Does the federal Guarantee Clause obligate Oregon to maintain a republican form of government, and is the obligation enforceable on individual state officials even though courts rarely entertain Guarantee Clause claims?

Plain-English summary

Senate President Peter Courtney sent the AG a series of questions about the federal Guarantee Clause, Article IV, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution. That clause provides that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence."

The questions arose from a long-running debate, especially intense in the early 2000s, about whether Oregon's heavy use of the initiative and referendum process is compatible with a "republican" (i.e., representative) form of government. Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), was the U.S. Supreme Court's classic answer that questions about whether a state's government remained "republican" were political questions for Congress to resolve, not for federal courts to adjudicate. The justiciability gap left state officials uncertain about how, if at all, the Guarantee Clause shaped their day-to-day decisions.

Attorney General Hardy Myers's answer was structured. First, the Guarantee Clause does obligate Oregon to maintain a republican form of government, and that obligation binds every Oregon official, not just the legislature. Second, the absence of a strong federal-court enforcement doctrine does not eliminate the obligation; it just changes the path of enforcement, with Congress as the primary enforcement actor and state institutions as the primary front-line implementers. Third, state officials may legitimately ask the AG for advice on whether a particular state-law proposal or practice complies with the Guarantee Clause. Fourth, where modern Supreme Court doctrine is sparse, historic sources (Federalist Papers, founding-era debates, framers' commentary, and state court opinions on parallel republican-government provisions in state constitutions) can inform the analysis.

The opinion did not adjudicate any specific Oregon law against the Guarantee Clause. It supplied a framework for asking the question.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2008. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. Federal Guarantee Clause litigation has continued to evolve since 2008 (notably Kerr v. Hickenlooper in the Tenth Circuit), so the precise contours of justiciability today may differ.

Common questions

Q: What is the Guarantee Clause?
A: Article IV, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence." It has three parts: (1) a federal guarantee of republican government, (2) a federal duty to repel invasion, and (3) a federal duty (on request) to suppress domestic violence within a state. This opinion addresses only the first part.

Q: Why did Senator Courtney ask about it in 2008?
A: Oregon has unusually robust direct-democracy mechanisms (initiative, referendum, recall) compared to most states. The political-science literature in the 1990s and 2000s repeatedly raised the question whether state policy-making by ballot initiative is consistent with the "republican form" the federal Constitution guarantees, in tension with the Pacific States Telephone holding that the question is non-justiciable. Senator Courtney's questions were part of a state-level effort to get clarity on whether legislators and executive officials had any active duty under the clause.

Q: Does the Guarantee Clause actually constrain state officials in practice?
A: The AG's reading was yes, but the constraint runs through political and conscience-based channels rather than judicial ones. Officials must take seriously their oath to support the U.S. Constitution, including the Guarantee Clause. Whether a particular state action so badly departs from republican government as to trigger the clause is a question where federal courts have largely deferred to Congress. But individual officials are still bound by the clause when they act.

Q: What about the U.S. Supreme Court's 1912 Pacific States Telephone decision?
A: That case held that whether Oregon's initiative-and-referendum system left it with a "republican form" of government was a non-justiciable political question. The Supreme Court has not retreated from that holding, even as it has narrowed the political-question doctrine generally (especially in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). The AG read Pacific States as limiting federal-court enforcement of the clause but not the clause's substantive content.

Q: Where does an Oregon official go when the U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken to a Guarantee Clause question?
A: The AG suggested historic sources and other states' jurisprudence. Many state constitutions (including Oregon's) have their own "republican form" or analogous provisions that state courts have interpreted. Federalist Nos. 39 and 43, Madison's other writings, and Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution all bear on the meaning of "republican form." State court decisions construing parallel state-constitutional language can supply persuasive guidance.

Background and statutory framework

The Guarantee Clause sits at the intersection of federal constitutional structure and state institutional design. Its historical purpose, as Madison and Hamilton explained in The Federalist, was twofold: to ensure the new states formed under the Constitution would be republics rather than monarchies or oligarchies, and to give the federal government a tool to protect those republics from internal subversion. Antebellum litigation around the clause (most famously Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)) established that the political branches of the federal government, not the courts, would generally decide which state government qualified as "republican."

The 20th-century Supreme Court has occasionally hinted that the clause might be enforced in narrow circumstances. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), referenced the clause without resting its anti-commandeering holding on it, but the Court declined to revisit the political-question doctrine. The post-2008 Kerr v. Hickenlooper litigation in the Tenth Circuit (challenging Colorado's TABOR amendment as contrary to a republican form of government) failed on standing grounds, leaving the substantive question untouched.

