Can my school district legally ban employees from talking directly to school board members?

Plain-English summary

Reports surfaced that several Oklahoma school districts had policies discouraging or prohibiting employees from raising concerns directly with school board members. Representative Michelle McCane asked the AG whether such policies are legal under the First Amendment.

AG Drummond's answer: a blanket ban likely violates the First Amendment, but disciplining individual employees for particular communications can be lawful depending on a fact-specific test.

The framework is the Pickering test (named after Pickering v. Board of Education, 1968), as developed through later Supreme Court cases:

1. Did the employee speak as a citizen or pursuant to job duties? Speech made as part of the job (per Garcetti v. Ceballos, 2006) is not First Amendment protected. Speech made outside official duties is.
2. Was the topic a matter of public concern? Personal grievances (transfer issues, classroom assignments, interpersonal conflicts) are generally not "public concern." Big-picture issues, financial mismanagement, curriculum policy, facility issues, equity questions: generally are.
3. Does the government's efficiency interest outweigh the employee's interest? A balancing test, with the manner, time, and place of the speech all relevant.

For blanket prohibitions, the Court's decision in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (1995) raises the bar even higher: "chills potential speech before it happens," so the government must justify the broader sweep with stronger evidence of operational harm. A school district's interest in orderly communication probably won't justify banning all direct communication between staff and board members.

The opinion also notes Oklahoma's whistleblower exception under Barker v. State Insurance Fund (2001), which protects internal and external reporting of wrongdoing under a state-law wrongful-discharge theory, even when the speech is part of job duties.

What this means for you

If you are a school district employee

You have First Amendment rights even though you work for the government. A blanket policy prohibiting direct communication with board members is likely unconstitutional and probably unenforceable. But individual cases are fact-specific:

• Speaking to a board member at a meeting about policy or curriculum: likely protected.
• Cornering a board member at her home about your raise: not protected (personal grievance, possibly disruptive).
• Reporting financial mismanagement or curriculum policy concerns through normal channels or to a board member directly: protected speech on public concern.
• Speech as part of your formal job duties (e.g., a required quarterly report): not First Amendment protected (per Garcetti).

Independent of the First Amendment, Oklahoma law protects whistleblower speech, including internal reporting (Barker v. State Insurance Fund).

If you serve on a school board

You can adopt reasonable policies that channel communication (e.g., online complaint forms, structured meeting protocols, time limits on board-meeting public comment), but you cannot wholesale prohibit direct employee-to-board contact. Make sure your policy distinguishes between:

• Process rules (how, when, where to communicate), generally OK
• Subject-matter bans (you can't talk about X), risky
• Total bans on direct communication, almost certainly unconstitutional

If you are a school district administrator

Disciplining an employee for direct communication with a board member is high-risk. Before any adverse action, run through Pickering: was the speech (a) part of official duties? (b) on a topic of public concern? (c) sufficiently disruptive to justify discipline? Document the analysis. Consult district counsel.

If you are a school district attorney

The opinion is a useful summary of the framework. Watch out for:

• Garcetti speech-as-job-duties analysis, the Tenth Circuit takes a "broad view" of what counts as job duties (Thomas v. City of Blanchard).
• Connick personal-grievance carve-out, most personnel disputes are not "public concern."
• Blanket policies, much harder to defend than individual disciplinary actions (National Treasury Employees Union).
• Oklahoma whistleblower law, extends to internal reporting; Barker could provide relief independent of the First Amendment.

If you are a parent or community member concerned about district transparency

If you suspect district employees are being silenced from communicating with the board, this opinion gives you a strong framework to challenge the policy. Document the policy in writing. Engage with public-comment processes at board meetings. If the policy is enforced against an employee, that employee may have a § 1983 claim or a state-law wrongful-discharge claim.

If you are an Oklahoma legislator

The Oklahoma Constitution's free-speech provision (art. II, § 22) is "more protective of speech than ... the United States Constitution" per In re Initiative Petition No. 366 (2002). The legislature could provide stronger statutory protections for school employee speech if it wanted to address the issue more directly.

