen. (July 1, 1969). In conclusion, under the previous Opinion of this Office, the County Board of Education must use the funds at its disposal for the primary objective of equalization of funding. "Every other financial objective is secondary thereto," and any expenditures such as the ones that you have noted would not be permissible unless consistent with that primary objective. Ops. A!!Y· Gen. (July I, 1969). This letter is an informal Opinion. It has been written by designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the opinion of the undersigned attorney only as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally reviewed by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal Opinion. If you need other information, please let me know.

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Very truly yours,
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