Senator Courtney's questions did not require the AG to decide any particular case. The opinion treats the Guarantee Clause as a constitutional principle that informs decisions made by Oregon officials in their own roles, even though federal courts will rarely review those decisions for compliance.

Citations and references

Constitutional provisions (as cited in the opinion):
- U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4

Cases:
- Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)
- Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)
- New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.doj.state.or.us/oregon-department-of-justice/office-of-the-attorney-general/attorney-general-opinions/
• Original PDF: https://www.doj.state.or.us/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/op8286.pdf

Original opinion text

October 30, 2008

No. 8286
This opinion responds to a series of questions posed by the Honorable Peter Courtney,
President of the Oregon State Senate, related to the Guarantee Clause provision of the United
States Constitution. The Guarantee Clause is set out in Article IV, section 4 of the United States
Constitution. In full, that section provides, “The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion;
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic violence.”
FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the United States Constitution obligate the State of Oregon to maintain a republican
form of government?
SHORT ANSWER
Yes.
SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED
If so, is this legal obligation binding on all state public officials, irrespective of whether
or how the obligation is judicially enforced?
SHORT ANSWER
Yes.
THIRD QUESTION PRESENTED
If so, may state officials obtain the legal opinion or advice of the Oregon Attorney
General on questions of compliance with the obligation?

SHORT ANSWER
Appropriate state officials may present questions about compliance with the Guarantee
Clause to the Attorney General.
FOURTH QUESTION PRESENTED
In the absence of modern substantive decisions by the United States Supreme Court, may
answers to such questions be derived from historic sources and opinions of courts in Oregon and
in other states?
SHORT ANSWER
The listed sources may provide useful guidance in answering this type of question.
FIFTH QUESTION PRESENTED
May the Legislature by statute set impartial standards and procedures for assuring
adherence to a republican form of government, so long as the statute does not contravene the
United States Constitution?
SHORT ANSWER
The Oregon legislature may establish impartial standards and procedures intended to
assure a republican form of government, so long as the legislation does not contravene the
Oregon Constitution, the United States Constitution, or governing federal law.
DISCUSSION
I.

The Guarantee Clause imposes obligations on states.

By its terms, the Guarantee Clause describes only federal obligations toward the states.
Its command is that “[t]he United States shall guarantee” a republican form of government and
protect the states from various kinds of violent strife. But the courts have determined that,
properly understood, the Guarantee Clause also imposes corresponding obligations on states.
Thus, in Minor v. Happersett, 88 US (212 Wall.) 162, 175, 22 L Ed 627 (1874), the United
States Supreme Court held that the Guarantee Clause “necessarily implies a duty on the part of
the States themselves to provide such a government.” The Oregon Supreme Court has also
recognized this implication of the Guarantee Clause. In Kadderly v. City of Portland, 44 Or 118,
144, 74 P 710 (1903), the court noted that one function of the Guarantee Clause is “to prevent
[the people of the several states] from abolishing a republican form of government.”
These judicial interpretations appear to mesh with the original intentions underlying the
Guarantee Clause. Discussing the Guarantee Clause at the Constitutional Convention, Edmund
Randolph indicated that “a republican government must be the basis of our national union; and
no state in it ought to have it in their power to change its government into a monarchy.” 1 Max
Farrand, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Farrand) at 206 (1911). The
Guarantee Clause, in substantially its final form, was later adopted after Nathaniel Gorham
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expressed concerns that in the absence of such a guarantee, “an enterprising Citizen might erect
the standard of Monarchy.” 2 Farrand at 48-49. Other discussion preceding the adoption of the
Guarantee Clause rejected James Madison’s formulation that would have guaranteed “the
Constitutional authority of the States,” out of concern that such a clause could enshrine existing
constitutions while failing to explicitly prohibit monarchy. 2 Farrand at 47-48. In addition to
suggesting that the founders intended that the Guarantee Clause be flexible enough to permit
change and variation, this history indicates that the courts have properly understood the clause to
require states to implement and maintain republican forms of government.
Moreover, the historical record contains examples of consequences to states for the
failure to maintain sufficiently republican forms of government. These examples arose during
the period of Reconstruction following the Civil War, when the federal government took an
active role in re-designing the governments of recalcitrant states of the defeated Confederacy. In
Texas, for example,
[T]he President of the United States issued his proclamation appointing a
provisional governor for the State, and providing for the assembling of a
convention, with a view to the re-establishment of a republican government,
under an amended constitution, and to the restoration of the State to her proper
constitutional relations. A convention was accordingly assembled, the
constitution amended, elections held, and a State government, acknowledging its
obligations to the Union, established.
Texas v. White, 74 US (1 Wall.) 700, 729, 19 L Ed 227 (1869). The United States Supreme
Court recognized that authority to “re-establish[] the broken relations of the State with the
Union” in this manner “was derived from the obligation of the United States to guarantee to
every state in the Union a republican form of government.” Id. at 727.
The Supreme Court’s description of the importance of the Guarantee Clause in relation to
events in Texas comports with the historical record of the federal government’s approach to
Reconstruction in the post-war South. President Lincoln’s Proclamation of Amnesty and
Reconstruction, 8 December 1863, indicated that the steps outlined in the proclamation would
result in Southern states receiving “the benefits of the Constitutional provision which declares
that ‘The United States shall guaranty [sic] to every State in this union a republican form of
government.’” Similarly, President Johnson’s appointments of provisional governors for
Southern states relied explicitly on the necessity to “enforce the obligations of the United States
* * * in securing [for the people of the states] the enjoyment of a republican form of
government” and authorized appointees to instigate proceedings for the development of
republican constitutions. Wiecek, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(Wiecek), at 189 (1972). Finally, the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867 authorized the
occupying Northern military commanders to begin the process of establishing popularly ratified
constitutions in the Southern states that would extend suffrage to black men. This process was a
precursor to the elimination of military government and federal recognition of a state’s
congressional delegation. Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
Scholars believe that “the guarantee clause’s importance * * * was so considerable that the
Military Reconstruction Act may properly be considered the fruition of it.” Wiecek at 206
(citing McKitrick, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960)).
3