Common questions

Q: My principal told me I can't email a board member with concerns about how the district handles special education. Is that legal?
A: Probably not, if your concerns are about district policy (a public concern) rather than your personal employment situation. Ask the principal to identify a written policy and consult an attorney.

Q: Can the district require me to go through the chain of command first?
A: A "process rule" requiring you to raise issues internally before going to the board is generally valid. But it cannot effectively block you from ever reaching board members on legitimate public-concern issues.

Q: Can the district punish me for criticizing the superintendent at a board meeting?
A: Public board meetings are protected speech zones. Criticism of the superintendent on policy issues is typically a matter of public concern. Personal attacks unrelated to district operations are different. Time/place/manner restrictions (e.g., 3-minute speaking limits) are lawful.

Q: Can the district ban me from speaking to a specific board member?
A: Highly suspect. A targeted ban on direct communication with a specific elected official raises additional First Amendment concerns. Could also implicate the right to petition for redress of grievances.

Q: I disclosed financial mismanagement to a board member and was fired. Can I sue?
A: Possibly under § 1983 (First Amendment retaliation) and/or under Oklahoma's wrongful-discharge cause of action for whistleblowers (Barker). Talk to a labor or civil-rights attorney quickly, there are filing deadlines.

Q: My speech was made in my classroom. Is that "as a citizen" or "as an employee"?
A: Probably as an employee, per Garcetti. The Tenth Circuit takes a broad view of what counts as on-the-job speech. Speech in the classroom about classroom topics is usually job duties.

Q: Does the First Amendment protect speech I make at a school board meeting during public comment?
A: Yes, that's classic citizen speech in a public forum. Time/place/manner restrictions apply, but you cannot be punished for the content of your remarks (with very narrow exceptions like true threats).

Background and statutory framework

The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects speech on matters of public concern. The Supreme Court has built a framework for public-employee speech through several decisions:

• Pickering v. Board of Education (1968), created the balancing test.
• Connick v. Myers (1983), narrowed protection by requiring "matter of public concern."
• Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006), speech pursuant to official duties is unprotected.
• Lane v. Franks (2014), speech beyond job duties (e.g., truthful sworn testimony) is protected.
• United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (1995), heightened scrutiny for blanket prohibitions.

The Tenth Circuit takes a broad view of what counts as job duties (Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 2008), making Garcetti a powerful defense for districts in many cases. But the same circuit has recognized broad public-concern protection for whistleblowing on official misconduct (McFall v. Bednar).

The Seventh Circuit's Knapp v. Whitaker (1985) is particularly on point: complaints about teacher evaluations and classroom assignments were "personal matters" (not public concern), but complaints about coach mileage allowances, liability insurance, and grievance ineffectiveness were public concern.

Oklahoma's whistleblower jurisprudence under Barker v. State Insurance Fund (2001) extends wrongful-discharge protection to whistleblowers, including for internal reports. This is independent of the First Amendment.

The opinion does not address Oklahoma's free-speech provision (art. II, § 22) in depth because the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not analyzed retaliation against public-employee speech under that provision. The provision is "more protective" of speech than the federal Constitution (In re Initiative Petition No. 366), so future Oklahoma cases could expand protections beyond the federal floor.

Citations and references

Constitution:
- U.S. Const. amend. I, Free speech
- Okla. Const. art. II, § 22: State free speech (more protective)

Cases:
- Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), balancing test foundation
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), speech as part of job duties unprotected
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), public concern requirement
- United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), blanket prohibition standard
- Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), protection for speech beyond duties
- Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1985), school employee speech to board members
- Barker v. State Insurance Fund, 2001 OK 94, 40 P.3d 463, Oklahoma whistleblower wrongful-discharge

