If a New York town wants to convert parkland-located parking spaces from boat-trailer spaces to general municipal parking, does the State Legislature have to pass a special law to authorize the change?

Plain-English summary

The Town of Brookhaven owns a parking lot on parkland. The eastern portion serves general municipal parking; the western portion holds eight boat-trailer spaces near a marina. A village within the town wanted to enter into an inter-municipal agreement under which the village would reconfigure the western eight boat-trailer spaces into 30 spaces for passenger vehicles, available to the public for general municipal parking. The village would maintain and control the spaces for at least 50 years (renewable for another 50).

The town's deputy attorney asked whether this change of use required special legislation from the State Legislature. The Attorney General's office concluded that it did. The original spaces sat on parkland, which under New York's public trust doctrine cannot be diverted to non-park purposes without specific legislative authorization. Boat-trailer parking incidental to a marina was treated as a "park purpose"; general municipal parking, by contrast, was not. Converting the use moved the land out of park dedication and triggered the statutory-authorization requirement.

The AG offered an alternative ground that further supported the result: the inter-municipal agreement transferred control over the spaces from town to village for half a century or more. Under Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34 (1964), even subjecting parkland to a non-revocable use right beyond a permit may itself require legislation, regardless of any change in use. The opinion did not need to rest on this alternative ground because the change-of-use analysis already required special legislation, but it noted the alternative.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2017. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical context

What the opinion meant for towns and villages

A New York municipality that wanted to repurpose any parkland, even for another public use, needed Legislature-passed special legislation. The opinion treats this rule as broad: it applies to changes in use that other public-purpose justifications might seem to support (water-treatment plants, courts, schools, highways), each of which the Court of Appeals had previously held still required special legislation.

What the opinion meant for inter-municipal agreements

If two municipalities want to share or reallocate control over parkland, the agreement alone is not enough. The transfer of substantial control over the long term may be treated, on its own, as alienation requiring legislation, even apart from the change of use.

What "park purpose" looked like at the time

Park purpose was read with a functional eye. Boat-trailer parking, although it is "parking," was treated as park-purpose because it served the marina that itself sat on parkland. General municipal car parking, by contrast, was not park-purpose. The functional inquiry, not the label "parking," determined the result.

Common questions

Q: What is the public trust doctrine for parkland?
A: Under cases like Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, 95 N.Y.2d 623 (2001), parkland in New York is impressed with a public trust. Once dedicated to park use, the land cannot be alienated or diverted to non-park purposes without specific authority from the State Legislature, even if the new use is itself a public benefit.

Q: Is the rule about parkland or about parks?
A: It applies to land dedicated to park purposes. The dedication can be by deed, statute, or long-standing public use. Once dedicated, the public trust attaches; the doctrine then governs whether the use can be changed.

Q: Does it matter that no title is transferring?
A: No. The opinion treats title transfer as unnecessary to trigger the alienation rule. Functional diversion (changing the use) or transferring substantial control (the inter-municipal-agreement angle) can each independently trigger the requirement of legislative authorization.

Q: Why did "for general municipal parking" fail to qualify as a park purpose?
A: General-public parking, available to anyone for any reason, was not connected to the park's use. The eight boat-trailer spaces, by contrast, served the on-site marina (a park-purpose use). The conversion fundamentally changed who the spaces were for, and that change moved the land out of park dedication.

Q: Were there exceptions or short-cuts?
A: Yes. A revocable permit to use parkland for a non-park purpose can sometimes be granted without legislation, per Miller v. City of New York. But a 50-year (renewable) inter-municipal agreement is not a revocable permit; it transfers durable control.

Background and statutory framework

The public trust doctrine in New York is largely judge-made, anchored by Court of Appeals decisions stretching back more than a century. The opinion's three pillars:

• Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 623 (2001), holding that a water treatment plant on parkland required legislative authorization.
• Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248 (1920), holding the same for courts and schools.
• Matter of Central Parkway, 140 Misc. 727 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady Co. 1931), holding the same for a highway.

