OR OP 8280 2004-11-04

Does an Oregon police officer have to file an accident report after deliberately ramming a fleeing suspect's vehicle, and what happens if the officer doesn't?

Short answer: Yes, if the officer was driving the patrol vehicle when the intentional collision occurred and the collision met the ORS 811.720 thresholds (injury, death, or serious property damage). The 2004 AG opinion concluded that 'accident' included intentional collisions and contained no police-officer exception. If the officer didn't file the report, DMV had to suspend the officer's driving privileges and post the suspension on the non-employment driving record. Tactics that didn't involve driving — like spike strips or shooting tires — did not trigger the duty.
Currency note: this opinion is from 2004
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Oregon Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Oregon attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

Oregon DMV asked the AG two questions about police pursuit tactics:

  1. If a police officer intentionally collides with a fleeing suspect's vehicle, or otherwise intentionally damages it, while on duty, must the officer file an accident report?
  2. If the officer doesn't file a report when one is required, what does DMV have to do?

The AG split the first question along a "was the officer driving?" line.

If the officer was driving the patrol car and rammed the suspect's vehicle: the officer had to file an accident report under ORS 811.725 if the collision met ORS 811.720's reportable thresholds (personal injury, death, or property damage over $1,500 in the various combinations the statute specifies). The opinion explained that "accident" in the reporting statutes includes intentional conduct. State v. Parker, 299 Or 534 (1985), construed the same word in the predecessor hit-and-run statute and held that a driver who intentionally rammed another vehicle had been in an "accident" within the statute. Parker's reasoning was that the legislature used "accident" without any qualifying adjectives (intentional, accidental, etc.) and that the dictionary meaning of "accident" includes events caused by human agency that are unusual or unexpected from the affected person's perspective. The AG concluded Oregon courts would carry that reading over to ORS 811.720 and 811.725, both of which were recodifications from the same 1931 traffic-regulation framework. The legislature did not distinguish lawful from unlawful intentional collisions, and statutory construction rules forbid courts from inserting an unwritten exemption.

If the officer used a tactic that didn't involve driving — spike strips on the highway, shooting out tires from a stopped position: the officer was not "driving" within the meaning of ORS 811.725, so the reporting duty didn't attach. ORS 811.725 only applies to "the driver of a vehicle" who "is driving" when the accident occurs. The AG used the Webster's definition of "drive" ("to operate the mechanism and controls and direct the course of [a motor vehicle]") and the Oregon Court of Appeals's "driving = operation" reading from State v. Cruz, 121 Or App 241 (1993), and Moe v. Motor Vehicles Division, 133 Or App 75 (1995).

Reporting distinctions, applied to a typical pursuit: if an officer rammed a suspect's vehicle and the suspect lost control and hit a third party, the officer had to file an accident report even if the initial collision wasn't reportable on its own (because injury to third parties is a reporting trigger under ORS 811.720(1)). But if the officer used a spike strip and the suspect lost control after running over it and hit a third party, the officer didn't have to file because the officer wasn't driving.

On Question 2: ORS 809.417(1) required DMV to suspend the driving privileges of any person who failed to file a required accident report. So if DMV learned from another source (the suspect's report, a different agency's report, an investigation) that the officer had been in a reportable collision and hadn't filed, DMV had to suspend. The opinion noted DMV had no separate duty to hunt for unreported officer crashes; it acted when notice arrived. The suspension would last until the officer filed the report. ORS 802.200(10) controls where suspensions appear on driving records: only court-ordered or court-recommended employment-related suspensions go on the employment driving record. A failure-to-report suspension is not court-ordered, so it had to go on the officer's non-employment driving record. ORS 802.200(10)(b)–(c). That mattered because non-employment suspensions can affect the officer's personal-vehicle insurance under ORS 746.265.

The opinion was, in form, a textbook answer: same word ("accident") used in 1931 and the recodified statutes, judicial construction in Parker binding on that word, no statutory exception for police, statutory construction rules barring reading-in an exception. The substantive consequence — that an officer making a tactical decision under official policy to deliberately collide with a fleeing suspect could face DMV suspension if the paperwork wasn't filed — was the surprise to many readers.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2004. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

In particular, the dollar threshold in ORS 811.720(2) (then $1,500) has been changed over the years, and the legislature has periodically reorganized the accident-reporting scheme. Anyone using this opinion to evaluate current obligations should check the current text of ORS 811.720, 811.725, 811.730, 811.735, and 809.417, plus DMV's current accident-reporting forms and procedures.

Background and statutory framework

ORS 811.720 prescribes when an "accident" is reportable. Subsection (1) covers any accident on a highway or premises open to the public resulting in personal injury or death. Subsection (2) covers accidents resulting in property damage over $1,500 (then) under various sub-conditions: damage to the driver's vehicle exceeds $1,500, damage to property other than the involved vehicles, or a vehicle had to be towed.

ORS 811.725 imposes the reporting duty on "the driver of a vehicle" who "is driving any vehicle that is involved in an accident required to be reported under ORS 811.720." The driver has 72 hours to complete a DMV-approved report. Failure to report is a Class B traffic violation.

ORS 809.417(1) tells DMV what to do when a driver fails to file a required report: suspend the driver's privileges. The suspension continues until the driver files the report.

Two Webster's-grade definitions did real work. "Accident" — the AG took this from State v. Parker, 299 Or 534 (1985), which had construed "accident" in former ORS 483.602 (the 1931 hit-and-run statute and the direct ancestor of ORS 811.720 and 811.725). Parker held that "accident" included intentional collisions. The court reasoned that the 1931 framework used "accident" in three sections (Or Laws 1931, ch 360, §§ 15-17) without any qualifying adjective — every section used the word the same way, to describe an impact between a vehicle and an object, regardless of intent. The court drew on Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "accident" as covering events caused by human agency that are "unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens." That framing makes intentional collisions still "accidents" from the receiving driver's perspective, even when the colliding driver acted on purpose. The 1983 recodification (Or Laws 1983, ch 338, § 3) replaced ORS 483.602 with ORS 811.700, 811.705, 811.720, and 811.725 without changing the word "accident" or its meaning.

"Drive" — the AG drew on Webster's ("to operate the mechanism and controls and direct the course of [a motor vehicle]") and on State v. Cruz, 121 Or App 241 (1993), and Moe v. MVD, 133 Or App 75 (1995). Those Court of Appeals cases (DUI-context) treated "driving" as synonymous with "operation," so a passenger who took the steering wheel and pressed the accelerator could be a "driver." That reading kept the focus on whether the actor was operating the vehicle's mechanism at the moment of the accident-causing act.

The same-words-same-meaning canon (PGE v. BOLI, 317 Or 606, 611 (1993)) carried "accident" from former ORS 483.602 forward to ORS 811.720 and 811.725. The no-implied-exception canon (ORS 174.010, prohibiting courts from inserting words the legislature omitted) ruled out a police-officer exemption.

Other states' courts had relied on Parker's analysis to reach the same result for their own statutes: State v. Silva, 24 P3d 477 (Wash 2001) (Washington); Wylie v. State, 797 P2d 651 (Alaska App 1990); People v. Laursen, 222 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1985); People v. Martinson, 409 N.W.2d 754 (Mich. 1987). The AG cited those to show the result wasn't an outlier.

DMV record placement is governed by ORS 802.200(10). Only employment-related suspensions ordered or recommended by a court under ORS 809.280 go on the employment driving record. A failure-to-report suspension under ORS 809.417(1) is not court-ordered, so it goes on the non-employment driving record. ORS 802.200(10)(b)–(c). And under ORS 746.265, an insurer can consider non-employment record suspensions when issuing, renewing, or pricing a personal-vehicle policy. So an officer's failure-to-report suspension could indirectly affect the officer's personal car insurance.

ORS 811.720(1) and 811.735 also impose reporting duties on passengers if the driver is incapable. If a partner officer was a passenger in the patrol car at the time of the collision and the driver was incapacitated, the partner had the report duty. A passenger's failure to report is a Class B traffic violation but does not trigger license suspension under ORS 809.417(1).

Common questions

Q: At the time of this opinion, did an Oregon police officer who intentionally rammed a fleeing suspect have to file an accident report?
A: Yes, if the officer was driving the patrol car and the collision met ORS 811.720's reportable-accident criteria (personal injury, death, or significant property damage). The opinion read "accident" to include intentional conduct, following State v. Parker, and found no police-officer exception in the statutes.

Q: What about non-driving tactics like spike strips or shooting out tires?
A: Those did not trigger the reporting duty. ORS 811.725 only applied to "the driver of a vehicle" who "is driving" when the accident occurred. An officer using a spike strip from a stationary position or shooting out a tire from outside the patrol vehicle was not driving in any relevant sense.

Q: What if a third party got hurt because of a chain reaction?
A: That depended on whether the officer was the driver of a vehicle that was "involved in" the accident under ORS 811.720. The opinion gave an example: officer rams suspect, suspect loses control and strikes a third vehicle injuring its occupants. The officer had to file even if the initial ram-collision wasn't reportable on its own, because the third-party injury was a separate reportable accident in which the officer's vehicle was involved. By contrast, if the chain reaction came from a spike strip rather than a ram, no driving = no reporting duty for the officer.

Q: What did DMV have to do if the officer didn't file?
A: ORS 809.417(1) required DMV to suspend the officer's driving privileges. The suspension continued until the officer filed the report. The opinion noted that DMV had no general duty to investigate unreported officer-involved accidents; DMV acted when notice came in from another source.

Q: Did the suspension show up on the officer's employment driving record?
A: No. Only court-ordered or court-recommended employment-related suspensions go on the employment record. ORS 802.200(10)(b). A failure-to-report suspension goes on the non-employment record. ORS 802.200(10)(c). That meant insurance carriers could consider it when pricing the officer's personal car insurance under ORS 746.265.

Q: Did the officer's compliance with department pursuit policy matter to the AG's analysis?
A: No. The AG noted that the meaning ascribed to "accident" in Parker did not include any unlawfulness requirement, and nothing in ORS 811.720 or 811.725 created a police-officer exemption. Whether the intentional collision was lawful (police pursuit policy) or unlawful (criminal mischief in Parker) didn't change the reporting obligation.

Q: What if the legislature wanted to exempt officers?
A: The AG's closing on Question 1 said: "To achieve a contrary result, the legislature would need to amend the relevant statutes, either to exempt on-duty police officers from reporting intentional collisions or to define 'accident' for reporting purposes in a way that excludes this type of collision."

Citations and references

Statutes and session laws:

  • ORS 174.010 (no inserting omitted exemptions)
  • ORS 746.265 (insurer reliance on driving records)
  • ORS 801.370 (definition of "operation")
  • ORS 802.200(10) (driving-record placement of suspensions)
  • ORS 809.280 (court-ordered employment-related suspensions)
  • ORS 809.417(1) (DMV must suspend for failure to file an accident report)
  • ORS 811.700, 811.705 (recodifications of former ORS 483.602)
  • ORS 811.720(1), (2) (reportable-accident triggers)
  • ORS 811.725 (driver's duty to file accident report)
  • ORS 811.730 (owner's duty to file)
  • ORS 811.735 (passenger's duty to file when driver incapable)
  • former ORS 483.602 (1931 hit-and-run statute, repealed 1983)
  • former ORS 486.221 (predecessor of 809.440(1)(a))
  • Or Laws 1931, ch 360, §§ 15-17 (uniform traffic regulation)
  • Or Laws 1983, ch 338, § 3 (recodification, no substantive change to "accident")
  • Or Laws 1983, ch 338, § 978 (repeal of former ORS 483.602)

Cases:

  • PGE v. BOLI, 317 Or 606 (1993), Oregon statutory construction
  • State v. Parker, 299 Or 534 (1985), "accident" includes intentional collisions in the predecessor statute
  • State v. Cruz, 121 Or App 241 (1993); Moe v. MVD, 133 Or App 75 (1995), "driving" equals "operation"
  • Norden v. State ex rel. Water Resources Dept., 329 Or 641 (2000); State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525 (1998), case law as part of statutory context
  • State v. Silva, 24 P3d 477 (Wash 2001); Wylie v. State, 797 P2d 651 (Alaska App 1990); People v. Laursen, 222 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1985); People v. Martinson, 409 N.W.2d 754 (Mich. 1987), other states' courts following Parker

Source

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

November 4, 2004

No. OP-8280

This opinion is issued in response to questions from the Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division of the Department of Transportation (DMV) about the accident reporting requirements for a police officer who intentionally collides with or otherwise intentionally damages a vehicle while in the performance of the officer's duties, and DMV's responsibilities in response to a police officer who fails to file an accident report.

FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED

If, while performing official duties, a police officer either intentionally drives into another vehicle or, while not driving a vehicle, intentionally damages another vehicle, is the officer required to file an accident report?

ANSWER GIVEN

A police officer must file an accident report if the officer intentionally drives into another vehicle and the collision results in consequences specified in ORS 811.720, e.g., personal injury. An officer who is not operating a vehicle when he or she intentionally damages another vehicle is not required to file an accident report, even if the officer's actions result in consequences specified in ORS 811.720.

SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED

If a police officer fails to file a required accident report, what action, if any, must DMV take?

ANSWER GIVEN

If a police officer fails to make a required accident report, DMV is required to suspend driving privileges and post the suspension on the officer's non-employment driving record.

DISCUSSION

I. Accident Reporting Requirements

ORS 811.720(1) provides that any "accident" occurring on a highway or premises open to the public that results in personal injury or death is subject to the reporting requirements prescribed by ORS 811.725. ORS 811.720(2) provides that a driver involved in an "accident" occurring on a highway or premises open to the public is subject to the reporting requirements prescribed by ORS 811.725 if damage to the property of any person exceeds $1500 and either (a) damage to the driver's vehicle exceeds $1500; (b) the damage is to property other than a vehicle involved in the accident; or (c) a vehicle involved must be towed from the scene because of damage from the accident. The driver of a vehicle involved in an "accident" required to be reported under ORS 811.720 must file an accident report within 72 hours. ORS 811.725. The driver either files the report with, or it is forwarded to, DMV.

Police officers sometimes intentionally collide with a vehicle as a means to apprehend a fleeing suspect. Alternatively, officers will sometimes intentionally damage and disable a vehicle through other methods, such as shooting its tires or laying a spiked barrier strip across the roadway. In most if not all circumstances, the vehicle with which a police officer collides or that is otherwise damaged is one in which the suspect is a driver or passenger. In answering your first question, we first determine whether a police officer's intentionally colliding with a suspect's vehicle is an "accident" for purposes of the reporting requirements stated in ORS 811.720 and 811.725.

A. Intentional Collisions

In the text of a statute, "words of common usage typically should be given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning." PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). To determine the plain, natural, and ordinary meaning of a word such as "accident," we would usually begin by consulting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993) (WEBSTER'S). However, in this instance, the Oregon Supreme Court has already considered the meaning of "accident" within the context of the original 1931 enactment governing driver responsibilities subsequent to traffic accidents. State v. Parker, 299 Or 534, 704 P2d 1144 (1985). Therefore, we begin our analysis with Parker.

Parker interpreted "accident" specifically within the context of former ORS 483.602, which required the driver of a vehicle involved in an "accident" resulting in death, injury or damage to a vehicle to stop "immediately" and "remain at the scene" until he had fulfilled certain specific duties, such as an exchange of information and the rendering of aid. Parker, 299 Or 534. In that case, the defendant was prosecuted for violating ORS 483.602 (among other charges) for failing to perform duties of a driver involved in an accident after deliberately driving his vehicle into another in order to damage it. He contended that he was not in an "accident" because the collision was intentional. The court disagreed, holding that the legislature intended "accident" to encompass intentional as well as unintentional conduct and that a driver who intentionally collides with a vehicle has had an "accident." Id. at 542-43.

Although Parker interprets "accident" as it appears in former ORS 483.602 instead of ORS 811.720 or 811.725, all three statutes prescribe driver behavior following traffic accidents. Moreover, in discerning legislative intent, Parker refers back to the law enacted in 1931 to establish uniform traffic regulation, noting that the legislature used the term "accident" in three sections of the law. Id. at 541 citing Or Laws 1931, ch 360, §§ 15-17. Two of the three relevant sections, sections 15 and 16, were the precursors to both former ORS 483.602 and the current statutes governing stopping at the scene and reporting accidents to DMV. The court stated that "accident" was used "throughout sections 15 and 16 to represent situations where an impact between a vehicle and an object has occurred. No adjectives were used to qualify or restrict the word in any way." Id. at 541-42. The court relied on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY to conclude that "[w]hen taken in its natural and obvious sense, 'accident' can mean 'if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens.'" Id. at 542.

For that reason, we would expect the court to employ the same analysis in discerning the legislature's intent with regard to ORS 811.720 and 811.725. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (term repeated within statute should be interpreted consistently throughout). Based on the meaning of "accident" ascribed in Parker, we conclude that the fact that a police officer's collision with a suspect's vehicle is intentional does not, by that fact alone, make the collision any less an "accident" as that term is used in ORS 811.720 and 811.725.

We recognize that there are differences between the facts in Parker and the question that you pose. In Parker, the driver intentionally struck another vehicle when committing the crimes of criminal mischief and menacing, while an intentional collision caused by a police officer pursuant to policy is a lawful act. However, the meaning ascribed to "accident" in Parker does not include that the event be unlawful. Neither does anything in the text and context of ORS 811.720 and 811.725 suggest an exemption for police officers. For a court to find such an exemption would be inconsistent with the rule of statutory construction that requires a court to neither "insert what has been omitted" or "omit what has been inserted" by the legislature. ORS 174.010.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the accident reporting requirements of ORS 811.720 and 811.725 apply to a police officer who, while performing official duties, drives a vehicle so as to intentionally collide with another vehicle. To achieve a contrary result, the legislature would need to amend the relevant statutes, either to exempt on-duty police officers from reporting intentional collisions or to define "accident" for reporting purposes in a way that excludes this type of collision.

B. Intentional Damage Not Caused By a Collision

You also ask whether police officers are obligated to file accident reports when they take other types of action to damage another vehicle, for example, shooting out the tires on a suspect's vehicle. ORS 811.725 requires the "driver" of a vehicle to report an accident when he or she is "driving" any vehicle that is involved in an accident. In the context of motor vehicles, the plain, natural and ordinary meaning of "drive" is "to operate the mechanism and controls and direct the course of (as a motor vehicle or speedboat)." WEBSTER'S at 692. In interpreting statutes addressing driving under the influence, the Oregon Court of Appeals has held that "driving" is synonymous with "operation," so that a person in the passenger seat who takes a hold of the steering wheel and presses the accelerator or turns on the ignition and places the car in gear is a "driver" of the car. State v. Cruz, 121 Or App 241, 855 P2d 191 (1993); Moe v. Motor Vehicles Division, 133 Or App 75, 889 P2d 1334 (1995). Accounting for the meaning of "driving" provided by WEBSTER'S and Oregon case law, we conclude that a police officer is not required to file an accident report when the officer intentionally damages a vehicle by an act such as placing a spiked barrier across the highway or shooting out the tires of a vehicle, i.e., an act that does not involve the officer driving a vehicle.

C. Reporting Distinctions

ORS 811.725 requires reporting when a person is driving a vehicle that is involved in a reportable accident. For example, in the context of a police officer's intentional collision with a suspect's car, the statutes require that the officer file an accident report if either the officer's or the suspect's vehicle causes injury to any person. If the officer's vehicle collides with the suspect's and the suspect loses control and strikes another car causing injury to the occupants, the officer must file an accident report, even if the initial collision is not reportable because neither the officer nor the suspect was injured and damage to the vehicles caused by the collision is less than $1500. But, if the suspect causes such injury as a result of losing control of his vehicle after puncturing a tire upon hitting a spiked barrier placed by the police officer, the officer does not have to file an accident report.

II. Suspension of Driving Privileges for Failure to File an Accident Report

ORS 809.417(1) requires DMV to suspend the driving privileges of a person who fails to file an accident report as required under ORS 811.725. Having concluded that a police officer who drives so as to intentionally collide with a vehicle must comply with the requirements of ORS 811.720 and 811.725, DMV must suspend the officer's driving privileges and right to apply for driving privileges if the officer does not file an accident report and DMV learns of the collision from another source. We are not aware, however, of any statute that would require DMV to search out unreported accidents involving police officers. A suspension under ORS 809.417(1) continues until the police officer files the accident report.

Because DMV may place only employment-related suspensions that are ordered or recommended by a court under ORS 809.280 on a person's employment driving record, ORS 802.200(10)(b), DMV must post the suspension of driving privileges due to a failure to file an accident report on the police officer's non-employment driving record. ORS 802.200(10)(c). Because suspension for failure to report is on the police officer's non-employment driving record, an insurance company could consider the suspension for purposes of issuing, renewing, or canceling a policy or for setting insurance rates on the police officer's personal vehicles. ORS 746.265.

HARDY MYERS
Attorney General

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