Can a physician assistant in Oklahoma prescribe Schedule II drugs at an off-site location?

Plain-English summary

Oklahoma physician assistants can prescribe controlled substances in Schedules III, IV, and V wherever they practice. Schedule II is different. Section 519.6(E)(2) of title 59 says a PA "may write an order for a Schedule II drug for immediate or ongoing administration on site."

The Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure asked the AG to interpret that phrase. AG Drummond concluded the on-site requirement is a real limit, not a flourish. A PA can issue Schedule II orders inside the clinical facility for the patient to receive there, but cannot write an off-site Schedule II prescription for a patient to fill at a retail pharmacy.

The narrower reading reconciles two adjacent subsections. Subsection (E)(1) gives PAs general authority to prescribe Schedule II–V drugs. Subsection (E)(2) carves out Schedule II for the on-site limit. Reading subsection (1) to swallow subsection (2) would render the carve-out meaningless, and Oklahoma courts will not interpret a statute to make any sentence "idle and nugatory."

What this means for you

If you are a physician assistant in Oklahoma

You can sign Schedule II orders for in-facility administration: a hospital inpatient who needs an opioid, a same-day surgical patient, a clinic patient receiving an injection on site. You cannot write a Schedule II prescription that the patient walks out and fills at a community pharmacy.

For Schedule III through V drugs (most ADHD stimulants, most benzodiazepines, codeine combinations), the on-site limit does not apply. You can prescribe those for outpatient use within the limits of the Physician Assistant Drug Formulary and your delegating physician's protocol.

If a patient needs an off-site Schedule II prescription, the delegating physician has to write it.

If you are a supervising physician

Your written protocol cannot expand a PA's Schedule II prescriptive authority beyond what the statute allows. Even with your direct verbal order, the on-site limit holds. Build the workflow around: PAs handle inpatient and on-site Schedule II orders; the physician handles outpatient Schedule II prescriptions.

If you operate a hospital, ambulatory surgery center, or pain clinic

PA-signed Schedule II orders for in-facility administration are valid. PA-signed Schedule II prescriptions for outpatient pickup are not. Your pharmacy and EHR rules should distinguish between the two and route outpatient Schedule II prescriptions to a physician.

If you are a pharmacist

A Schedule II prescription presented at a retail counter must come from a prescriber whose authority extends to off-site administration. PAs are not in that category in Oklahoma. If you receive a Schedule II prescription signed only by a PA for outpatient pickup, the AG's reading is that it falls outside the PA's statutory authority.

If you are an attorney advising a healthcare client

The opinion turns on the canon that specific terms in a later subsection limit the general grant in an earlier one. The decisive language is "for immediate or ongoing administration on site", the AG read those words as a hard ceiling, not as one example among others. The opinion did not interpret what counts as "on site" or "off-site," so client-specific facility scope questions remain open.

Common questions

Q: Can a PA in Oklahoma prescribe a 30-day supply of an opioid like oxycodone for a post-op patient to fill at a pharmacy?
A: No. Oxycodone is a Schedule II drug. A PA can administer it on site, but cannot write an outpatient prescription for it. The supervising physician has to sign an off-site Schedule II prescription.

Q: What about ADHD medications like Adderall or Vyvanse?
A: Those are Schedule II amphetamines, so the same on-site limit applies. A PA cannot write an outpatient prescription for them.

Q: Are Schedule III drugs (hydrocodone combinations, ketamine) restricted the same way?
A: No. The on-site limit in subsection (E)(2) applies only to Schedule II. Schedules III, IV, and V are covered by the general grant in (E)(1) without that restriction.

Q: Does the opinion define "on site"?
A: No, the AG explicitly noted that the request did not ask for a definition of "off-site," "on-site," or "immediate or ongoing administration on site," and treated those questions as outside the scope of the opinion.

Q: Did this change anything? PAs were already operating under this rule.
A: It resolved a disagreement. Some clinicians had read subsection (E)(1) as a free-standing grant, with subsection (E)(2) as a non-mandatory example. The AG closed that reading off.

Background and statutory framework

The Physician Assistant Act (PAA) was enacted in 1993. PAs were initially limited to "transmitting" prescriptions, not signing them. In 1998, the legislature extended PAs general prescriptive authority for Schedules III–V (Schedule II was deliberately omitted). In 2001, S.B. 32 added Schedule II authority but coupled it with the on-site requirement now codified at § 519.6(E)(2).

The Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act (UCDSA), at title 63 § 2-312(E), gives PAs general authority to prescribe Schedules II–V. The AG read § 2-312(E) and § 519.6(E) together: when a PA prescribes a controlled substance under the UCDSA, the PA must "otherwise comply with" the more specific PAA requirements. Because § 519.6(E)(2) imposes the on-site limit on Schedule II orders specifically, that limit overrides the broader Schedule II grant in § 2-312(E).

The opinion relies heavily on the canon that "general words in a statute are limited by subsequent more specific terms." It also draws on the title of the 2001 bill, which referred to "specifying when" PAs may write Schedule II prescriptions: confirming that § 519.6(E)(2) was designed as a constraint, not a redundancy.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- 63 O.S.Supp.2022, § 2-312(E), UCDSA, PA prescriptive authority
- 59 O.S.2021, § 519.6(E)(1)–(2), Physician Assistant Act, prescriptive authority
- 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.: Federal Controlled Substances Act (background)

Cases:
- Am. Airlines, Inc. v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 2014 OK 95, 341 P.3d 56, plain meaning controls
- State ex rel. Trimble v. City of Moore, 1991 OK 97, 818 P.2d 889, specific statute controls over general
- Compsource Mut. Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 2018 OK 54, 435 P.3d 90, incorporation by statutory reference
- Patterson v. Beall, 2000 OK 92, 19 P.3d 839, expressio unius

Source

• Landing page: https://oklahoma.gov/oag/opinions/ag-opinions/2024/ag-opinion-2024-3.html
• Original PDF: https://oklahoma.gov/content/dam/ok/en/oag/opinions/ag-opinions/2024/ag_opinion_2024-3_ago24-3.pdf

Original opinion text

GENTNER DRUMMOND
ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION
2024-3
Lyle R. Kelsey, Executive Director
Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision
101 N.E. 51st Street
Oklahoma City, OK 73105

February 22, 2024

Dear Executive Director Kelsey,
This office has received your request for an official Attorney General Opinion in which you ask,
in effect, the following question:
Does Oklahoma law, specifically title 63, section 2-312(E) (Supp.2022) and title
59, section 519.6(E) (2021), authorize physician assistants to prescribe and
administer Schedule II controlled dangerous substances under the direction of
a delegating physician at off-site locations?
I.

SUMMARY
No. Both the plain and unambiguous language of Oklahoma law, as well as the application of longstanding rules of statutory interpretation, confirm that physician assistants’ prescriptive authority
over Schedule II substances is limited to on-site administration. 1 Specifically, this conclusion is
derived from the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act (“UCDSA”), title 63, sections 2309A–2-315, and the Physician Assistant Act (“PAA”), title 59, sections 519.1–524.
The relevant provision of the UCDSA, title 63, section 2-312(E), confirms that physician assistants
prescribing controlled substances must otherwise comply with the PAA, specifically section 519.6
of title 59. That section grants physician assistants a general authority to “prescribe drugs,
including controlled medications in Schedules II through V[,]” but expressly qualifies in the next
subsection that “[a] physician assistant may write an order for a Schedule II drug for immediate or
ongoing administration on site.” 63 O.S.Supp.2022, 519.6(E)(1–2). This plain language can only
be read one way: to limit physician assistant prescriptive authority over Schedule II drugs to onsite administration only. Thus, Oklahoma law does not allow physician assistants to prescribe or
administer Schedule II drugs at off-site locations. Any other interpretation would create an
absurdity that renders the limiting language meaningless.

1
Your request did not ask the Attorney General to opine on the meaning of “off-site locations[,]” on-site
locations, or “immediate or ongoing administration on site[,]” as used in title 59, section 519.6(E)(2) (2021). Thus,
such questions are beyond the scope of this Opinion.

313 N.E. 21ST STREET • OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 • (405) 521-3921 • Fax: (405) 521-6246

Lyle R. Kelsey, Executive Director
Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision

A.G. Opinion
Page 2

II.

BACKGROUND
A.