For the alternative-ground analysis (transfer of control), the opinion cites Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34, 37 (1964): a park cannot be alienated or subjected to anything beyond a revocable permit without legislative sanction.

There is no specific Navigation Law or Town Law section governing parkland alienation; the rule is part of common-law public-trust doctrine that the Legislature has reaffirmed by enacting specific home-rule alienation acts case by case. Each individual diversion from park use is its own statute, passed for that specific parcel.

Citations and references

Cases:
- Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 623, 630-32 (2001), water-treatment plant on parkland required legislation
- Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34, 37 (1964), parkland cannot be alienated or subjected to non-revocable rights without legislative sanction
- Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248, 253 (1920), courts and schools on parkland required legislation
- Matter of Central Parkway, 140 Misc. 727 (Sup. Ct. Sch'dy Co. 1931), highway on parkland required legislation

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.ny.gov/libraries-documents/opinions/opinions-year
• Original PDF: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/2017-1_pw.pdf

Original opinion text

A change in the use of municipal parking spaces on parkland must be authorized by special legislation.

December 13, 2017

Beth Ann Reilly
Deputy Town Attorney
Town of Brookhaven
One Independence Hill
Farmingville, NY 11738

Informal Opinion
No. 2017-1

Dear Ms. Reilly:

You have requested an opinion asking whether specific legislative authority is required for a village within the Town to convert certain parking spaces in a parking lot owned by the Town from eight spaces for boat trailers to 30 spaces for passenger vehicles, in accord with an inter-municipal agreement between the village and the Town. You have explained that at present the eastern portion of the parking lot is used for general municipal parking, and the western portion of the lot, closest to the boat ramp of a marina, is used for parking both cars and boat trailers for the Town's marina. The village intends to reconfigure the existing eight boat-trailer spaces in the western portion to make 30 spaces for passenger vehicles. These reconfigured spaces will not be reserved for those using the marina but instead will be available to members of the public for municipal parking generally. Under the terms of the agreement, the village will maintain and control the parking spaces for at least 50 years, with an option to renew the agreement for up to another 50 years.

You have stated that the eight boat-trailer spaces are located on parkland. Parkland is imbued with a public trust and cannot be alienated or diverted to non-park purposes without specific authority from the Legislature. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 623, 630 (2001). Because the current use of the spaces in question, parking of boat trailers incidental to the use of the marina, is distinctly different from the proposed use, parking for general municipal purposes, including but by no means limited to parking for use of the marina, we believe that legislative authority for the proposed change is required.

Your letter suggests that no legislative action is required because there would be no transfer of title to the land in question, and because the land would remain a parking lot, changing only the specific vehicles that will be permitted to park there from boat trailers to automobiles. We note that although title will not be transferred, the proposed inter-municipal agreement will transfer control over the parking spaces from the Town to the village, and thus that transfer alone might well require special legislation. See Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34, 37 (1964) (park cannot be alienated or subjected to anything beyond revocable permit without legislative sanction). Setting aside that question, we are of the opinion that because land currently dedicated to park purposes, parking for the marina, would be made available for parking for other than park purposes, that is, general municipal parking, the change would constitute a diversion of park property that must be authorized by the Legislature before it can occur. Specific legislation is required even when the diversion of parkland serves another public purpose. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, 95 N.Y.2d 623, 631-32 (water treatment plant); Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y.248, 253 (1920) (courts or schools); Matter of Central Parkway, 140 Misc. 727 (Sup. Ct. Sch'dy Co. 1931) (highway).

The Attorney General issues formal opinions only to officers and departments of state government. Thus, this is an informal opinion rendered to assist you in advising the municipality you represent.

Very truly yours,

KATHRYN SHEINGOLD
Assistant Solicitor General
in Charge of Opinions