How close to a government building can a New York village or city reserve on-street parking for that building's users under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640(a)(22)?

Plain-English summary

The Pelham Union Free School District asked the Village of Pelham Manor to reserve on-street parking on streets in the Village for the school district's high school/middle school employees. The complication: the school building sits inside the neighboring Village of Pelham, and none of the streets bordering the school property are in Pelham Manor. The streets the school district wanted reserved were near the school, but did not touch the school property. Pelham Manor and the school district's attorneys asked the AG how far the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640(a)(22) authority reaches.

VTL § 1640(a)(22) gives cities and villages authority to "prohibit or regulate the stopping, standing and parking of vehicles in designated areas reserved for public business at or adjacent to a government facility." The question was whether "adjacent" means touching, or whether it also reaches further. The AG read the statute narrowly: "at or adjacent to" refers to the parking areas closest to the facility. That generally means the portions of bordering highways that abut or are across the street from the facility, plus reasonable extensions of those areas. Highways that do not border the facility are, with limited exceptions, outside the statute's scope.

The reasoning began with the statutory text. Section 1640(a)(22) uses "at" and "adjacent to" in the disjunctive. Under standard rules of statutory construction (Statutes § 231), each term must have a separate meaning. The AG read "at" as referring to bordering parking spots directly in front of, on the sides of, or behind the facility, and "adjacent to" as referring to other on-street areas that are still close, such as those across the street or reasonable extensions of the bordering areas.

The word "adjacent" is ambiguous on its own. Black's Law Dictionary and Ballentine's both note it can mean either "touching" or "near but not touching." The AG looked at how the Legislature uses "adjacent" elsewhere in the VTL: VTL § 144 (defining sidewalk as the portion of a street between the curb and adjacent property lines); VTL § 1156(a) (pedestrians prohibited from walking along an adjacent roadway); VTL § 1160(e) (u-turns from the lane adjacent to the center line); VTL § 1180(c) (lower speed limits on highways adjacent to a school). In each of those uses, "adjacent" refers to something that adjoins or is next to the highway. That pattern supports the narrower reading.

The AG also relied on the principle that statutes infringing on common-law rights are strictly construed. Statutes § 311. The right to use a public highway rests with the general public, not with adjacent landowners or local residents, and reserving parking spots for a particular user group is an exception to that general principle. Narrow reading honors the legislative grant while respecting public access to the highway.

The statutory purpose supports the limit too. The Senate sponsor's memorandum on chapter 663 (1996) explained that designating on-street parking allows public officials to reach their destinations quickly. Areas closest to the facility do this best. Reserving parking further away does not serve the purpose, and gives a wider chunk of public roadway to a narrow user group.

The exception the AG flagged: in Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 18 N.Y.S. 876 (1892), aff'd, 152 N.Y. 244 (1897), where the specified street had no streets directly touching it that satisfied the statutory grant, the court read "adjacent" to mean neighboring parallel streets. In limited circumstances like that, where parking is not available on streets that would otherwise be considered adjacent, areas further away may fall within the statute's scope.

On the discretion question, the AG confirmed that VTL § 1640 is permissive: a city or village "may" regulate parking, it is not required to. When one government entity asks another to reserve parking for its users (here, the school district asking the village), the village may reasonably require the requesting entity to demonstrate the facts that allow the village board to find the requested regulation reasonable, including that the designated areas are "at or adjacent to" the government facility.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2006. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: How close does parking need to be to count as 'adjacent'?
A: The AG didn't set a fixed distance. "At" the facility means directly in front of, on the sides of, or behind. "Adjacent to" extends that area a reasonable distance in either direction and includes parking across the street. It's a fact-specific question, but the touchstone is that the parking serves convenient access to the facility.

Q: What if there's no on-street parking on the streets bordering the building?
A: The AG cited the Brooklyn Heights R.R. exception: if the obvious adjacent streets do not have parking available, the statute may reach further to streets that the AG would otherwise consider too far. That carve-out exists to keep the statute functional in unusual layouts.

Q: Can a village reserve parking on streets in a different municipality?
A: No. VTL § 1640 is a delegation to "cities and villages" to regulate highways within their boundaries. A village can only regulate parking on its own streets. In the Pelham case, the school building sat in Pelham, and Pelham Manor could only regulate streets within Pelham Manor.

Q: Can the village just refuse the school district's request?
A: Yes. VTL § 1640(a) is permissive. The village "may" act, it is not required to. The village can require the requesting entity to demonstrate the facts that support reasonable regulation, and the village can decline if not persuaded.

Q: What counts as a 'government facility'?
A: The statute uses the broad term "government facility," which has been interpreted to include public schools (the AG's Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 2005-15). Court buildings, libraries, town halls, and other public buildings would fall in the same category.

