When Oregon guarantees school district bonds, does the constitutional cap of one-half of one percent of property value limit the amount of bonds Oregon can guarantee, or just the amount Oregon would have to pay if a district defaults?

Plain-English summary

Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 54 in 1998, adding Article XI-K to the constitution. That provision authorized the state to guarantee general obligation bonds issued by school districts, education service districts, and community college districts. The guarantee made the state legally responsible for paying the bondholders if the local district defaulted.

Article XI-K capped the state's exposure at "one-half of one percent of the true cash value of all taxable property in Oregon." The question was what that cap actually limited. Was it (a) the total face amount of school bonds the state could guarantee at any one time, or (b) the amount of state debt incurred when the state actually had to pay on a guarantee?

The AG concluded the cap applied only to the amount of debt the state may incur in honoring its guaranty. School bonds guaranteed by the state but being paid on time by the issuing district did not count against the cap, because the state hadn't yet incurred any debt on those guarantees. The cap was a limit on the state's own contingent debt, not on the size of the program.

That had a meaningful practical effect. If the cap had limited the total face amount of guaranteed bonds, the program's capacity would have been constrained to one-half of one percent of the state's true cash value, even though most districts pay their bonds on time and never draw on the guarantee. Reading the cap that way would have tied up guarantee capacity on districts that never needed the state to pay.

By tying the cap to the state's actual contingent debt, the AG's reading let Oregon back the full universe of school bonds while keeping the constitutional limit as a backstop. The cap would matter only if defaults were so widespread that the state's payment obligations approached the half-percent threshold.

The AG used standard PGE statutory interpretation methodology, supplemented by Roseburg School Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374 (1993), and Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38 (2000), for the additional steps of interpreting voter-approved constitutional amendments. The text, context, and history all supported reading the cap as a debt cap, not a guarantee cap.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2001. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Why does Oregon guarantee school district bonds?
Because the state guarantee lets school districts borrow at lower interest rates. Investors see the state's credit standing behind the bonds and demand less yield. The savings can be substantial over the life of a long-term bond. The voters approved Measure 54 in 1998 specifically to provide this borrowing-cost benefit to school districts.

How does the half-percent cap actually work?
Under the AG's reading, the cap limits the state's contingent debt, not the total face amount of guaranteed bonds. So long as school districts are paying their bonds on time, the state hasn't incurred any debt under the guarantee, and the cap doesn't constrain the program. The cap kicks in only if widespread defaults force the state to pay on guarantees.

Could the state guarantee an unlimited amount of school bonds under this reading?
The constitution itself sets no limit on the guarantee amount under the AG's reading. But the opinion notes the guaranty is discretionary, not mandatory, and that ORS 328.331(2)(g) authorizes the State Treasurer to set reasonable limits by rule on the total amount of school bonds the state guarantees, taking account of default risk.

What happens if a school district actually defaults?
The state steps in and pays the bondholders, drawing on available state funds, borrowing from the Common School Fund, or issuing state bonds (Article XI-K, sections 2 and 4). That payment is the state debt that counts against the half-percent cap.

Was the text clear, or was this a close call?
The AG found the text and context of Article XI-K pointed to the debt-cap reading; the alternative would render the last sentence of section 2 (which authorizes the guaranty itself) superfluous. The history was admittedly contradictory: two of the three Voters' Pamphlet statements for Measure 54 suggested the guarantee amount itself was capped, while the explanatory statement limited only the state's own bond issuance. The AG concluded the debt-cap reading was the only one that would not do violence to the text.

Background and statutory framework

Article XI-K of the Oregon Constitution was approved by voters as Ballot Measure 54 in 1998. The article authorizes the state to guarantee general obligation bonds issued by school districts, education service districts, and community college districts. The article caps the state's obligation at "one-half of one percent of the true cash value of all taxable property in Oregon."

The AG applied standard PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606 (1993), methodology, supplemented by Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38 (2000), for interpreting voter-approved constitutional amendments. The methodology examines text, context (including related ballot measures and prior provisions), and history (including ballot title, explanatory statement, and Voters' Pamphlet arguments).

Roseburg School Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374 (1993), confirms that the objective of interpreting a voter-approved constitutional provision is to discern the intent of the voters.

Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551 (1994), and SAIF Corporation v. Walker, 330 Or 102 (2000), provide further guidance on construing voter-adopted constitutional provisions.

