Can a village charter limit voting on a referendum to dissolve the village to property owners, or does the one-person, one-vote rule require letting every resident vote?

Plain-English summary

The Village of Catskill planned to put a dissolution proposition on the ballot at the next regular village election. The village charter set property ownership ("real or personal property in the Village assessed upon the last preceding assessment roll") as a qualification for voting on dissolution. The Village Attorney asked whether that charter provision could be applied.

The AG said no. The charter provision violated equal protection.

The federal and state equal protection guarantees require adherence to the one-person, one-vote principle. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception for special-purpose government bodies whose impact falls disproportionately on a definable group. In two cases (Salyer Land Co. v Tulare Water District and Ball v James), the Court upheld statutes restricting voting in directors' elections to landowners within special water districts. The reasoning: the district performed no general government functions, served almost solely to store and deliver water, financed itself from landowner assessments, and affected landowners disproportionately. In that narrow setting, limiting the franchise to landowners did not violate equal protection.

The New York Court of Appeals applied the same framework in Matter of Esler v Waters, upholding a New York statute that limited voting in a special water district to property owners. The Court concluded that the district served an extremely limited purpose, did not perform general government functions, and the property-ownership limit was rationally related to those facts. A prior AG informal opinion (91-31) reached the same conclusion for referendums to establish improvement districts under Town Law Article 12-A.

A village government is the opposite of a special-purpose district. It performs a wide variety of general government functions (police, fire, public works, planning, zoning, taxation). Its impact does not fall disproportionately on one defined group. The narrow Salyer / Ball / Esler exception did not apply. The default one-person, one-vote rule controlled, and the property-ownership voting qualification could not be applied to a dissolution referendum.

Village Law § 19-1900(3) provides that a dissolution proposal is effective if "approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon." The "qualified electors" entitled to vote on dissolution must be defined consistent with the constitutional rule the opinion described, not by reference to the property-ownership limit in the village charter.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Note that New York's village dissolution framework was substantially restructured by the N-PCL and General Municipal Law amendments in the 2010s (the "Empowerment Act"). Current dissolution mechanics differ from what was in place in 1998, although the underlying constitutional principle that dissolution voting must respect one-person, one-vote has not changed.

Common questions

What is the "one-person, one-vote" principle?

A constitutional rule under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, requiring that each eligible voter's vote count equally in elections for state and local governmental bodies. The doctrine emerged from the U.S. Supreme Court's reapportionment cases in the 1960s and has been extended to local elections.

Why does property ownership matter in some elections and not others?

The Supreme Court's narrow exception in Salyer and Ball applied to special-purpose districts (water districts, in those cases) where the burden of district operations falls almost entirely on landowners. The Court reasoned that in those narrow settings, limiting voting to landowners was rationally related to the district's nature. A village dissolution is a different category entirely: the village serves all residents and dissolution affects all residents, so voting cannot be limited to property owners.

What about elections to form an improvement district under Town Law Article 12-A?

Different answer. The AG had previously concluded that property ownership was a permissible voting qualification for referendums to establish such an improvement district (Op Atty Gen (Inf) No. 91-31). An improvement district under Article 12-A is a special-purpose entity that imposes its costs on landowners; the Esler line of cases controls.

Could the village still require some voter qualifications?

Yes. The opinion did not say all voter qualifications are barred. Standard qualifications (age, residency, registration) remain valid. What is barred is the property-ownership qualification because the village government is a general government body, not a special-purpose entity.

If the village charter says property owners only, why doesn't that control?

A village charter is subject to the State and federal Constitutions. A charter provision that conflicts with equal protection cannot be enforced. The opinion was an instruction to the village to disregard the charter limit when it ran the dissolution vote.

What happens if the village ignores the AG opinion and enforces the property-ownership requirement anyway?

A voter denied a ballot under the charter could sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seek to enjoin the election or require a new vote. A vote conducted on a constitutionally improper franchise rule would be vulnerable to invalidation.

Background and statutory framework

The Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions are the source of the one-person, one-vote rule. The U.S. Supreme Court's Reynolds v Sims line (and its local-election extensions) established the principle. Avery v Midland County, 390 US 474 (1968), extended it to local-government bodies; the Salyer / Ball exception carved out special-purpose districts.

Matter of Esler v Waters, 56 NY2d 306 (1982), is the leading New York case applying the Salyer exception to a New York special water district. The Court concluded that the New York State Constitution's equal protection and voting provisions did not impose a stricter rule than the federal Constitution in that context.

Village Law § 19-1900(3) sets the substantive standard for village dissolution by referendum (effective on approval by a majority of qualified electors voting). Town Law Article 12-A authorizes the formation of town improvement districts.

The 1998 opinion is essentially an application of Esler. The Catskill charter provision was the kind of historical artifact that predated Reynolds v Sims and the federal one-person, one-vote cases. It had to yield to current constitutional doctrine.

Citations

• Town Law Art 12-A (town improvement districts).
• Village Law § 19-1900(3) (effective date of village dissolution proposal).
• Matter of Esler v Waters, 56 NY2d 306 (1982) (Court of Appeals applying Salyer exception to NY water district).
• Salyer Land Company v Tulare Water District, 410 US 719 (1973) (U.S. Supreme Court special-purpose-district exception).
• Ball v James, 451 US 355 (1981) (U.S. Supreme Court reaffirming exception for narrow-function water district).
• Op Atty Gen (Inf) No. 91-31 (property ownership permissible as voting qualification for Town Law Art 12-A improvement district referendum).

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.ny.gov/libraries-documents/opinions/opinions-year
• Original PDF: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/I_98-2_pw.pdf

Original opinion text

TOWN LAW ART 12-A; VILLAGE LAW § 19-1900(3).
A proposal to dissolve a village government does not fall
within the narrow exception to the one-person, one-vote
principle.
The provisions of the village charter that require
property ownership as a qualification to vote upon the proposal
to dissolve the village, therefore, may not be applied.

February 5, 1998

Terry J. Wilhelm, Esq.
Village Attorney
Village of Catskill
370 Main Street
Catskill, NY 12414

Informal Opinion
No. 98-2

Dear Mr. Wilhelm:
You have asked who is entitled to vote upon a proposition to
dissolve the village that will be submitted at the next regular
village election. You note that the village charter establishes
qualifications for voting upon proposals for dissolution. Those
qualifications include, among other things, ownership "of real or
personal property in the Village assessed upon the last preceding
assessment roll thereof". You also note that the Village Law
provides that a proposal to dissolve the village shall be
effective if "approved by a majority of the qualified electors
voting thereon". Village Law § 19-1900(3). You have asked
whether the property ownership requirement established in the
village charter may be applied to the proposal to dissolve the
village.
We conclude that the charter provision that makes property
ownership a qualification for voting upon the dissolution is not
consistent with constitutional requirements. Generally, State
and federal equal protection guarantees require adherence to the
one-person, one-vote principle. Narrow exceptions to this
principle have been recognized but they are limited to
circumstances not present here.
The Court of Appeals examined the constitutionality of a
statute restricting the right to vote in a special election
concerning water districts to individuals who owned real property
in the districts in Matter of Esler v Waters, 56 NY2d 306 (1982).
The Court noted that the equal protection guarantees apply to the
right to vote and place a heavy burden on the State to justify

2
any departure from the "one-person, one-vote" principle. The
Court went on to analyze United States Supreme Court precedents
that created a narrow exception to this principle and upheld
certain statutes limiting the right to vote to a specific group.
Among the precedents examined was Salyer Land Company v
Tulare Water District, 410 US 719 (1973). There, the United
States Supreme Court held that a statute limiting the right to
vote to a specific group would be sustained when the election
related to a government body that performs a special limited
function that has a disproportionate effect on a definable
segment of the community, unless the basis for the limitation was
wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation's objectives.
In that case, the statute provided that only landowners within a
special water district could vote for directors of the district
and provided that the voting be weighted according to the
assessed valuation of the voter's land. The Supreme Court noted
that the district performed no general government functions,
served almost solely to store water, and affected landowners
disproportionately. Landowners alone financed the district's
activities.
Similarly in Ball v James, 451 US 355 (1981), the Supreme
Court again upheld a statute that limited voting eligibility in a
directors' election to landowners within a special water
district. The Court concluded that the "peculiarly narrow
function of this local governmental body and the special
relationship of one class of citizens to that body releases it
from the strict demands of the one-person, one-vote principle".
451 US at 357.
In Esler, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the costs
of the water district operation would not be assessed against all
residents, but only against landowners. It also recognized that
the district served an extremely limited purpose and did not
perform general government functions. It concluded that, under
the precedents discussed above, limiting the franchise to
property owners did not violate the equal protection guarantees
of the federal Constitution. The Court went on to hold that the
statute also did not violate the equal protection or voters'
rights provisions of the State Constitution. See also,
Op Atty Gen (Inf) No. 91-31, in which we concluded that the
requirement of real property ownership to vote in a referendum to
establish an improvement district under Article 12-A of the Town
Law is consistent with federal and State constitutional
requirements.

3
A proposal to dissolve a village government does not fall
within the narrow exception to the one-person, one-vote principle
established in the precedents discussed above. Those cases
involved government bodies with extremely limited functions that
disproportionately impacted a defined group of citizens, like
property owners. The village government is not such a body. It
performs a wide variety of government functions and its impact
does not fall disproportionately upon one defined group of
citizens. The provisions of the village charter that require
property ownership as a qualification to vote upon the proposal
to dissolve the village, therefore, may not be applied.
The Attorney General renders formal opinions only to
officers and departments of State government. This perforce is
an informal and unofficial expression of the views of this
office.
Very truly yours,

SIOBHAN S. CRARY
Assistant Attorney General