Q: Does this analysis apply to towns too?
A: VTL § 1640(a)(22) by its terms applies to "cities and villages." Town authority to regulate parking comes from other VTL sections. The AG's interpretation of "adjacent" would inform the same statutory language wherever it appears, but the source of authority differs.

Background and statutory framework

VTL § 1640's structure. VTL § 1640 delegates highway-regulation authority to cities and villages. Subsection (a) lists permissive regulations including stop signs, one-way streets, weight limits, and parking regulations. Subsection (a)(22) specifically authorizes regulation of "stopping, standing and parking of vehicles in designated areas reserved for public business at or adjacent to a government facility." The statute is permissive: a city or village "may" enact regulations under § 1640(a). The statute is also delegated power; the regulations must serve a legitimate public purpose.

The 1996 amendment. Chapter 663 of the Laws of 1996 added or refined this authority. The Senate sponsor's memorandum explained that cities and villages historically designated on-street parking spaces to allow public officials to reach their destinations quickly. The phrase "at or adjacent to a government facility" was the codification of that purpose.

The statutory construction principles in play. Statutes § 231 requires each word in a statute to be given meaning, with disjunctive constructions ("at or adjacent") signaling two distinct concepts. Statutes § 311 directs strict construction of statutes that infringe on common-law rights, here, the public's right to use the public highway. Leader v. Maroney applied the disjunctive-meaning principle to reject an interpretation that would have made one of two statutory standards superfluous.

The ambiguity of 'adjacent'. The AG canvassed dictionaries and cases. United States v. St. Anthony R.R. Co., 192 U.S. 524 (1904), noted that "adjacent" is "frequently uncertain and relative as to its meaning." The case-specific facts determine whether two objects are adjacent within a statute's reach.

Use elsewhere in the VTL. The AG checked the VTL's other uses of "adjacent": § 144 (sidewalk between curb and adjacent property lines); § 1156(a) (adjacent roadway); § 1160(e) (lane adjacent to center line); § 1180(c) (highways adjacent to a school). In each case, "adjacent" refers to something next to or touching the highway. Reading § 1640(a)(22) consistently with that pattern produces the same narrow scope.

The 'closest to the facility' formulation. The AG settled on a working definition: parking areas closest to the facility. That generally includes (1) portions of bordering highways directly in front of, on the sides of, or behind the facility (the "at" component), (2) areas across the street from the facility (still "adjacent" because directly opposite), and (3) reasonable extensions of those areas in either direction.

The Brooklyn Heights R.R. carve-out. Where the bordering streets don't have parking available (for example, because the facility is on a controlled-access road or because the directly-adjacent streets are entirely commercial without on-street parking), the statute may reach somewhat further to keep its purpose alive. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 18 N.Y.S. 876, 1892, treated "adjacent" as reaching parallel neighboring streets where the touching streets did not satisfy the statutory grant.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640 (delegation of highway regulation to cities and villages)
• Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640(a)(22) (parking reservation at or adjacent to a government facility)
• Vehicle and Traffic Law § 144 (sidewalk definition)
• Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1156(a) (pedestrians and adjacent roadway)
• Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1160(e) (u-turn from lane adjacent to center line)
• Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(c) (lower speed limits adjacent to a school)
• L. 1996, ch. 663 (1996 amendment of VTL § 1640(a)(22))
• Statutes § 231 (each word of a statute should be given meaning)
• Statutes § 311 (statute infringing on common right is strictly construed)

Cases:

• Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 N.Y.2d 95 (2001)
• United States v. St. Anthony R.R. Co., 192 U.S. 524 (1904)
• Ranke v. State, 206 Misc. 569 (Ct. Claims 1954), aff'd, 285 A.D. 1113 (4th Dep't 1955)
• Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 18 N.Y.S. 876 (Brooklyn City Ct., Gen'l Term 1892), aff'd, 152 N.Y. 244 (1897)

Secondary authority:

• Ballentine's Law Dictionary 30 (3d ed. 1969)
• Black's Law Dictionary 44 (8th ed. 2004)

Prior AG opinions:

• Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 2005-15 (village may reserve parking adjacent to a public school)
• Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 97-33 (right to use of highways rests with the general public)

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.ny.gov/libraries-documents/opinions/opinions-year
• Original PDF: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/I_2006-6_pw.pdf

Original opinion text

Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 144, 1160, 1180, 1640; McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York §§ 231, 311

Cities and villages are authorized by VTL § 1640(a)(22) to set aside on-street parking for users of a government facility only on those parking areas closest to the facility.

July 25, 2006

Lawrence Praga
Keane & Beane, P.C.
445 Hamilton Avenue
White Plains, NY 10601

Informal Opinion
No. 2006-6

Neal Schwarzfeld
Village of Pelham Manor
Village Attorney
4 Penfield Place
Pelham Manor, NY 10803-3298

Dear Mr. Praga and Mr. Schwarzfeld:

As attorneys for the Pelham Union Free School District ("the School District") and the Village of Pelham Manor ("the Village"), you have asked whether Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") § 1640(a)(22), which authorizes cities and villages to enact regulations setting aside parking spaces on public highways "in designated areas reserved for public business at or adjacent to a government facility," is limited in its application to those highways that touch the property on which the government facility is located. The Village of Pelham Manor has also raised several questions relating to the exercise of its discretion under this statute.

Your questions stem from a request of the School District to the Village of Pelham Manor to set aside parking on specified streets in the Village for the use of employees who work in the School District's high school/middle school building. According to your letters, the streets on which the School District has requested that the Village of Pelham Manor set aside parking are located near the property on which the school building is located, but do not border the school property.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the statutory authorization was intended to allow the setting aside of on-street parking in those areas located closest to the facility, which will generally be those areas on bordering highways that abut or are directly across from the facility, or that extend a reasonable distance from these areas. Thus, areas on highways that do not border the facility are unlikely to be considered "adjacent" within the meaning of this statute. With respect to a village or city's exercise of its discretion in setting aside parking for the users of a building that belongs to another government entity, we conclude that the city or village may reasonably require that entity to demonstrate the facts necessary for the legislative body of the city or village to determine whether the requested parking regulations are reasonable, including whether the designated parking areas are "at or adjacent to" the government facility.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

VTL § 1640(a)(22) delegates to cities and villages the power to regulate the use of highways within their boundaries and in particular to "[p]rohibit or regulate the stopping, standing and parking of vehicles in designated areas reserved for public business at or adjacent to a government facility." We have previously concluded that this provision permits a village to enact regulations setting aside parking spaces on highways in the village adjacent to a public school for use by employees of the school, as long as such restrictions are reasonable and rationally related to a legitimate public purpose. Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 2005-15.

You have asked whether the reference to "adjacent" in this statute refers to only highways that touch the property on which the government facility is located, or also may include highways that are near, but do not border the property. While you have framed the question in terms of the adjacency of the highway, we note that the terms "at or adjacent to a government facility" in section 1640(a)(22) modify the words "designated areas reserved for public business." Thus, as explained below, the statute does not describe the authorization in terms of highways that are adjacent to the government facility, but more narrowly requires that the regulated parking areas be "at or adjacent" to the government facility.

ANALYSIS

There are no reported decisions construing the scope of the authority granted by VTL § 1640(a)(22), and nothing in the legislative history of this provision specifically addresses the meaning of the phrase "at or adjacent to." By its terms, the statute authorizes the setting aside of parking areas that are "at" or "adjacent" to a government facility. The Legislature's use of the terms "at" and "adjacent to" in the disjunctive indicates that each term was intended to have a separate meaning in the statute. See, e.g., Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 N.Y.2d 95, 104 (2001) (relying on fact that statute authorized two separate standards joined by the word "or" to reject interpretation that would define each standard by same criteria because it would render one standard superfluous); Statutes § 231, 1 McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. at 388 (1971) (each word in a statute should be given meaning and effect and words should not be rejected as superfluous when it is reasonable to give each word a distinct and separate meaning). The reference to designated parking areas "at" the government facility is reasonably understood to refer to areas of the bordering highways that are directly in front of, on the sides of or behind the facility. Thus, the language of the statute indicates that "adjacent to" was intended to refer to other areas of on-street parking.

As you recognize, the term "adjacent" is ambiguous, it can be used in a narrow sense to mean next to, touching or abutting, or in other contexts it may mean located near or close to, without necessarily touching. See Ballentine's Law Dictionary 30 (3d ed. 1969) (defining "adjacent" as near or close to, but sometimes meaning touching or contiguous); Black's Law Dictionary 44 (8th ed. 2004) (near or close to, not necessarily touching). Courts look to the context and purpose of a statute to ascertain the intended meaning of "adjacent" in a particular statute. See, e.g., United States v. St. Anthony R.R. Co., 192 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1904); Ranke v. State, 206 Misc. 569, 573-74 (Ct. Claims 1954), aff'd without opn. 285 A.D. 1113 (4th Dep't 1955). Further, because "adjacent" is an imprecise and relative term, it does not connote a specific distance; the determination of whether two objects are adjacent will often depend on the particular facts to which the statute is being applied. See United States v. St. Anthony R.R., 192 U.S. at 530, 537 ("As the word is frequently uncertain and relative as to its meaning, . . . it must be defined with reference to the context, at least to some extent.").

Consistent with the statutory purpose of section 1640(a)(22), the designated parking areas must be near enough to provide the users convenient access to the government facility. See Memorandum of Senate Sponsor, reprinted in Bill Jacket to ch. 663 (1996), at 5 (the historic practice of designating on-street parking spaces was used by cities and villages "to allow public officials to reach their destinations quickly"). Additionally, the fact that this statutory authorization can be viewed as an exception to the statutory and common law principle that the right to use of the highways rests with the general public, not with adjacent proprietors or local residents, Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 2005-15; Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 97-33, weighs in favor of a narrow construction. See generally Statutes § 311, 1 McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. at 473 (1971) ("A statute which infringes on common right is strictly construed.").

A narrower rather than expansive interpretation of "adjacent" is also consistent with the Legislature's use of the term "adjacent" elsewhere in the VTL. Where the term "adjacent" is used elsewhere in the VTL to refer to the relationship between a highway (or portion of a highway) and another object, the term generally refers to an object that adjoins or is next to the highway. See, e.g., VTL § 144 (defining sidewalk as the portion of a street between the curb and adjacent property lines); id. § 1156(a) (where sidewalks are provided, pedestrians are prohibited from walking along an adjacent roadway); id. § 1160(e) (where more than one lane is designated for left turns, directing that u-turns should be made from the lane adjacent to the center line); id. § 1180(c) (enforcement provision for the lower speed limits that are permitted on highways adjacent to a school).

In light of these factors, we believe the reference to designated parking areas "at or adjacent to" the government facility is properly limited to those on-street parking areas closest to the facility. Limiting the statutory authorization to the on-street parking areas closest to the facility provides a narrow interpretation that accords with the statute's context and purpose: The areas closest to the facility will provide the most convenient access to the facility and, because these parking spaces are likely to be used for access to the facility in the absence of restricted parking, limiting the statute in this way helps to curtail any infringement on the free use of the highways permitted by this provision. The areas closest to the facility will generally include those portions of the bordering highways that are directly in front of, on the sides of or behind the facility ("at"), as well as the areas that extend a reasonable distance in either direction from these directly abutting areas and the areas located across the street from the facility ("adjacent to").

Although the determination of precisely how far from the facility the area of the highway may be and still be considered "adjacent" within the meaning of the statute will depend on the specific facts to which the statute is being applied, we do not believe the statutory authorization was intended generally to include highways that do not border the facility. Only in limited circumstances, such as where parking is not permitted in the areas that would otherwise be considered adjacent to the facility, might areas further away, including on non-bordering highways, be considered within the statute's scope. Cf. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 18 N.Y.S. 876 (Brooklyn City. Ct., Gen'l Term 1892) (where there were no streets touching the specified street that satisfied the statutory grant, the term "adjacent" was interpreted to mean neighboring parallel streets), aff'd 152 N.Y. 244 (1897).

With respect to the additional questions raised by the Village of Pelham Manor concerning its exercise of discretion under this statute, we note that the statutory provision authorizes, but does not require, a city or village to set aside on-street parking for users of an adjacent government facility. The legislative grant of authority under section 1640(a) is permissive. VTL § 1640 ("The legislative body of any city or village, with respect to highways . . . in such city or village . . . may by local law, ordinance, order, rule or regulation . . . .") (emphasis added). Where, as here, a separate governmental entity (the Pelham Union Free School District) is requesting that the village set aside on-street parking for the requesting entity's employees, we believe the village may reasonably require the entity requesting the parking to demonstrate the factual basis for the reasonableness of the requested parking regulations, including that the designated parking areas are "at or adjacent to" the government facility. If the village board of trustees is satisfied that setting aside the requested parking areas is reasonable under the circumstances, it may, but is not required, to do so.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that designated parking areas "at or adjacent to a government facility" within the meaning of VTL § 1640(a)(22) refers to the on-street parking areas closest to the facility, which generally will be limited to those areas on bordering highways that abut or are directly across from the facility, or that extend a reasonable distance from these areas. We also conclude that where another government entity requests the setting aside of on-street parking under this provision, a village or city may reasonably require that entity to demonstrate the facts that allow the legislative body of the village or city to make a determination that the requested parking regulations are reasonable, including that the designated parking areas are "at or adjacent to" the government facility.

The Attorney General issues formal opinions only to officers and departments of state government. Thus, this is an informal opinion rendered to assist you in advising the municipality you represent.

Very truly yours,

LAURA ETLINGER
Assistant Attorney General
In Charge of Opinions