Oklahoma law governing prescriptive authority of physician assistants

In 1993, the PAA was signed into law after receiving overwhelming support from the Legislature.
See OKLA. STATE LEG., Bill information for S.B. 334. 2 The PAA established a regulatory and
licensing system covering physician assistants, authorizing them to provide health care services in
certain circumstances under the supervision and direction of physicians. See S.B. 334, 44th Leg.,
1993 Reg. Sess., 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 289. The PAA further authorized physician assistants
to transmit prescriptions and orders for prescriptions, but not to dispense them. See id. § 6(D)
(codified at 59 O.S.Supp.1993, § 519.6(D)).
Five years later, in 1998, the Oklahoma Legislature expanded a physician assistant’s prescriptive
authority through enrolled S.B. 1069, 46th Leg., 1998 2d Reg. Sess., 1998 Okla. Sess. Laws ch.
128 (“1998 Bill”). This 1998 Bill amended the PAA to allow physician assistants to “prescribe”
prescriptions and orders rather than transmit them. Id. § 4 (amending 59 O.S.Supp.1993,
§ 519.6(D)). Importantly, the 1998 Bill also granted physician assistants the authority to “prescribe
drugs, including controlled medications in Schedules III through V pursuant to” the UCDSA.
Consistent with the same, the 1998 Bill amended the UCDSA to expressly allow a licensed
physician assistant to “prescribe and administer Schedule III, IV and V controlled dangerous
substances” “pursuant to subsection D of Section 519.6 of Title 59” under certain conditions and
under the direction of a supervising physician. Id. § 6(C–D) (amending 63 O.S.Supp.1997, § 2312(E)). Through the omission of any reference to Schedule II, the statutory language made clear
physician assistants had no authority to prescribe Schedule II controlled substances in 1998. See
2000 OK AG 34 ¶ 8 (“No authority exists which gives physician assistants authority to prescribe,
order, dispense or administer Schedule II controlled dangerous substances in a hospital setting.”).
That changed in 2001, when S.B. 32, 48th Leg., 2001 Reg. Sess., 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 385
(“2001 Bill”) was signed into law. The 2001 Bill amended the relevant provision of the PAA to
include prescriptive authority for Schedule II controlled substances. Specifically, the 2001 Bill
divided the relevant subsection of title 59, section 519.6 (Supp.1998) into two parts: retaining the
original prescriptive authority in subsection 1 (while expanding that authority to Schedule II
controlled substances), and adding subsection 2, which placed heightened restrictions on
prescriptive authority for Schedule II drugs. See id. § 3(D). The only subsequent amendments to
the relevant provisions of the PAA and UCDSA between 2001 and the present were the result of
a re-numbering in title 59, section 519.6, which moved subsection D to subsection E. 3

2

2024).

Available at http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=SB334&Session=9300 (last visited Feb. 21,

See S.B. 1915, 57th Leg., 2020 2d Reg. Sess., 2020 Okla. Sess. Laws ch.154 § 2. Consistent with this 2020
amendment to the PAA, the complementary provision of the UCDSA was amended in 2022 to strike the reference to
“subsection D” previously appearing in title 63, section 2-312(E) (2001). See S.B. 1322, 58th Leg., 2022 2d Reg. Sess.,
2022 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 184 § 2.
3

Lyle R. Kelsey, Executive Director
Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision

A.G. Opinion
Page 3

Thus, by 2001, the PAA and UCDSA established the prescriptive authority of physician assistants
over controlled substances that continues to this day under title 63, section 2-312(E) (Supp.2022)
and title 59. section 519.6(E) (2021). Your request is decided by interpreting these two statutory
provisions.
B.

Relevant statutory text

The UCDSA, title 63, sections 2-309A–2-315, grants a general authority to physician assistants to
prescribe and administer Schedule II–V controlled substances under the direction of a supervising
physician when (a) the physician assistant is authorized to prescribe under the PAA and (b) has
otherwise complied with registration requirements. In full, section 2-312(E) states:
A physician assistant who is recognized to prescribe by the State Board of Medical
Licensure and Supervision under the medical direction of a supervising physician,
pursuant to Section 519.6 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and who has
complied with the registration requirements of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous
Substances Act, in good faith and in the course of professional practice only, may
prescribe and administer Schedule II through V controlled dangerous substances.
63 O.S.Supp.2022 § 2-312(E).
The PAA, title 59, sections 519.1–524, contains a similar general grant of prescriptive authority to
physician assistants for Schedule II–V controlled substances. Subsection 1 of section E, which
provides that general grant of authority, states in relevant part:
The physician assistant may prescribe drugs, including controlled medications in
Schedules II through V pursuant to Section 2-312 of Title 63 of the Oklahoma
Statutes, and medical supplies and services as delegated by the delegating physician
and as approved by the State Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision after
consultation with the State Board of Pharmacy on the Physician Assistant Drug
Formulary.
59 O.S.2021, § 519.6(E)(1). Subsection 2 of section E addresses the more specific prescriptive
authority of physician assistants over Schedule II controlled substances, stating in relevant part:
A physician assistant may write an order for a Schedule II drug for immediate or
ongoing administration on site. Prescriptions and orders for Schedule II drugs
written by a physician assistant must be included on a written protocol determined
by the delegating physician and approved by the medical staff committee of the
facility or by direct verbal order of the delegating physician.
Id. § 519.6(E)(2).
III.