Source

• Landing page: https://oklahoma.gov/oag/opinions/ag-opinions/2025/ag-opinion-2025-12.html
• Original PDF: https://oklahoma.gov/content/dam/ok/en/oag/opinions/ag-opinions/2025/A.G. Opinion 2025-12 2025 OK AG 12.pdf

Original opinion text

GENTNER DRUMMOND
ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION
2025-12
The Honorable Michelle McCane
Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 72
2300 N. Lincoln Blvd., Rm. 503
Oklahoma City, OK 73105

August 29, 2025

Dear Representative McCane:
This office has received your request for an Attorney General Opinion in which you ask, in effect,
the following question:
May a public school district prohibit or otherwise restrict its employees from
communicating directly with members of the district’s board of education
without violating the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or article II,
section 22 of the Oklahoma Constitution?
I.
SUMMARY
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence likely forbids a blanket prohibition on
school district personnel communicating directly with members of the district’s school board.
Whether a school district may prohibit or punish such communications turns on whether the
employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and if so, whether the employee’s
interest in commenting on such matters outweighs the interest of the school district, as an
employer, in promoting effective and efficient public service. Any individual decision to discipline
an employee for his or her speech to board members would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis,
which falls outside the scope of an official Attorney General Opinion. See 74 O.S. § 18b(A)(5).
II.
BACKGROUND
This request arose out of reports that employees of various school districts have been discouraged
or even prohibited from raising concerns directly with school board members. That
discouragement has led to questions about the rights of school district employees to communicate
directly with school board members.

313 N.E. 21ST STREET • OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 • (405) 521-3921 • FAX: (405) 521-6246

Representative Michelle McCane
Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 72

A.G. Opinion
Page 2

You ask about the implications of both the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article
II, section 22 of the Oklahoma Constitution. However, because the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
not analyzed retaliation against a public employee for his or her speech under section 22, this
opinion focuses only on the First Amendment.1
III.
DISCUSSION
Prohibiting school district personnel from raising concerns directly to board members—or
disciplining personnel for doing so—implicates the First Amendment. After all, “citizens do not
surrender their First Amendment rights by accepting public employment.” Lane v. Franks, 573
U.S. 228, 231 (2014). But the First Amendment’s protections may sometimes coexist uneasily
with the Government’s rights as an employer, given the importance of providing efficient
government services. When these interests collide, there is no one-size-fits-all rule. Instead, a court
will analyze various factors, including the language of the school district’s policy, the subject and
setting, as well as the potential disruption caused by the employee’s speech.2
A.

When considering a prohibition of or punishment for a public employee’s speech,
courts balance the employee’s interest in speaking on matters of public concern with
the employer’s interest in efficiently providing public services.

Speech on matters of public concern “lies at the heart of the First Amendment.” Lane, 573 U.S. at
235. At the same time, the Supreme Court has recognized that government employers “need a
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions” to foster “the efficient
provision of public services.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). The test the Court
employs for balancing these interests is known as the Pickering test. In Pickering, a school district
fired a high school teacher for writing a critical letter in the newspaper about his school board’s
and superintendent’s handling of proposals to raise revenue for local schools. Pickering v. Bd. Of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968). The Court, first, held that the teacher’s criticism “concern[ed] an
issue of general public interest.” Id. at 571. Next, the Court weighed the teacher’s speech against
the government’s efficiency interests, and held that the criticism did not affect the teacher’s “daily
duties in the classroom” or “interfere[] with the regular operation of the schools generally.” Id. at
572-73. Thus, the school district violated the First Amendment by firing the teacher. Id. at 575.
With this holding, Pickering—and cases that followed—created a two-step inquiry for judging
whether a public employee’s speech is protected under the First Amendment. The first step is to
answer “whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 418. If not, there is no First Amendment protection. Id. If yes, a court must consider whether
1

The First Amendment sets the floor for how much speech is protected, but as the Oklahoma Constitution’s
free speech provisions are more broadly worded it is possible that the Oklahoma Supreme Court could grant public
employees greater free speech protection than the First Amendment requires. See In re Initiative Petition No. 366,
2002 OK 21, ¶ 7, 46 P.3d 123, 126 (“We first note that the Oklahoma Constitution is more protective of speech than
is the United States Constitution.”).
2

This opinion seeks to provide guidance on the law in this area, but any analysis of the constitutionality of a
specific policy or employment action is beyond the scope of this opinion. Such a determination would depend on the
particular facts of the situation. 2023 OK AG 14, ¶ 2.

Representative Michelle McCane
Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 72

A.G. Opinion
Page 3

the government “had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other
member of the public.” Id. While the government has some discretion in regulating speech as an
employer, the restrictions “must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s
operations.” Id. The test defies bright-line rules and “has proved difficult” to apply. Id.
1. Did the employee speak, as a citizen, on a matter of public concern?
The first step is meant to protect against “constitutionaliz[ing] the employee grievance.” Id. at 420.
In determining whether an employee’s speech survives the first step, courts consider two
questions: (1) whether the employee spoke as a citizen or pursuant to his or her official duties, and
(2) whether the speech involved a matter of public concern.
a. Speech as a citizen or as an employee.
“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens . . ., and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. In Garcetti, for instance, a deputy district attorney
raised concerns to his supervisors about the veracity of an affidavit and was later subject to alleged
retaliatory employment actions. Id. at 413–15. The Court determined that the attorney’s speech
was “made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy[,]” which included “advis[ing] his
supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case.” Id. at 421. Accordingly, the First
Amendment did not protect his speech.
By contrast, some examples of communication outside the scope of an employee’s job duties
include: a director of a youth training program testifying in a federal prosecution of a former
employee. Lane, 573 U.S. at 238; a teacher writing an op-ed on the use of public funds in his
school district, and a public employee that discusses politics with a co-worker. Garcetti, 547 U.S.
at 423. As these examples illustrate, speech can be outside the scope of an employee’s job duties
even if the speech contains information that was acquired by virtue of the employee’s public
employment. Lane, 573 U.S. at 240. The key aspect is whether the speech at issue is normally part
of the employee’s job duties.3 The Tenth Circuit takes a “broad view” of what constitutes speech
that is pursuant to an employee’s official duties, and speech may be so categorized “even if it deals
with activities that the employee is not expressly required to perform.” Thomas v. City of
Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1324 (10th Cir. 2008).

3

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized an exception to at will employment for people that were fired
in retaliation for whistleblowing. Barker v. State Ins. Fund, 2001 OK 94, ¶ 15, 40 P.3d 463, 468. That protection
extends to both internal and external reporting of whistleblowers. Id. ¶ 16. To bring a wrongful discharge claim on
this ground, a plaintiff “must first identify an Oklahoma public policy goal that is well established, clear and
compelling and articulated in existing constitutional, statutory or jurisprudential law” and then prove that the
employer’s termination conflicted with that public policy. Id. Accordingly, it is possible that an internal whistleblower
may successfully bring a wrongful discharge claim even though the whistleblowing speech was made pursuant to his
or her employment duties—and thereby not protected by the First Amendment.

Representative Michelle McCane
Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 72

A.G. Opinion
Page 4

b. Speech on a topic of public concern.
If the employee’s speech was outside of the scope of the employee’s duties, a court next considers
whether the subject of the speech constituted a matter of public concern. If not, the speech will not
be protected by the First Amendment. “Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can
‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community’ . . . or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest.’” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
443, 453 (2011).
In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, (1983), the Supreme Court considered a situation where an
assistant district attorney—upset over her transfer to a different section—circulated a questionnaire
to her fellow employees “concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work
in political campaigns.” Id. at 140–141. The attorney’s boss viewed the survey as insubordination
and fired her. Id. at 141.
The Court determined that the survey was “most accurately characterized as an employee
grievance concerning internal office policy” and not a matter of public concern. Id. at 154. The
Court noted that the employee did not “seek to inform the public” that the District Attorney’s office
was not performing its duties or “seek to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing.” Id. at 148.
If the questionnaire was released to the public, it “would convey no information at all other than
the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo.” Id. The Court emphasized that the
purpose of the questionnaire was “to gather ammunition” for the attorney’s personal battle with
her supervisors. Id. The only exception was the question about whether her fellow employees felt
pressured to work for certain political campaigns because that question touched on a fundamental
constitutional right to avoid coercion of beliefs. Id. at 149.
Applying these precedents, the Tenth Circuit held that a public defender’s complaints to her
supervisors alleging that unqualified people were placed in charge of the expert witness approval
process involved matters of public concern.4 McFall v. Bednar, 407 F.3d 1081, 1089 (10th Cir.
2005). As the Tenth Circuit saw it, this speech implicated “the integrity and qualifications of public
officials, the operations of government, and the right of a criminal defendant to effective assistance
of counsel.” Id. The Tenth Circuit has also determined that speech which discloses corruption,
impropriety, malfeasance in government, or involves the expenditure of public funds is a matter
of public concern. Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir. 1988); Glover v. Mabrey, 384
F.App’x 763, 769-70 (10th Cir. 2010).
In perhaps the most relevant case to your question, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a high school
teacher’s myriad complaints made directly to school board members regarding his school district.
Ultimately, the court held that the teacher’s complaints regarding his teacher evaluations and his
classroom assignment were “personal matters”—not implicating public concern—while
complaints about “inequitable mileage allowance for . . . coaches, liability insurance for coaches
4
McFall was decided one year before the Supreme Court held that speech pursuant to employment duties
was not protected under the First Amendment regardless of whether the subject was a matter of public concern.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. Accordingly, it is possible that post-Garcetti the public defender’s complaints would not be
protected. But McFall’s holding on whether the complaints implicated matters of public concern is still precedential.

Representative Michelle McCane
Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 72

A.G. Opinion
Page 5

and volunteer parents, and the ineffectiveness of the grievance procedure” were all subjects of
public concern. Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 840 (7th Cir. 1985). The latter topics were
deemed to affect the school or community broadly.
From these cases, several guidelines emerge relevant to school district employees. Comments or
complaints about an employee’s particular employment situation, such as classroom reassignment,
interpersonal issues with coworkers, or frustration with lack of advancement, are unlikely to be
considered topics of public concern. Conversely, big picture complaints or criticisms of the school
district are likely to be subjects of public concern. Examples would include concerns that the
school district systematically is failing to educate special needs children or that a particular official
mismanaged or embezzled public funds.
2. Does the employer’s interest in the efficient provision of services outweigh the
employee’s interest in speaking on the issue?
The fact that speech involves a matter of public concern does not, by itself, guarantee First
Amendment protection. Instead, the Court must balance the competing interests involved. As the
Supreme Court put it, the task “is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering,
391 U.S. at 566. A citizen’s interest in commenting freely on matters of public concern is
straightforward. The government employer’s interest is more varied. It can include the orderly
operation of schools, as well as avoiding disruptions to the office, undermining of authority, and
destruction of close working relationships. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. In addition, the “manner,
time, and place” of the speech is relevant to this inquiry. Id. at 152–53; see also Givhan v. W. Line
Consolidated Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979).
As an example, a teacher’s decision to hijack a school assembly to expound on his or her views of
the merits of discontinuing the penny is less likely to be protected than a teacher opining at a school
board meeting that the school district should prioritize writing skills more within the curriculum.
Similarly, a teacher confronting a school board member outside her home is less likely to be
protected than a teacher who scheduled an appointment to meet with said board member. While
the balancing can be straightforward in extreme hypotheticals, it can be difficult in the real world.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. Again, the evaluation of any particular example would be fact dependent
and beyond the scope of an AG opinion. 2023 OK AG 14, ¶ 2; 74 O.S. § 18b(A)(5).
3. The Pickering balancing test applies to policies prohibiting a particular form of
communication.
While the Pickering test is most often used in the context of individual instances of speech, the
Supreme Court has also applied it to blanket prohibitions or restrictions on certain types of speech.
Because such a restriction “chills potential speech before it happens[,]” the Court held that a
blanket prohibition “gives rise to far more serious concerns than could any single supervisory
decision.” United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995). Thus, the
government’s burden under the Pickering framework is greater when dealing with blanket
prohibitions than it is when considering a solitary employment decision.

Representative Michelle McCane
Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 72

A.G. Opinion
Page 6

Applying the Pickering framework in this way, the Court struck down a federal law that
“prohibit[ed] federal employees from accepting any compensation for making speeches or writing
articles.” Id. at 457. The Court held that most of the speech restricted by the law did not involve
the subject matter of the government employment, which meant that the government was “unable
to justify [the statute] on the grounds of immediate workplace disruption in Pickering and the cases
that followed it.” Id. at 470. The Court took the opposite view, however, when analyzing a federal
law that prohibited federal employees from taking “an active part in political management or in
political campaigns.” U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 550
(1973). In that case, the Court recognized that it was “fundamental” that federal employees
administer the law as opposed to their own preferences or that of their political party, that it is
“critical” that the government “appear[s] to the public to be avoiding [political justice][,]” and that
advancement in government service should be based on merit as opposed to participation in party
politics. Id. at 565–66. Therefore, the Court upheld the prohibition on federal employees engaging
in political management or political campaign involvement.
B.

A school district’s blanket prohibition on its employees communicating directly with
members of the district’s board of education would likely violate the First
Amendment.

Applying these precedents, a school district policy that flatly prohibits employees from
communicating directly with the district’s board of education would restrict a broad sweep of
communication touching on matters of public concern. As such, the school district would face a
higher burden to demonstrate that its interests as an employer outweigh the interests of the
employee to speak as a citizen. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 468.
In some ways, the school district would have a stronger interest than the federal government
possessed in banning compensation for outside work. There, the Court held that “the vast majority
of speech at issue . . . [did] not involve the subject matter of Government employment.” Id. at 470.
In this scenario, presumably many of the subjects a school district employee would want to talk to
a board member about would involve the subject matter of employment. But it is unclear how the
school district’s efficient operations would be so seriously threatened by direct communication to
justify a blanket prohibition.
This conclusion does not mean that a school district is powerless to restrict any communication by
school employees to board members. Just as a state agency is allowed to limit the number of public
comments at a meeting, so too can a school board limit the number of comments from employees
at board meetings. See 1998 OK AG 45, ¶ 9. Similarly, a school district may create an online
complaint form to serve as a conduit to board members. In fact, there is no First Amendment
requirement for a school district to facilitate communication with board members. But a school
district likely would violate the First Amendment if it prohibited all direct communication to board
members.
Putting aside an official policy prohibiting all such direct communications, whether a school
district may discipline an employee for particular instances of direct communication would depend
on an application of the Pickering balancing test. If the speech involved the employee’s official
duties, it would not be protected under the First Amendment. For example, if part of an employee’s

Representative Michelle McCane
Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 72

A.G. Opinion
Page 7

job is to give a formal report to the school board, under Garcetti, speech contained within that
report would not be protected. Next, even if the speech does not involve the employee’s official
duties, it still must relate to a subject of public concern to be afforded First Amendment protection.
Examples of a public concern would include allegations of financial mismanagement within the
school district and concerns over teaching methods. Speech that does not relate to a public concern
includes the employee’s personal grievances. Ultimately, whether speech on a public concern is
protected by the First Amendment depends on whether the free speech interests outweigh the
school district’s interests in promoting the efficient delivery of public services.
It is, therefore, the official Opinion of the Attorney General that:
A school district’s blanket prohibition on its employees communicating
directly with school district board members likely violates the First
Amendment. Whether a school district may take disciplinary action over a
particular instance of communication would depend on a case-by-case
balancing test.

GENTNER DRUMMOND
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA

WILL FLANAGAN
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL