Did a second South Carolina speeding conviction carry a different penalty under the law considered in 1996?

Plain-English summary

A Lancaster County magistrate asked how to sentence a second or later speeding offense when the specific speeding provision described its fines as applying to a first offense. He also asked whether an officer needed to note a prior offense on the summons. The 1996 AG concluded that the graded speeding penalties in Section 56-5-1520(d) covered speeding violations regardless of how many earlier speeding offenses the driver had. He found no separate increased penalty for repeat speeding in the law discussed, so the general fallback penalty in Section 56-5-6190 did not supply one.

The opinion reasoned that the legislature had carefully graded penalties by speed over the limit and had not made offense count another sentencing factor. It viewed a different repeat-offense penalty as a matter for the General Assembly. Because it found no separate repeat penalty, the letter did not prescribe a special notation of prior offenses on a summons.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the 1996 speeding provision increase fines for a second conviction?

The AG said no. He read the speed-based penalty schedule as governing violations without a separate increase tied to prior speeding offenses.

Did the general traffic penalty section supply a repeat-offense sentence?

No. The AG understood the general provision as applying when another penalty was not provided; the speeding provision already supplied graded penalties.

Did the AG require officers to list earlier speeding offenses on a summons?

The magistrate asked about this, but the opinion did not give a separate summons-format rule. Its answer rested on there being no distinct repeat-offense speeding penalty to apply.

Background and legal framework

The opinion interpreted Section 56-5-1520(d) alongside Section 56-5-6190. It discussed legislative intent, strict construction of criminal statutes, and the absence of an expressly higher repeat-offense punishment. The letter was an informal view of the signing assistant deputy attorney general.

Citations

• Section 56-5-1520(d); Section 56-5-6190.
• State v. Weeks; Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/april-2-1996/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/96apr2deese.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

April 2, 1996

The Honorable Lee R. Deese
Lancaster County Magistrate
P. 0. Box 1809
Lancaster, South Carolina 29721
Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Judge Deese:
You have asked our opinion on the penalty of Section 56-5-1520 and 56-5-6190 of the Code. You indicate that: Section 56-5-1520 paragraph "D" states upon conviction for a FIRST OFFENSE the penalty is stated in section I through 4 of paragraph D. Since this paragraph states first offense and direct[s] the penalty, the question is the following. If a person is charged ~ with speeding and this is their second or subsequent offense should the person be given a penalty under section ... 56-56190? I ask this question because section 56-5-1520 does not state a penalty for second or subsequent offense.

If the person's penalty is in section 56-5-6190, should the officer note the offense on the s'.llllIIlons when issued? I ask this question because a lot of bonds or fines are received through the mail. As you indicate, S.C. Code Ann. Section 56-5-1520(d) sets the penalties for speeding by degree. Such provision provides as follows: ""'

REMBERT

c. DENNIS Bl 1LDING
1

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POST OFFICE Box [ 1549

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Cot.l'MBIA,

s.c. 29211-l 549

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TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

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fACSIMl!...E: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Lee R. Deese
Page 2
April 2, 1996
[a]ny person violating the speed limits established by this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction for a first offense, must be fined or imprisoned as follows: ( 1)

in excess of the above posted limit but not in
excess of ten miles an hour by a fine of not less
than fifteen dollars nor more than twenty-five
dollars;

(2)

in excess of ten miles an hour but less than
fifteen miles an hour above the posted limit by
a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars nor
more than fifty dollars;

(3)

in excess of fifteen miles an hour but less than
twenty-five miles an hour above the posted limit
by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more
than seventy-five dollars; and

(4)

in excess oftwenty-fr:e miles an hour above the
posted limit by a fine of not less than seventyfive dollars nor more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned for more than thirty days.

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible. Bankers Trust of S.C. v. Bruce, 275 S.C. 35, 267 S.E.2d 424 (1980). A statutory provision should be given a reasonable ~d practical construction consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the statute:" Hay v. S.C. Tax Comm., 273 S.C. 269, 255 S.E.2d 837 (1979). Courts will reject the ordinary meaning of words used in a statute however plain it may be when to accept such meaning would defeat the plain legislative intent. Greenville Baseball v. Bearden, 200 S. C. 363, 20 L.E.2d 813 (1942). Moreover, legislative intent must be gathered from a reading of the statute as a whole in light of the circumstances and conditions existing at the time of its enactment and thus where the statutory language gives rise to doubt or uncertainty as to legislative intent, the search for such intent may range beyond the borders of the statute itself. Abell v. Bell, 229 S.C. 1, 91 S.E.2d 548 (1956). The court may properly consider the title or caption of an act in aid of construction to show intent of the legislature. Lindsav v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 258 S.C. 272, 188 S.E.2d 374 (1972). Finally, in

The Honorable Lee R. Deese
Page 3
April 2, 1996
view of the principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed, Lund v. Gray Line Water Tours, Inc., 277 S.C. 447, 289 S.E.2d 404 (1982), one charged with a crime must not only come within the letter of the law, but also the spirit. City of Anderson v. Fant, 96 S.C. 5, 79 S.E. 641 (1913). While Section 56-5-1520()d) speaks in tenns of the statute's being applicable to a "conviction for a first offense", nowhere else in the Code are there specified penalties for subsequent offenses for speeding. "Where there is a different and greater punishment for a subsequent offense, the settled law seems to be that an offense is considered a first offense unless the former offenses are not only proved on the trial, but also alleged in the indictment or allegation." State v. Weeks, 68 A.2d 426, 427 (N.J. 1949). Here, there is no "different and greater punishment for a subsequent offense .. . ." It is evident that Section 56-5-1520(d) was intended as a comprehensive speeding statute. Indeed, the General Assembly very carefully graded various speeds over the speed limit in terms of the punishment imposed. Moreover, the offense of speeding, to my knowledge, has never been viewed as one in this State where the punishment depends upon the particular number of offenses committed. Where such is the case in other jurisdictions it is made so by specific statutory authority. See e.g. State v. Pessefall, 621 N.E.2d 1370 (Ohio 1993) [second offense speeding within one year]. Thus, even though Section 56-5-1520(d) specifically mentions the phrase "i.rpon conviction for a first offense", and Section 56-5-6190 establishes a penalty "for a violation
... for which another penalty is not provided", the imposition of punishment for speeding based upon the number of speeding offenses committed is a legislative prerogative and c~nnot be implied through an opinion of this Office. In construing a statµte, a court cannot read into the statute something not within the manifest intention of the Legislature. Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964). Thus, it would be a matter for the General Assembly to further define the punishment for speeding in terms of the number of offenses committed. Moreover, the title to Act No. 1069 of 1970, the statutocy enactment where the graded penalties for speeding were inserted, casts further doubt upon the General Assembly's intent to punish subsequent offense for speeding differently from what is specified in the statute. The title declares Act No. 1969 to be An Act To Amend Section 46-196; Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, As amended, Relating To The Point System For Motor Vehicle Moving Violations, So As To

The Honorable Lee R. Deese
Page 4
April 2, 1996
Further Provide For Driving Too Fast For Conditions Or Speeding, And To Amend Section 46-361 of the 1962 Code, As Amended, Relating to Various Speed Limits, So As To Provide For Penalties For Violations. (emphasis added). The title to the Act thus uses the plural, "violations", indicating the Legislature's intent
.that Section 56-5-1520(d) constitutes the punishment for speeding irrespective of the number of offenses committed. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am Very truly yours,

·~

Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/an