In light of the above, we conclude that Article IV, section 4 of the United States
Constitution obligates Oregon to maintain a republican form of government. The federal and
state Supreme Courts have recognized such an obligation. The history surrounding the adoption
of the Guarantee Clause indicates the correctness of those judicial decisions. And historical
examples of consequences attaching to states’ failures to provide adequately republican
governments confirm the existence of Oregon’s duty.
II.

The obligation to maintain a republican form of government binds state officials.

Having concluded that the Guarantee Clause imposes a duty on the state to maintain a
republican form of government, we have no difficulty concluding that the obligation binds state
officials. We begin by noting that Article VI of the United States Constitution establishes that
the Constitution, along with other aspects of federal law, “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.” Article VI also specifically provides that “the Members of the several State Legislatures,
and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.” Consequently, the obligation to
maintain a republican form of government is binding on Oregon’s public officials.
The Oregon Constitution requires similar oaths. Article IV, section 31 specifies that
legislators’ oaths must include a commitment to “support the Constitution of the United States,
and the Constitution of the State of Oregon.” A similar requirement applies to judges under
Article VII (Amended), section 7. More generally, Article XV, section 3 provides that “[e]very
person elected or appointed to any office under this Constitution, shall * * * take an oath or
affirmation to support the Constitution of the United States, and of this State.”
III.

State officials may present questions concerning compliance with the Guarantee
Clause to the Attorney General.

The obligation to maintain a republican form of government is a legal obligation that
arises under law. Pursuant to ORS 180.060(2), the Attorney General shall provide a written
opinion on questions of law in which the State or any of its subdivisions has an interest when
requested by certain state officers. Consequently, we conclude that those state officials who
come within the parameters of those listed in ORS 180.060(2) may obtain the legal opinion of
the Attorney General on questions of compliance with the obligation to maintain a republican
form of government.
We note, however, that as to federal courts, the United States Supreme Court has held
that questions of a state’s compliance with the Guarantee Clause are not justiciable in federal
courts but instead lie with Congress to resolve. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,
223 U.S. 118, 151, 32 S. Ct. 224, 56 L.Ed. 377 (1912). The Oregon Supreme Court has inferred
from this holding that Oregon courts, as a matter of federal law, are also unable to decide issues
of compliance with the Guarantee Clause. Oregon ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597,
626, 932 P2d 1145 (1997); see also, Baum v. Newbrey et al., 200 Or 576, 584-585, 267 P2d 220
(1954).1/ Because of these court decisions as to the justiciability of Guarantee Clause
compliance issues there is little, if any, judicial guidance about the contours or boundaries of the
reach of the republican form of government guarantee. Consequently, there are no well-defined
standards against which to measure whether any particular situation comports with or violates
the Guarantee Clause.
4

The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of state government, however, and
conformance of all operations of state government with state and federal law is perhaps the
paramount responsibility of the position. Uncertainty about the meaning of the Guarantee Clause
may well temper the ability of the Attorney General to answer definitively questions about
compliance with the Guarantee Clause, and it may well mitigate the level of helpful guidance
that the Attorney General can provide. And, indeed, there may well be questions that arise under
the Guarantee Clause that do not present legal questions at all, but rather present political
questions not resolvable through legal analysis. These uncertainties will need to be addressed
when they arise and they will govern the proper response of the Attorney General to the specific
questions presented. As a general proposition, however, we conclude that appropriate state
officers can seek the counsel of the Attorney General on questions of compliance with the
Guarantee Clause.
IV.

