Could a South Carolina county pay its veterans affairs officer for more than 45 days of military leave?

Plain-English summary

A legislator asked who could decide whether a county veterans affairs officer continued receiving county pay beyond forty-five days of military leave: the county government or the county legislative delegation. The April 2001 informal opinion said neither could authorize paid leave beyond that period under Section 8-7-90 as the AG read it.

The AG treated the veterans affairs officer as a county officer serving at the pleasure of the appointing legislative delegation. That meant the county's ordinary personnel policies did not govern the position. Even so, the delegation's control over how the officer served could not conflict with the state statute. The opinion suggested a legislative amendment if lawmakers wanted to allow local extensions.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2001. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

County veterans affairs officers

The opinion said the officer was a county officer but was appointed by and served at the pleasure of the county legislative delegation. It read Section 8-7-90 as applying to officers as well as employees of the state and political subdivisions.

Counties and legislative delegations

The letter said delegation personnel authority could not extend paid military leave past what the statute allowed. It also said county personnel policies did not apply to this appointed officer.

Common questions

Could the county extend this officer's paid military leave by policy?
A: The AG said no. County personnel policies did not govern this officer, and the state law capped paid military leave as the opinion understood it.

Could the legislative delegation approve extra paid days instead?
A: No. The opinion said the delegation controlled personnel policy for the appointed officer but could not adopt a policy inconsistent with Section 8-7-90.

How did the AG arrive at forty-five days?
A: The letter recounted fifteen days of annual paid military leave plus up to thirty additional days when called to serve during an emergency. It read “not exceeding” as a cap.

Background and statutory framework

A prior AG letter had applied Section 8-7-90 to political subdivision officers and employees called to military service. The April 2001 opinion applied that statute to the county veterans affairs officer, distinguished the delegation's appointment power from the county's personnel policies, and treated the statutory limit as controlling both.

Citations and references

• The AG said “neither the county nor the county legislative delegation would have the authority to extend the period for paid military leave beyond forty-five days.”
• It observed that the delegation's personnel policy “could not contravene state law.”

Official title

Concerning a veterans affairs officer asking if the officer “would be considered a county employee so that a decision to continue his county compensation beyond the 45 days of paid military leave pursuant to Section 8-7-90 turns on policies and procedures of the county government or, in the alternatives, whether a county legislative delegation has the authority to determine whether to continue this county compensation beyond the 45 days of paid military leave.”

Requester

The Honorable Alfred B. Robinson, Jr., Member, House of Representatives

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/april-11-2001/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/01april-11-robinson.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M. CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

April 11, 2001

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The Honorable Alfred B. Robinson, Jr.
Member, House of Representatives
P.O. Box 1561
Easley, South Carolina 29641
RE: Informal Opinion
Dear Representative Robinson:
By your letter of April 3, 2001, you have requested an opinion of this Office concerning a veterans affairs officer. You ask if the officer "would be considered a county employee so that a decision to continue his county compensation beyond the 45 days of paid military leave pursuant to Section 8-7-90 turns on policies and procedures of the county government or, in the alternative, whether a county legislative delegation has the authority to determine whether to continue this county compensation beyond the 45 days of paid military leave." Your letter results from a previous letter from Deputy Attorney General Zeb Williams to G. Edward Welmaker, the Pickens County Attorney. In that letter, Deputy Attorney General Williams advised that officers and employees of a political subdivision serving in the National Guard or Reserve Components are entitled to an aggregate of fifteen days of paid military leave per year, or, if called upon to serve in an emergency, up to an additional thirty days of paid leave. The letter also relied upon a memorandum of the State Director of Human Resources, who concluded that Section 8-7-90 would apply to all officers and employees called to active duty in Bosnia, entitling them to a maximum of forty-five working days of paid leave. Your follow-up question appears to ask if either the county or the county legislative delegation has the authority to extend the officer's compensation beyond the forty-five days authorized by Section 8-7-90. In a prior opinion of this Office, dated October 27, 1998, we advised that the county veterans affairs officer, although considered a county officer, would serve at the pleasure of the appointing body, the county legislative delegation. In this case, the power to appoint would include not only how long the officer serves, but how he serves, as well. Thus, we concluded, the county's employee personnel policies would be inapplicable to the veterans affairs officer. See OP.ATTY.GEN. Oct. 27, 1998.

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REMBERT

POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLUMBIA, S.C. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Representative Robinson
April 11, 2001

Page 2 of2

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That being said, however, we believe that neither the county nor the county legislative delegation would have the authority to extend the period for paid military leave beyond forty-five days. The prior opinion does suggest that the delegation would normally control the personnel policy applicable to the veterans affairs officer. However, that personnel policy could not contravene state law. Section 8-7-90 applies to "officers and employees ofthis State or a political subdivision." Thus, the State law is applicable to a county officer such as the veterans affairs officer. Section 8-7-90 further states that "[i]n the event any such person is called upon to serve during an emergency he is entitled to such leave of absence for not exceeding thirty additional days." (Emphasis added). The use of the language "for not exceeding" in the statute appears to cap the amount of time public employees and officers may be paid for military leave at a maximum of forty-five days. In our opinion, an attempt to extend the veterans affairs officer's paid military leave time beyond this period would be inconsistent with this statute. I have enclosed for your review an opinion of February 20, 1986, which supports this conclusion and advises that a city council could not authorize ninety days of paid military leave as part of its employee personnel policy. As a final note, you may wish to seek a legislative amendment to Section 8-7-90 that would allow county legislative delegations the authority to extend paid military leave for veterans affairs officers. Or, more broadly, the statute could allow political subdivisions the option to extend military leave for all of the political subdivision's employees and officers. Such an amendment would leave any extensions of paid military leave to the wise discretion of the delegation and local governing bodies. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I remain Very truly yours,

Susannah Cole
Assistant Attorney General