Citations

• Oregon Constitution Article XI-K (state guarantee of school district bonds)
• Ballot Measure 54 (1998) (referred measure adopting Article XI-K)
• ORS 174.010 (statutory construction rules)
• Roseburg School Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374 (1993) (voter intent objective)
• Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38 (2000) (interpretation of voter-approved provisions)
• PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606 (1993) (statutory interpretation methodology)
• Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551 (1994)
• SAIF Corporation v. Walker, 330 Or 102 (2000)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.doj.state.or.us/oregon-department-of-justice/office-of-the-attorney-general/attorney-general-opinions/
• Original PDF: https://www.doj.state.or.us/wp-content/uploads/2001/02/op8276.pdf

Original opinion text

February 6, 2001

No. 8276
This opinion is issued in response to a question from Chuck Smith, Director of the Debt
Management Division of the Oregon State Treasury, concerning Article XI-K of the Oregon
Constitution, which authorizes the state to guarantee general obligation bonds issued by school
districts, education service districts and community college districts (school bonds).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the limitation in Article XI-K of one-half of one percent of the true
cash value of all taxable property in Oregon apply to (a) the amount of school
bonds that the state may guarantee, or (b) the amount of debt that the state itself
may incur to honor its guaranty, or both?
ANSWER GIVEN
The limitation applies only to the amount of debt that the state may incur in honoring its
guaranty of school bonds.
DISCUSSION
I.

Methodology for Interpreting Constitutional Provisions

Before addressing the question that we have been asked, we briefly describe our method
of analysis for interpreting constitutional provisions approved by the voters, the objective of
which “is to discern the intent of the voters.” See Roseburg School Dist. v. City of Roseburg,
316 Or 374, 378, 851 P2d 595 (1993).
Article XI-K of the Oregon Constitution was approved by the voters as referred Ballot
Measure 54 (1998). In interpreting a constitutional provision adopted by referral, the Oregon
Supreme Court applies the same method of analysis that it applies to initiated constitutional
amendments. Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 61, 11 P3d 228 (2000). Thus, the
court applies the same method of analysis that it applies to the construction of a statute. See
Roseburg, 316 Or at 378; Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551,

560 n 8, 871 P2d 106 (1994); PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries (PGE), 317 Or 606, 612
n 4, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).
We follow the same methodology. We first look at the text and context of the provision
to determine the intent of the voters, with the text being the best evidence of their intent. PGE,
317 Or at 610. In interpreting the text, we consider statutory and judicially developed rules of
construction “that bear directly on how to read the text,” such as “not to insert what has been
omitted, or to omit what has been inserted,” and to give words of common usage their plain,
natural and ordinary meaning. Id. at 611; ORS 174.010. An analysis of the text includes
relevant case law interpreting that text. Stranahan, 331 Or at 61 (2000). The context of a
constitutional provision adopted by ballot measure includes related ballot measures before the
voters at the same election, related constitutional provisions that were in place when the
provision at issue was adopted, and case law interpreting such provisions. Id., at 62 n 15;
Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 560 n 8; SAIF Corporation v. Walker, 330 Or 102, 108, 996
P2d 979 (2000). If the voters' intent is clear from the text and context, the analysis ends there.
The Oregon Supreme Court, however, is unlikely to conclude analysis of an initiated measure at
the first level of review. Stranahan, 331 Or at 64.
The second level of review is an examination of the history of the provision. The history
of a referred constitutional provision includes information available to the voters at the time the
measure was adopted that discloses the public's understanding of the measure. Ecumenical
Ministries, 318 Or at 560 n 8. Sources of such information include the ballot title, explanatory
statement and arguments for and against the measure included in the Voters' Pamphlet as well as
contemporaneous news reports and editorials on the measure. Id. The extent to which these
sources of information will be considered depends on their objectivity, as well as their disclosure
of public understanding. Stranahan, 331 Or at 65 (citing LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB, 284 Or
173, 184 n 8, 586 P2d 765 (1978)).
II.

Interpretation of Article XI-K

With the above principles in mind, we now turn to Article XI-K of the Oregon
Constitution. Article XI-K provides in relevant part:
Section 1. To secure lower interest costs on the general obligation bonds
of school districts * * * , the State of Oregon may guarantee the general obligation
bonded indebtedness of those districts as provided in sections 2 to 6 of this Article
and laws enacted pursuant to this Article.
Section 2. In the manner provided by law and notwithstanding the
limitations contained in sections 7 and 8, Article XI of this Constitution, the
credit of the State of Oregon may be loaned and indebtedness incurred, in an
amount not to exceed, at any one time, one-half of one percent of the true cash
value of all taxable property in the state, to provide funds as necessary to satisfy
the state guaranty of the bonded general obligation indebtedness of school
districts * * * that qualify * * * to issue general obligation bonds that are
guaranteed by the full faith and credit of this state. The state may guarantee the
general obligation debt of qualified school districts * * * and may guarantee

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general obligation bonded indebtedness incurred to refund the school district * * *
general obligation bonded indebtedness.