Historic sources and opinions from state courts may provide guidance about
compliance with the obligation to provide a republican form of government.

Our answer to the fourth question presented is necessarily informed by the
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court and the Oregon Supreme Court indicating
that questions of compliance with the Guarantee Clause are “exclusively committed to Congress’
judgment.” Huddleston, 324 Or at 622. In general, the political branches have extensive
discretion when called upon to address such political questions; by definition, the courts do not
interfere with the resulting decisions. To the extent that the fourth question presented seeks
authoritative “answers” to political questions through examination of the materials described in
the question, the inherently discretionary nature of political power presents a significant barrier.
Simply put, Congress may not be bound to reach the results suggested by any particular
authority.
Nevertheless, the fact that questions concerning compliance with the requirements of the
Guarantee Clause are not justiciable does not eliminate the duty of elected officials to uphold the
United States Constitution. Historical decisions of the United States Supreme Court, along with
decisions by other state courts and various historic sources may be variously persuasive with
regard to the contours of that duty. Consideration of those sources would seem to provide the
best available guidance for concerned officials. Of course, given the well-documented ambiguity
of the meaning that the founders attached to the Guarantee Clause, see generally, Wiecek, above,
it seems likely that different officials may have good faith differences regarding the content of
the obligations imposed by the clause. Indeed, the United States Congress’s authoritative
understanding of those obligations may well change over time. By way of example, Wiecek
documents a number of competing understandings of the clause that were expressed in Congress
around and during the period of the Civil War. Wiecek at 166-243.
We note that there may be extreme examples where the failure to comply with the
Guarantee Clause is readily apparent. Examples would be attempts to institute monarchy or a
permanent military dictatorship. Regardless of the precise meaning of the Guarantee Clause, the
history of the adoption of the clause confirms what common sense tells us, namely that those
forms of government are anathema to the federal constitution.

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In short, we conclude that authoritative answers to questions of compliance with the
Guarantee Clause cannot reliably be derived from the sources recited in the question, or from any
other authority, with narrow exceptions. However, we believe that those sources provide the
best guidance to public officials who are concerned about such matters.
V.

The Oregon State Legislature may enact laws intended to ensure Oregon’s
compliance with requirements of the Guarantee Clause.

Our answer to the fifth question presented begins by noting the broad legislative authority
of the Oregon State Legislature. Article IV, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution states that “The
legislative power of the state, except for the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the
people, is vested in a Legislative Assembly.” There is nothing that would categorically prohibit
the legislature from enacting laws intended to assure the republican form of Oregon’s
government. There are, however, two relevant caveats.
First, we observe that the legislature’s lawmaking authority is subject to various
limitations. The question presented acknowledges the necessity of complying with the United
States Constitution. The legislature is also without power to enact laws that contravene treaties
of the United States, federal statutes or regulations in substantive fields where the federal
government’s authority is paramount, or the Oregon Constitution. In addition to establishing
some substantive limitations to the authority of the legislature, the state constitution also
establishes procedural requirements that must be followed.
Second, the ultimate authority of the United States Congress to determine whether the
state’s government is adequately republican makes it impossible to state with certainty that such
laws would be necessary or sufficient to achieve their intended purpose. Assuming that they are
properly enacted and do not overstep any of the limitations on legislative authority previously
discussed, such state laws would, of course, be operative. Thus, the Oregon Legislature could
establish impartial standards and procedures in an attempt to ensure adherence to a republican
form of government. But under the existing judicial decisions discussed above “[i]t rests with
Congress to decide what government is the established one in a state * * * as well as its
republican character,” Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42, 12 L Ed 581 (1849).

HARDY MYERS
Attorney General
HM:MCK:mcg/611585
1/

The United States Supreme Court, however, has not yet decided whether that is a correct
extension of its decision in Pacific Telephone & Telegraph. In addition, the United States Supreme
Court has suggested willingness to revisit the issue of whether claims under the Guarantee Clause are
justiciable, at least in some circumstances. See, New York v. U.S., 505 US 144, 184-186, 112 S Ct 2408,
120 L.Ed2d 120 (1992). We express no opinion here as to how the United States Supreme Court might
resolve the question of state court authority to decide issues of a state’s compliance with the obligation to
maintain a republican form of government should the Court examine the issue. We also express no

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opinion as to the position the State of Oregon should take on the merits if the United States Supreme
Court were to consider that issue.

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