Did the firearm ban apply on Francis Marion University roads that were not open full time to public traffic?

Plain-English summary

Francis Marion University’s campus police chief asked how the 2005 firearm-possession statute applied to university roads. The law excluded certain state or locally owned roads and rights-of-way running through or next to campus property when they were open full time to public vehicular traffic. The chief said the university’s roads were not open full time in that way.

On that factual premise, the AG concluded that those roads did not fit the road exception and remained within the campus firearm ban, absent express permission from campus authorities or another statutory exception. He said whether a particular road was open full time was a factual question dependent on its circumstances.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the opinion treat every road through a campus as exempt?
No. The road exception turned on ownership or maintenance and whether the route was open full time to public vehicular traffic.

How did the AG treat Francis Marion’s roads?
Accepting the chief’s statement that they were not open full time, he concluded that the road exception did not apply.

Did the AG determine each road’s actual access conditions?
No. He described that as a factual determination and answered on the condition supplied by the requester.

Background and statutory framework

The letter quoted § 16-23-420, which prohibited firearm possession on school and university property without express permission, subject to listed exceptions. It focused on subsection (E), the exception for certain roads open full time to public traffic.

Citations and references

The original conclusion says road status is “a factual determination dependent upon individual, relevant facts and circumstances.”

Official title

Requested an interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-420.

Requester

Richard J. Austin, Chief, Campus Police, Francis Marion University

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/april-1-2005/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/05apr1austin.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY McMAsn:R
ATT'ORNEY GENERAL

April 1, 2005

Richard J. Austin, Chief
Campus Police, Francis Marion University
Box 100547
Florence, South Carolina 29501-0547
Dear Chief Austin:

In a letter to this office you requested an interpretation ofS.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-420 (Supp. 2004) which states: (A) It is unlawful for a person to possess a fireann of any kind on any premises or property owned, operated, or controlled by a private or public school, college, university, technical college, other post-secondary institution, or in any publicly-owned building, without the express permission ofthe authorities in charge of the premises or property. (B) It is unlawful for a person to enter the premises or property described in subsection (A) and to display, brandish, or threaten others with a firearm. (C) A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (D) This section does not apply to a guard, law enforcement officer, or member of the armed forces, or student of military science. A married student residing in an apartment provided by the private or public school whose presence with a weapon in or around a particular building is authorized by persons legally responsible for the security of the bui ldings is also exempted from the provisions of this section. (E) For purposes of this section, the terms "premises" and "property" do not include state or locally owned or maintained roads, streets, or rights-of-way ofthem, running through or adjacent to premises or property owned, operated, or controlled by a private or public school, college, university, technical college, or other post-secondary institution, which are open full time to public vehicular traffic. (F) This section does not apply to a person who is authorized to carry concealed weapons pursuant to Article 4, Chapter 31 of Title 23 when upon any premises, property, or building that is part of an interstate highway rest area facility.

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Chief Austin
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April 1, 2005
Such provision, therefore, makes it unlawful for an individual to possess a firearm of any kind on any premises or property owned, operated, or controlled by a university such as Francis Marion University unless otherwise permitted. Subsection (E) provides that "premises" and "property" as used in subsection (a) do not include state or locally owned or maintained roads or streets running through or adjacent to a university when those roads or streets "are open full time to public vehicular traffic." You referenced that the roads of Francis Marion University are not "open full time to public vehicular traffic".

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When interpreting the meaning of a statute, certain basic principles must be observed. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). Typically, legislative intent is determined by applying the words used by the General Assembly in their usual and ordinary significance. Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451 (1971). Resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting or expanding the operation of a statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). Courts must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991). Statutes should be given a reasonable and practical construction which is consistent with the policy and purpose expressed therein. Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166 (1966). The status of any roads or streets as to whether they are "open full time to public vehicular traffic" is a factual determination dependent upon individual, relevant facts and circumstances in a particular situation. In my opinion, inasmuch as the roads and streets of Francis Marion University are not as you indicate "open full time to public vehicular traffic", they are not exempt from the ban against possessing a firearm of any kind on any premises or property owned, operated, or controlled by the University without the express permission of the authorities in charge of the premises or property.

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If there are any questions, please advise.
Sincerely,

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Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General