Section 4. The State of Oregon may issue bonds if and as necessary to
provide funding to satisfy the state’s guaranty obligations undertaken pursuant
to this Article. In addition, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Article
VIII of this Constitution, the state may borrow available moneys from the
Common School Fund if such borrowing is reasonably necessary to satisfy the
state’s guaranty obligations undertaken pursuant to this Article. The State of
Oregon also may issue bonds if and as necessary to provide funding to repay the
borrowed moneys, and any interest thereon, to the Common School Fund. * * *
(Emphasis added.) Article XI-K, section 1, authorizes the state to guarantee school bonds as
provided in the remainder of the Article. The first sentence of section 2 authorizes the state to
loan its credit and incur indebtedness “to provide funds as necessary to satisfy the state
guaranty,” notwithstanding the limitations in Article XI, sections 7 and 8.1 This authority is
limited, however, to one-half of one percent of the true cash value of all taxable property in the
state. The last sentence of section 2 authorizes the state to guarantee the general obligation
bonds of school districts. Unlike the first sentence, this authority appears to be unlimited.
Section 4 authorizes the state both to issue bonds and to borrow from the Common School Fund
if necessary to provide funds “to satisfy the state’s guaranty.” Section 5 provides that any state
bonds issued pursuant to Article XI-K are direct obligations of the state. Finally, section 6
provides that Article XI-K “shall supersede all conflicting constitutional provisions.”
a.

Text and Context

From the text of Article XI-K, section 2, we know two things – first, that the state is
authorized to lend its credit and to incur indebtedness “to provide funds as necessary to satisfy
the state guaranty” of school bonds and, second, that the amount of this credit and indebtedness
is limited to “an amount not to exceed, at any one time, one-half of one percent of the true cash
value of all taxable property in the state.”2
We are asked whether the credit and indebtedness that is so limited refers only to the
amount of bonds or other debt that the state may incur to honor its guaranty or whether it also
refers to the amount of school bonds that the state may guarantee. To answer this question, we
must interpret the phrase “the credit of the State of Oregon may be loaned and indebtedness
incurred * * * to provide funds as necessary to satisfy the state guaranty [of school bonds].”
In guaranteeing school bonds, the state undertakes to pay on those bonds if the school
district that issued them fails to do so. See 38A CJS Guaranty § 2. As a practical matter, the
state guarantees school bonds by providing a backup source of payment for the school bonds that
is a general obligation, or “full faith and credit” obligation, of the state. But provision of this
guaranty does not “provide funds” to the school district; rather, it facilitates the district’s ability
to raise its own funds. The only time it would be “necessary” for the state “to provide funds

• • • to satisfy the state guaranty” would be if a school district were unable to make payment on
      the bonds. As guarantor, the state would then be obliged to step in and make the payment. From
      3