DISCUSSION
To interpret the two statutory provisions governing physician assistants’ prescriptive authority
over Schedule II controlled substances, we begin with the text. When the text of a statute is plain

Lyle R. Kelsey, Executive Director
Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision

A.G. Opinion
Page 4

and unambiguous, courts will “give effect to the legislative intent and purpose as expressed by the
statutory language.” Am. Airlines, Inc. v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2014 OK 95, ¶ 33, 341
P.3d 56, 64. Put differently, when statutory language is clear, “the courts may not search for its
meaning beyond the statute itself, but will give it the meaning intended by the Legislature.”
Armstrong v. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 1, 1948 OK 198, ¶ 13, 199 P.2d 1012, 1017.
When statutory language is ambiguous, or “susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation[,]” courts will “apply rules of statutory construction” to ascertain legislative intent.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 2014 OK 95, ¶ 33, 341 P.3d at 64. One of those well-established rules requires
an ambiguous statute “to be given a reasonable construction, one that will avoid absurd
consequences if this can be done without violating legislative intent.” Id. Another requires
legislative intent “be ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective
considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each.” Id., 341 P.3d at 64–
65. Similarly, “a statute should be given a construction which renders every word and sentence
operative rather than one that renders some words or sentences idle and nugatory.” Case v. Pinnick,
1939 OK 467, ¶ 6, 97 P.2d 58, 60. Finally, the “general words in a statute are limited by subsequent
more specific terms.” City of Okla. City v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 157, 2011 OK 29,
¶ 17, 254 P.3d 678, 683.
Here, the relevant statutory provisions governing physician assistant prescriptive authority over
Schedule II drugs are clear and unambiguous. Even if ambiguity exists, however, only one
reasonable interpretation is supported by the text and well-established rules of statutory
interpretation.
A.

The UCDSA requires compliance with the PAA, specifically title 59, section 519.6
(2021).

The plain language of the UCDSA, at title 63, section 2-312, can only be read one way: to require
physician assistants prescribing controlled substances to comply with the separate requirements
set out in the PAA, at title 59, section 519.6. Section 2-312(E) of the UCDSA limits prescriptive
authority to a physician assistant who is “recognized to prescribe by the State Board of Medical
Licensure and Supervision under the medical direction of a supervising physician, pursuant to
Section 519.6 of Title 59 of the Oklahoma Statutes,” among other things. Id. (emphasis added.)
Thus, a clear condition of prescriptive authority is the physician assistant’s compliance with title
59, section 519.6. 4
Even if the language of section 2-312(E) was susceptible to more than one interpretation, only one
interpretation here is reasonable: that the UCDSA requires physician assistants prescribing
scheduled substances to otherwise comply with the relevant requirements of the PAA found in title
59, section 519.6. By referencing title 59, section 519.6, the UCDSA adopts that statute “and
makes it wholly or partially applicable to the subject of the reference statute.” CompSource Mut.
Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2018 OK 54, ¶ 20, 435 P.3d 90, 98–99. Moreover,
because both the UCDSA and the PAA govern the same subject—a physician assistant’s
The general reference to “Section 519.6 of Title 59” here makes clear that compliance with the entirety of
that statute is required. The fact that the prior, superseded version of this statute included a specific subsection
reference does not alter this plain language.
4

Lyle R. Kelsey, Executive Director
Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision

A.G. Opinion
Page 5

prescriptive authority over controlled substances—they “must be construed as a harmonious
whole.” Taylor v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1999 OK 44, ¶ 19, 981 P.2d 1253, 1261. After all,
“[a]ll legislative enactments in pari materia are to be interpreted together as forming a single body
of law that will fit into a coherent symmetry of legislation.” Id.
Moreover, the legislative history behind section 2-312(E) confirms the intent to harmonize the
requirements of the UCDSA with the requirements of the PAA in section 519.6. 5 As an example,
the 2020 re-organization of section 519.6 that moved the relevant text of subsection D to subsection
E rendered the UCDSA’s prior reference to subsection D of section 519.6 obsolete. See supra note
2. Thus, the Legislature had to update this reference to cure an ambiguity over whether physician
assistants prescribing controlled substances under the UCDSA were still subject to the relevant
portion of the PAA. Without updating this reference, the plain language of the UCDSA would not
have required physician assistants to comply with the relevant portion of the PAA, which only
reinforces the conclusion that the intent of the 2022 amendment was to bring the requirements of
UCDSA into harmony with the PAA—not to create a set of conflicting requirements between the
two. It is unremarkable, to say the least, that the Legislature opted to leave a broad statutory
reference rather than change “D” to “E.” The decision was no doubt aimed to reduce the number
of amendments required to keep the UCDSA and PAA in harmony on an ongoing basis.
In conclusion, both the plain and unambiguous text of section 2-312(E), as well as rules of statutory
interpretation, confirm that physician assistants prescribing controlled substances pursuant to the
UCDSA must otherwise comply with the PAA, specifically title 59, section 519.6.
B.

The PAA restricts physician assistant prescriptive authority over Schedule II drugs
to on-site administration only.

The plain language of the PAA, at title 59, section 519.6, can only be read one way: to restrict
physician assistants’ prescriptive authority over Schedule II controlled substances to on-site
administration. The text of section 519.6(E)(2) is clear and unambiguous when it comes to
prescriptive authority over Schedule II drugs. It states, among other requirements, that “[a]
physician assistant may write an order for a Schedule II drug for immediate or ongoing
administration on site.” 59 O.S.2021, § 519.6(E)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, if a physician
assistant wishes to write an order for a Schedule II drug, that order must be for immediate or
ongoing administration on site.
The use and placement of the word “may” in the sentence structure denotes the discretion of the
physician assistant to prescribe Schedule II drugs, not discretion to disregard the subsequent
limitation “for immediate or ongoing administration on site.” Id. Put differently, the word “may”
merely conveys that a physician assistant may but need not prescribe Schedule II drugs pursuant
to this statutory authority. A contrary reading, one that interprets “may” as rendering the
subsequent limitations to the Schedule II prescriptive authority optional, would create an absurdity
that renders the entire sentence superfluous. If the Legislature intended physician assistant
prescriptive authority over Schedule II drugs to extend to both on-site and off-site administration,
it could have so said. But “[w]e may not add words that are not there” and we “will not presume
It is, of course, “proper to consider the history and consistent purpose of the legislation on the subject and
to discover the policy of the Legislature as disclosed by the course of the legislation.” McNeill v. City of Tulsa, 1998
OK 2, ¶ 9, 953 P.2d 329, 332.
5

Lyle R. Kelsey, Executive Director
Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision

A.G. Opinion
Page 6

the legislature has done a vain and useless act.” Frank Bartel Transp., Inc. v. State ex rel. Murray
State Coll., 2023 OK 121, ¶ 5, 540 P.3d 480, 483; State ex rel. Thompson v. Ekberg, 1980 OK 91,
¶ 7, 613 P.2d 466, 467; see also Patterson v. Beall, 2000 OK 92, ¶ 24, 19 P.3d 839, 845 (explaining
that “the mention of one thing in a statute impliedly excludes another thing”).
The words and phrases used in subsection 2 of title 59, section 519.6(E) are unambiguous and
susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. For example, the plain meaning of the phrase
“Schedule II drug” encompasses any and every Schedule II drug, including those encompassed by
the first subsection. The fact that the first subsection grants physician assistants general authority
to “prescribe drugs, including controlled medications in Schedules II through V” does not alter
this plain language. Nor does it create ambiguity or conflict. The broad grant of prescriptive
authority over Schedule II–V drugs (in subsection 1) does not inherently conflict with the more
specific limitation of Schedule II drug prescriptive authority (in subsection 2). See McIntosh v.
Watkins, 2019 OK 6, ¶ 4, 441 P.3d 1094, 1096 (“The legislative intent will be ascertained from
the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective considering relevant provisions together
to give full force and effect to each.”). More importantly, even if conflict could be imagined, it
must be resolved to give effect to the more specific terms of subsection 2. See Ekberg, 1980 OK
91, ¶ 7, 613 P.2d at 467 (“[A]s a rule, general words in a statute are limited by subsequent more
specific terms.”). As the Oklahoma Supreme Court has made clear: “[w]here a matter is addressed
by two statutes—one specific and the other general—the specific statute, which clearly includes
the matter in controversy and prescribes a different rule, governs over the general statute.” State
ex rel. Trimble v. City of Moore, 1991 OK 97, ¶ 30, 818 P.2d 889, 899. Any contrary interpretation
would render the express limitations found in subsection 2 meaningless and fail to give harmonious
effect to the entirety of section 519.6(E). 6
Similarly, the term “order” used in subsection 2 is synonymous and interchangeable with the term
“prescription,” which is defined in the UCDSA and the Oklahoma Pharmacy Act as an “order” for
a drug or controlled dangerous substance. 63 O.S.Supp.2023, § 2-309(D)(1); 59 O.S.Supp.2022,
§ 353.1(41); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MED. DESK DICTIONARY 667 (Revised ed. 2005)
(defining “prescription” as “a written direction for the preparation, compounding, and
administration of a medicine”); id. at 580 (defining “order” as “to give a prescription for:
PRESCRIBE”). A prior Attorney General Opinion took up a remarkably similar issue in 2001,
albeit in the context of veterinary prescription drugs. See 2001 OK AG 21 ¶¶ 12–19. As that
opinion explained:
These statutory definitions [in the Pharmacy Act] indicate the terms “drug order”
and “prescription” are virtually interchangeable. A prescription is an order for
dangerous drugs and an order for dangerous drugs is a prescription. Most simply
put, both a ‘drug order’ and a ‘prescription’ are instructions to a person authorized
to dispense a dangerous drug.

6
The legislative decision to subdivide section 519.6(E) into two parts does not undermine this conclusion.
No statutory canon of construction places the organizational form above the statutory language. Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957) (“The change of arrangement, which placed portions of what was
originally a single section in two separated sections cannot be regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the
enactment.”). Thus, we will not ignore well-established rules of statutory construction in favor of an unreasonable
assumption that the division of the two parts demands separate and equal treatment.

Lyle R. Kelsey, Executive Director
Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision

A.G. Opinion
Page 7

Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis omitted). Thus, to “write an order” is to write a prescription, which matches the
very definition of the verb prescribe: “to write or give medical prescriptions.” MERRIAMWEBSTER’S MED. DESK DICTIONARY 666–67 (Revised ed. 2005). Accordingly, the plain meaning
supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend the phrase “write an order” used in
subsection 2 to convey a different or more limited prescriptive authority than the phrase
“prescribe” used in subsection 1.
The history of amendments to section 519.6 confirms the Legislature’s intent to place heightened
restrictions on a physician assistant’s authority to prescribe Schedule II controlled substances.
When physician assistants were first granted general prescriptive authority over controlled
substances in 1998, that authority did not include Schedule II drugs. See S.B. 1069, 46th Leg., 1998
2d Reg. Sess., 1998 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 128 §§ 4, 6. Likewise, when the Legislature added that
authority in 2001, and expanded what is now subsection 1 to include Schedule II, it simultaneously
added the specific requirements now found in subsection 2. See S.B. 32, 48th Leg., 2001 Reg. Sess.,
2001 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 385 § 3(D). Thus, it is evident that the new prescriptive authority over
Schedule II drugs was subject to the restrictions added in subsection 2.
The title of the 2001 Bill confirms that this is the correct construction of section 519.6. See Kratz
v. Kratz, 1995 OK 63, ¶ 15, 905 P.2d 753, 756 (“The title to an Act is a valuable aid in its
construction and may be considered in determining legislative intent.”) Here, the title of the 2001
Bill states that the purpose of this amendment was to “specify[] when physician assistants may
write orders or prescriptions for Schedule II drugs . . . .” Id. To accomplish this, the Legislature
specified that which was previously otherwise absent from section 519.6: that physician assistants
are expressly limited to prescribing a Schedule II drug on site. Patterson, 2000 OK 92, ¶ 24, 19
P.3d at 845.
In sum, the plain language of title 59, section 519.6(E) can only be read one way: to limit physician
assistant prescriptive authority over Schedule II drugs to on-site administration only.
It is, therefore, the official Opinion of the Attorney General that:
Oklahoma law, specifically title 63, section 2-312(E) (Supp.2022) and title 59,
section 519.6(E) (2021), does not allow physician assistants to prescribe and
administer Schedule II controlled dangerous substances under the direction of
a delegating physician at off-site locations. Physician assistants’ prescriptive
authority over Schedule II substances is limited to on-site administration only.

GENTNER DRUMMOND
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA
AUDREY A. WEAVER
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL