Can a village charter limit voting on a referendum to dissolve the village to property owners, or does the one-person, one-vote rule require letting every resident vote?

Plain-English summary

The Village of Catskill planned to put a dissolution proposition on the ballot at the next regular village election. The village charter set property ownership ("real or personal property in the Village assessed upon the last preceding assessment roll") as a qualification for voting on dissolution. The Village Attorney asked whether that charter provision could be applied.

The AG said no. The charter provision violated equal protection.

The federal and state equal protection guarantees require adherence to the one-person, one-vote principle. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception for special-purpose government bodies whose impact falls disproportionately on a definable group. In two cases (Salyer Land Co. v Tulare Water District and Ball v James), the Court upheld statutes restricting voting in directors' elections to landowners within special water districts. The reasoning: the district performed no general government functions, served almost solely to store and deliver water, financed itself from landowner assessments, and affected landowners disproportionately. In that narrow setting, limiting the franchise to landowners did not violate equal protection.

The New York Court of Appeals applied the same framework in Matter of Esler v Waters, upholding a New York statute that limited voting in a special water district to property owners. The Court concluded that the district served an extremely limited purpose, did not perform general government functions, and the property-ownership limit was rationally related to those facts. A prior AG informal opinion (91-31) reached the same conclusion for referendums to establish improvement districts under Town Law Article 12-A.

A village government is the opposite of a special-purpose district. It performs a wide variety of general government functions (police, fire, public works, planning, zoning, taxation). Its impact does not fall disproportionately on one defined group. The narrow Salyer / Ball / Esler exception did not apply. The default one-person, one-vote rule controlled, and the property-ownership voting qualification could not be applied to a dissolution referendum.

Village Law § 19-1900(3) provides that a dissolution proposal is effective if "approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon." The "qualified electors" entitled to vote on dissolution must be defined consistent with the constitutional rule the opinion described, not by reference to the property-ownership limit in the village charter.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What is the "one-person, one-vote" principle?

A constitutional rule under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, requiring that each eligible voter's vote count equally in elections for state and local governmental bodies. The doctrine emerged from the U.S. Supreme Court's reapportionment cases in the 1960s and has been extended to local elections.

Why does property ownership matter in some elections and not others?

The Supreme Court's narrow exception in Salyer and Ball applied to special-purpose districts (water districts, in those cases) where the burden of district operations falls almost entirely on landowners. The Court reasoned that in those narrow settings, limiting voting to landowners was rationally related to the district's nature. A village dissolution is a different category entirely: the village serves all residents and dissolution affects all residents, so voting cannot be limited to property owners.

What about elections to form an improvement district under Town Law Article 12-A?

Different answer. The AG had previously concluded that property ownership was a permissible voting qualification for referendums to establish such an improvement district (Op Atty Gen (Inf) No. 91-31). An improvement district under Article 12-A is a special-purpose entity that imposes its costs on landowners; the Esler line of cases controls.

Could the village still require some voter qualifications?

The opinion addresses the property-ownership qualification and says it may not be applied to the dissolution referendum. It does not address other voter qualifications.

If the village charter says property owners only, why doesn't that control?

The letter says the charter provision could not lawfully be applied to the dissolution referendum. It also describes itself as an informal and unofficial expression of the office's views.

What happens if the village ignores the AG opinion and enforces the property-ownership requirement anyway?

The letter does not address what would happen if the village enforced the property-ownership requirement despite the AG's view.

Background and statutory framework

The Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions are the source of the one-person, one-vote rule. The U.S. Supreme Court's Reynolds v Sims line (and its local-election extensions) established the principle. Avery v Midland County, 390 US 474 (1968), extended it to local-government bodies; the Salyer / Ball exception carved out special-purpose districts.

Matter of Esler v Waters, 56 NY2d 306 (1982), is the leading New York case applying the Salyer exception to a New York special water district. The Court concluded that the New York State Constitution's equal protection and voting provisions did not impose a stricter rule than the federal Constitution in that context.

Village Law § 19-1900(3) sets the substantive standard for village dissolution by referendum (effective on approval by a majority of qualified electors voting). Town Law Article 12-A authorizes the formation of town improvement districts.

The 1998 opinion is essentially an application of Esler.

Citations

• Town Law Art 12-A (town improvement districts).
• Village Law § 19-1900(3) (effective date of village dissolution proposal).
• Matter of Esler v Waters, 56 NY2d 306 (1982) (Court of Appeals applying Salyer exception to NY water district).
• Salyer Land Company v Tulare Water District, 410 US 719 (1973) (U.S. Supreme Court special-purpose-district exception).
• Ball v James, 451 US 355 (1981) (U.S. Supreme Court reaffirming exception for narrow-function water district).
• Op Atty Gen (Inf) No. 91-31 (property ownership permissible as voting qualification for Town Law Art 12-A improvement district referendum).

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.ny.gov/libraries-documents/opinions/opinions-year
• Original PDF: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/I_98-2_pw.pdf

Original opinion text

TOWN LAW ART 12-A; VILLAGE LAW § 19-1900(3). A proposal to dissolve a village government does not fall within the narrow exception to the one-person, one-vote principle. The provisions of the village charter that require property ownership as a qualification to vote upon the proposal to dissolve the village, therefore, may not be applied.

February 5, 1998

Terry J. Wilhelm, Esq.
Village Attorney
Village of Catskill
370 Main Street
Catskill, NY 12414

Informal Opinion
No. 98-2

Dear Mr. Wilhelm:
You have asked who is entitled to vote upon a proposition to dissolve the village that will be submitted at the next regular village election. You note that the village charter establishes qualifications for voting upon proposals for dissolution. Those qualifications include, among other things, ownership "of real or personal property in the Village assessed upon the last preceding assessment roll thereof". You also note that the Village Law provides that a proposal to dissolve the village shall be effective if "approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon". Village Law § 19-1900(3). You have asked whether the property ownership requirement established in the village charter may be applied to the proposal to dissolve the village. We conclude that the charter provision that makes property ownership a qualification for voting upon the dissolution is not consistent with constitutional requirements. Generally, State and federal equal protection guarantees require adherence to the one-person, one-vote principle. Narrow exceptions to this principle have been recognized but they are limited to circumstances not present here. The Court of Appeals examined the constitutionality of a statute restricting the right to vote in a special election concerning water districts to individuals who owned real property in the districts in Matter of Esler v Waters, 56 NY2d 306 (1982). The Court noted that the equal protection guarantees apply to the right to vote and place a heavy burden on the State to justify

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any departure from the "one-person, one-vote" principle. The Court went on to analyze United States Supreme Court precedents that created a narrow exception to this principle and upheld certain statutes limiting the right to vote to a specific group. Among the precedents examined was Salyer Land Company v Tulare Water District, 410 US 719 (1973). There, the United States Supreme Court held that a statute limiting the right to vote to a specific group would be sustained when the election related to a government body that performs a special limited function that has a disproportionate effect on a definable segment of the community, unless the basis for the limitation was wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation's objectives. In that case, the statute provided that only landowners within a special water district could vote for directors of the district and provided that the voting be weighted according to the assessed valuation of the voter's land. The Supreme Court noted that the district performed no general government functions, served almost solely to store water, and affected landowners disproportionately. Landowners alone financed the district's activities. Similarly in Ball v James, 451 US 355 (1981), the Supreme Court again upheld a statute that limited voting eligibility in a directors' election to landowners within a special water district. The Court concluded that the "peculiarly narrow function of this local governmental body and the special relationship of one class of citizens to that body releases it from the strict demands of the one-person, one-vote principle". 451 US at 357. In Esler, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the costs of the water district operation would not be assessed against all residents, but only against landowners. It also recognized that the district served an extremely limited purpose and did not perform general government functions. It concluded that, under the precedents discussed above, limiting the franchise to property owners did not violate the equal protection guarantees of the federal Constitution. The Court went on to hold that the statute also did not violate the equal protection or voters' rights provisions of the State Constitution. See also, Op Atty Gen (Inf) No. 91-31, in which we concluded that the requirement of real property ownership to vote in a referendum to establish an improvement district under Article 12-A of the Town Law is consistent with federal and State constitutional requirements.

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A proposal to dissolve a village government does not fall within the narrow exception to the one-person, one-vote principle established in the precedents discussed above. Those cases involved government bodies with extremely limited functions that disproportionately impacted a defined group of citizens, like property owners. The village government is not such a body. It performs a wide variety of government functions and its impact does not fall disproportionately upon one defined group of citizens. The provisions of the village charter that require property ownership as a qualification to vote upon the proposal to dissolve the village, therefore, may not be applied. The Attorney General renders formal opinions only to officers and departments of State government. This perforce is an informal and unofficial expression of the views of this office. Very truly yours,

SIOBHAN S. CRARY
Assistant Attorney General