a plain reading of the text of Article XI-K, section 2, therefore, it would appear that the limitation
applies only to the amount of debt that the state itself may incur in providing funds to pay a
school district’s bonds thereby satisfying the state’s guaranty of those bonds.
The context of the remainder of Article XI-K supports this interpretation. Specifically,
section 4 authorizes the state to issue bonds “as necessary to provide funding to satisfy the state’s
guaranty.” This is virtually identical to the language used in section 2. Thus, section 4 expressly
authorizes the state to issue bonds as one form of the indebtedness that the state may incur under
section 2 to satisfy its guaranty of school bonds.
Under this interpretation, the limitation in Section 2 applies only to the amount of debt
that the state incurs to honor its guaranty, and there is no limitation on the amount of school
bonds that the state may guarantee. This interpretation is viable, however, only if the phrase “the
credit of the State of Oregon may be loaned and indebtedness incurred” may be interpreted to
connote a single action, i.e., the state lends its credit as an integral part of incurring the
indebtedness. Otherwise, we would be omitting the words “the credit of the State of Oregon may
be loaned” from section 2, which we may not do in interpreting a constitutional provision. See
ORS 174.010.
Clearly, when the state guarantees a school district’s bonds, the state is lending its credit
to the school district. But the state is also lending its credit whenever it issues bonds under
Article XI-K to provide funds to satisfy that guaranty. Section 5 of Article XI-K states that such
bonds are a direct obligation of the state, which means that the state pledges its full faith and
“credit.” See ORS 328.351(6)(b) (state bonds issued to meet guaranty under Article XI-K shall
recite that “full faith, credit and resources of the state are pledged” for payment of state bond).
The authorization to lend the credit of the state is a part of the full faith and credit obligation that
is authorized as the form of indebtedness that may be incurred under Article XI-K.
Each time the voters have previously amended the Oregon Constitution to authorize the
state to incur indebtedness, i.e., to provide funds, the wording of the provision states that “the
credit of the State of Oregon may be loaned and indebtedness incurred.” See Or Const Arts XI-A
to XI-J. The exclusive purpose of each of these constitutional provisions is to provide funds
through the state’s incurring a general obligation debt; unlike Article XI-K, none of these
provisions has any anticipation that the state will lend its credit apart from the state itself actually
raising funds. See, e.g., Or Const Art XI-A (to create Oregon War Veterans’ Fund), Art XI-E (to
provide funds for forest rehabilitation), Art XI-F(2) (to create World War II Veterans’
Compensation Fund), Art XI-I(2) (to provide funds to be advanced by contract, grant, loan or
otherwise for financing multifamily housing for elderly and disabled); see also Sprague v.
Straub, 240 Or 272, 277, 400 P2d 229, 401 P2d 29 (1965) (describing the purpose of Articles
XI-F(1) and XI-G as “to loan the State’s general credit to bonds” issued by State Board of
Higher Education). Thus, the voters have consistently approved constitutional amendments with
the phrase “the credit of the State of Oregon may be loaned and indebtedness incurred” to
authorize the state to incur general obligation indebtedness, the repayment of which is supported
by the full faith and credit of the state. In light of this consistent terminology, we conclude that
this same phrase in Article XI-K, section 2, may reasonably be read as authorizing the state to

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incur general obligation indebtedness to honor its guaranty of school bonds and that it is the
amount of this indebtedness alone which is subject to the one-half of one percent limitation.
Because we interpret Article XI-K as authorizing the state to guarantee school bonds
without limit, it would be possible for the amount of defaulted school bonds guaranteed by the
state to exceed the amount of bonds that the state could issue to satisfy that guaranty. This
possibility does not affect our interpretation of Article XI-K because the guaranty is not
mandatory but permitted in the discretion of the state. Article XI-K, section 1, makes the state’s
guaranty subject to laws enacted pursuant to Article XI-K. ORS 328.331(2)(g) authorizes the
State Treasurer by rule to establish reasonable limitations on the total aggregate outstanding
amount of all school bonds the state may guarantee. We believe that this statute gives the
Treasurer the discretion to determine actuarially the amount of school bonds that the state could
safely guarantee in light of the possibility of default and the possibility that the state might be
required to provide funds to satisfy its guaranty.
An argument could be made that the language of Article XI-K, section 2, limits both the
amount of credit that the state may lend and the amount of indebtedness that the state may incur.
Such an interpretation has three problems. First, it requires an assumption that lending the
state’s credit by itself would somehow “provide funds.” Although the state’s guaranty may
assist in making funds available to school districts at lower interest rates, that guaranty does not
itself provide any funds. Second, it makes meaningless the words “as necessary to satisfy the
state guaranty of the [school bonds].” Lending the state’s credit alone does not “satisfy” the state
guaranty; the state lends its credit initially when it makes the guaranty. It is only “necessary” for
the state to “satisfy” that guaranty when the state is required to provide funds to pay the debt
service on the school bonds of districts that have failed to make a scheduled payment. Third, it
renders superfluous the last sentence of section 2, which authorizes the state to actually
guarantee the school bonds. We think it highly unlikely that a court would accept such a
construction of the text of Article XI-K, section 2.
Thus, we interpret the text and context of Article XI-K, section 2, as authorizing the state
to lend its credit, without limit, to guarantee school bonds. In addition, the state may incur debt
(and, in the course of so doing, lend its credit), in an amount not to exceed one-half of one
percent of the true cash value of all taxable property in the state, to provide funds as necessary to
satisfy the state’s guaranty.
b.

History

Nevertheless, because the limitation in Article XI-K, section 2 is arguably susceptible to
an alternative interpretation of the voters’ intent, we move to the second level of analysis, the
history of Article XI-K. Because Article XI-K was adopted by referendum, “the people’s
understanding and intended meaning of the provision in question” are critical to its
interpretation. Stranahan, 331 Or at 57.3 In reviewing sources of information available to the
voters at the time of the November 1998 election, we focus first on the Voters’ Pamphlet.
There are three statements in the materials regarding Measure 54 (1998), adopted as
Article XI-K, that speak to the percentage limitation. First, the ballot title summary of Measure

5

54 states that the Measure “[l]imits amount state can guarantee to _ of one percent of true cash
value of taxable property in state.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the legislative argument in
support of the ballot measure states that it “[l]imits total bonds guaranteed by the state.”
(Emphasis added.) These two statements support an interpretation of Article XI-K, section 2,
that caps the amount of school bonds that the state may guarantee. Conversely, the Measure’s
explanatory statement says:
Measure 54 allows the state to pay the guaranteed indebtedness by using available
state funds, borrowing from the Common School Fund or issuing state bonds.
The measure further allows the state to issue bonds to reimburse moneys
borrowed from the Common School Fund. The measure limits the amount of the
state bonds that may be issued to one-half of one percent of state taxable property
value.
(Emphasis added.) Hence, two of the relevant statements in the Voters’ Pamphlet tell voters that
the guaranty itself is limited while the third speaks of limitation only with respect to the state’s
issuance of its own bonds.
Looking beyond the Voters’ Pamphlet, we reviewed media reports regarding Measure 54.
The only report containing any comment of relevance was a newspaper editorial in support of the
Measure stating that a safeguard built into the Measure “limits the amount the state can
guarantee.”4 Editorial, THE OREGONIAN, Sept 16, 1998, at B8 (emphasis added).
In addition to the constitutional provision that it referred to the voters, the l997 legislature
also enacted statutes to implement the bond guaranty program. Or Laws 1997, ch 614. While
the statutes had been enacted at the time the voters considered Measure 54 and, hence, were
available for the voters’ consideration, they did not become effective until the voters approved
the Measure. Or Laws 1997, ch 614, § 10. As a general matter, the people are presumed to
know the law. Bartz v. State, 314 Or 353, 359-60, 839 P2d 217 (1992) (citing Dungey v.
Fairview Farms, Inc. 205 Or 615, 621, 290 P2d 181 (1955)). And, in reviewing the history of a
referred measure, the Oregon Supreme Court considers the session laws in the year the
legislature made the referral to the voters. Stranahan, 331 Or at 65. We believe that, in
ascertaining voter intent, the court would look at session laws the effect of which was dependent
on the very measure that the voters were asked to approve.
The 1997 statutes at issue authorize the State Treasurer to promulgate rules establishing
“[r]easonable limitations on the total aggregate outstanding amount of school district general
obligation bonds the state may guarantee.” Or Laws 1997, ch 614, § 4(2)(g) (now codified as
ORS 328.331(2)(g)). Arguably, this authorization would conflict with the Measure referred to
the voters if the Measure, approved as Article XI-K, set a limit on the amount of school bonds
the state could guarantee at one-half of one percent of the true cash value of all taxable property
in Oregon. This “reasonable limitations” provision makes sense only if Measure 54 sets no limit
on the amount of school bonds that the state can guarantee.5 If voter knowledge of the 1997
statutes is presumed, the voters would likely have understood that the Measure itself did not limit
the state’s guaranty.

6

Finally, Measure 55, another measure before the voters in the November 1998 election,
which was not adopted by the voters, would have amended the constitution to authorize the state
to guarantee payments that Oregonians made into a prepaid college tuition trust fund. Section
one of Measure 55 states:
In the manner provided by law and notwithstanding the limitations contained in
sections 7 and 8, Article XI of this Constitution, the credit of the State of Oregon
may be loaned and indebtedness incurred in an amount not to exceed, at any one
time, one-half of one percent of the true cash value of all taxable property in this
state to provide funds as necessary to satisfy state guarantees of minimum benefits
or earnings derived from the contributions made to a prepaid tuition trust fund,
which shall be created by law. The interests * * * shall be guaranteed by the full
faith and credit of this state.
With respect to the percentage limitation, this provision is essentially identical to Article XI-K,
section 2. The ballot title summary of Measure 55 states that the Measure “permits state to
exceed constitutional debt limit to authorize indebtedness at _ of one percent of true cash value
of all property in state to guarantee minimum benefits on contributions to prepaid tuition trust
fund.” The explanatory statement says that the Measure limits the bonds that the state may issue,
to satisfy the state’s obligations to contributors and beneficiaries and to repay any moneys
borrowed from the Common School Fund, to one-half of one percent of the true cash value of all
taxable property in the state.
Measure 55 immediately followed Measure 54 in the 1998 Voters’ Pamphlet. Hence, the
voters reviewed two measures with virtually identical wording as to the limitations to be set on
the state’s obligations. Whereas the statements regarding Measure 54, adopted as Article XI-K,
provided voters with ambiguous information regarding the application of the percentage
limitation, the information for Measure 55 stated more clearly that the limitation applies only to
the state’s authority to issue bonds to honor its guaranty.
Oregon courts have not specifically commented on relying on the history of an
unsuccessful ballot measure as history for an adopted ballot measure.6 But the court in
Stranahan referred to statements circulated to the public at large as being indicative of a
measure’s intended meaning. Stranahan, 331 Or at 65, (citing LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB, 284
Or 173, 184 n 8, 586 P2d 765 (1978)). That Voters’ Pamphlet materials on Measure 55 were
circulated to all voters, coupled with the similarity in the wording of the two measures, arguably
makes the Measure 55 materials an indicator of the voters’ understanding of the limitation in
Measure 54. It is not clear that the failure of the voters to adopt Measure 55 impacts this
conclusion.
In sum, we conclude that, if presented with the issue, a court would conclude that the
state may lend its credit, without limit, to guarantee school bonds and that the limitation in
Article XI-K, section 2, applies only to the amount of debt that the state may incur in honoring

7

its guaranty of school bonds. Although the history of this provision is contradictory, we believe
that this interpretation is the only one that would not do violence to the actual text of Article
XI-K.

HARDY MYERS
Attorney General
HM:KBC:CCB:ALV/GEN65179
1

Article XI, section 7, of the Oregon Constitution provides that “[t]he Legislative Assembly shall not
lend the credit of the state nor in any manner create any debt or liabilities which shall singly or in the
aggregate with previous debts or liabilities exceed the sum of fifty thousand dollars * * * and every
contract of indebtedness entered into or assumed by or on behalf of the state in violation of the provisions
of this section shall be void and of no effect.” Article XI, section 8, provides that “[t]he State shall never
assume the debts of any county, town, or other corporation whatever, unless such debts, shall have been
created to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or defend the State in war.”
2

For ease of reference, we use the term “limitation” or “limit” in lieu of the constitutional phrase “in
an amount not to exceed, at any one time, one-half of one percent of true cash value of all taxable
property in the state.”
3

Appended to this remark by the court is a note that states: “We continue to emphasize that * * * our
focus must be on the intent of the enactors of the provision at issue. See Jones, 132 Or at 175 [285 P 205]
(court’s longstanding practice in constitutional interpretation is ‘to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the framers [of the provision at issue] and of the people who adopted it’) (emphasis added).”
Stranahan, 331 Or at 57 n 12. The case cited in the note, Jones v. Hoss, required the court to interpret
Article IV, section 29, of the original state constitution. The term “framers” is used to refer to those
persons who framed the original constitution. We are not aware of any instances in which that term is
used to describe those who drafted amendments to the constitution. Therefore, we do not believe that the
Stranahan court, in quoting Jones, was stating that the court would to take into consideration the intent
of the legislature in drafting a provision that it refers to the voters.
4

Stranahan speaks of “objective” materials circulated to the public at large, but cites to a pamphlet
circulated by proponents of a measure as an example of such material. Stranahan, 331 Or at 65, (citing
LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB, 284 Or 173, 184 n8, 586 P2d 765 (1978)). Based on this citation, a court
may characterize the OREGONIAN editorial as objective material that it may consider in determining voter
intent.
5

The 1999 legislature amended the statute so that the Treasurer’s authority to set reasonable limits on
the total amount of school bonds guaranteed is now “[s]ubject to Article XI-K of the Oregon
Constitution.” ORS 328.331(2)(g). This amendment is irrelevant to determining voter intent, however,
since it was enacted after the voters’ approval of Measure 54.
6

The context for interpreting a constitutional provision adopted by the voters includes “related ballot
measures submitted to the voters at the same election.” Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 559.

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