Can a NY police department post the results of internal discipline on a bulletin board that only officers can see?

Subject

Internal posting of police disciplinary results not barred by § 50-a

Plain-English summary

The Town of Greenburgh police department had a long-standing practice of posting the results of disciplinary matters on a bulletin board located in an area of police headquarters that the public could not access. The postings stayed up for up to 30 days after the discipline was finalized. The town attorney asked whether this practice violated Civil Rights Law § 50-a, the New York statute that makes police, correction, firefighter, and firefighter/paramedic personnel records confidential.

The AG concluded the practice did not violate § 50-a. The reasoning rested on the statute's purpose, not its bare text.

Section 50-a was enacted because unsubstantiated and irrelevant complaints in officer personnel records were being used by criminal defense counsel and other litigants to embarrass officers on cross-examination or to harass them. The Legislature wanted to stop that abuse of CPLR Article 31 discovery rights. The Court of Appeals in Capital Newspapers v Burns and Prisoners' Legal Services v Department of Correctional Services confirmed that the statute targets disclosure that could be used to harass officers or attack their credibility in pending or future litigation.

The First Department's decision in Reale v Kiepper, 204 AD2d 72 (1st Dept 1994), is the closest precedent. It held that § 50-a did not bar a New York City Transit Police department bulletin distributing disciplinary determinations within the department. The court reasoned that § 50-a was not a blanket exemption from any disclosure of any personnel record; it was meant to preclude a specific abuse. Disclosure within the department, for the department's own official function, is not that abuse. Poughkeepsie PBA v City of Poughkeepsie reached a similar conclusion on a summary of internal investigations.

Applying this rationale, the AG concluded that Greenburgh's internal posting:

• is not made available to the public or to litigation counsel,
• is disseminated in furtherance of the department's official function (deterrence and morale), and
• is limited to final determinations, not unsubstantiated complaints.

That fits squarely within the line of cases finding no § 50-a violation.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. In particular, the Legislature repealed Civil Rights Law § 50-a in 2020 (L 2020, ch 96), substantially changing the disclosure landscape for police personnel records. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What did § 50-a actually say?

Section 50-a (1995 version) made personnel records of police, sheriff's department, correction, fire department, and firefighter/paramedic personnel confidential and not subject to inspection or review without express written consent of the officer or a court order. It exempted certain government attorneys (DA's, AG, county attorneys, corporation counsels, town and village attorneys), grand juries, and government agencies acting in furtherance of their official functions.

What was the abuse § 50-a was meant to stop?

Defense lawyers in criminal cases (and lawyers in civil suits against officers) were using broad CPLR Article 31 discovery to obtain personnel files, then cross-examining officers about unsubstantiated complaints. Capital Newspapers and Prisoners' Legal Services confirmed that this trial-impeachment use was the target. The statute's "personnel records used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion" language reflects that focus.

What changed in 2020?

The Legislature repealed § 50-a entirely (L 2020, ch 96) following nationwide protests over police accountability. The repeal made police, firefighter, and correction officer personnel records subject to standard FOIL access. Some categories of personally identifying information still receive narrow protection through redaction rules, but the categorical confidentiality is gone.

Could a department today still post internal discipline results?

The internal-posting question has shifted in nature post-2020. Internal communications are not the access point that § 50-a or its successors govern; they were already permissible under the AG's 1995 reading. The bigger question now is what the public can see through FOIL requests, which is a different inquiry.

Why did the AG mention that posts are limited to "final determinations"?

To distinguish them from raw complaints or pending investigations. Unsubstantiated complaints have always been more sensitive: they may turn out to be unfounded, and disclosing them creates the harassment risk § 50-a was meant to address. Final determinations have been adjudicated and represent the department's official record of misconduct or non-misconduct. The AG's analysis was tighter because the postings were limited to final determinations.

Statutory framework

Civil Rights Law § 50-a (in effect at the time of this opinion) made the personnel records of police, sheriff's deputies, correction officers, firefighters, and firefighter/paramedics confidential. Subsection (1) was the confidentiality rule. Subsection (4) exempted DA's, AG, government attorneys, grand juries, and government agencies acting in furtherance of official functions.

The cases the AG relied on (Capital Newspapers, Prisoners' Legal Services, Reale, Poughkeepsie PBA) developed a "purpose-based" reading of § 50-a: the statute applies to disclosure that could feed into litigation harassment, not to all conceivable sharing of personnel information.

Note: As of 2020, § 50-a is repealed and the analytic framework has shifted.

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.ny.gov/libraries-documents/opinions/opinions-year
• Original PDF: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/I_95-27_pw.pdf

Original opinion text

CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a.
The posting of the results of disciplinary matters on a
department bulletin board located in an area where department
personnel have access to them but the public does not are not the
sort of disclosure prohibited by Civil Rights Law § 50-a.
May 9, 1995

Frederick W. Turner, Esq.
Town Attorney
Town of Greenburgh
155 Tarrytown Road
White Plains, NY 10807

Informal Opinion
No. 95-27

Dear Mr. Turner:
You have asked for an opinion concerning the application of
Civil Rights Law § 50-a. You advised us that the police
department has a longstanding policy of posting the results of
disciplinary matters on a department bulletin board located in an
area of police headquarters that is off limits to the public.
You ask whether this policy violates Civil Rights Law § 50-a.
You state that the postings at issue are made for a period
of up to thirty days following the adjudication. Your intent in
posting the determinations is to deter the offending officer from
further misconduct and generally to deter other members of the
force from engaging in misconduct. You also note that posting
the disciplinary determinations avoids morale problems that can
result when personnel are not informed accurately of the outcome
of disciplinary matters. We conclude that the practice you
describe does not violate Civil Rights Law § 50-a because it is
not the type of disclosure the statute was intended to prohibit.
The statute provides:

1. All personnel records, used to evaluate performance
   toward continued employment or promotion, under the control of
   any police agency or department of the state or any political
   subdivision thereof including authorities or agencies maintaining
   police forces of individuals defined as police officers in section 1.20
   of the criminal procedure law and such personnel records under the
   control of a sheriff's department or a department of correction of
   individuals employed as correction officers and such personnel
   records under the control of a paid fire department or force of
   individuals employed as firefighters or firefighter/paramedics shall

be considered confidential and not subject to inspection or review
without the express written consent

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of such police officer, firefighter, firefighter/paramedic or correction officer except as may be
mandated by lawful court order.

. . .

4. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any
   district attorney or his assistants, the attorney general or his deputies
   or assistants, a county attorney or his deputies or assistants, a
   corporation counsel or his deputies or assistants, a town attorney or
   his deputies or assistants, a village attorney or his deputies or
   assistants, a grand jury, or any agency of government which requires
   the records described in subdivision one, in the furtherance of their
   official functions.

Legislative history reveals that unsubstantiated and
irrelevant complaints contained in personnel records were often
used by criminal defense counsel and other attorneys to embarrass
officers on cross-examination or to harass them in other ways.
The Legislature sought to curtail this practice when it enacted
section 50-a. It was intended to limit counsel's use of the
broad disclosure provisions of CPLR article 31 to obtain police
officers' personnel records and use them to harass the officers
or to attack their credibility in pending litigation. See,
Matter of Capital Newspapers Division v Burns, 67 NY2d 562
(1986).
In Matter of Prisoners' Legal Services v Department of
Correctional Services, 73 NY2d 26 (1988), the Court held that
section 50-a barred disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Law of inmate grievances against correction officers to the legal
services firm representing the inmates. It reached that
conclusion even though there was no pending litigation in which
the requested records could be used to embarrass or harass the
officers. The Court held that the records of inmate complaints
were exactly the type of record the statute sought to protect and
concluded that the protection applied even though no litigation
actually had been commenced when the records were requested. It
noted that records having no potential use in litigation or where
the possibility of such use was remote, fell outside the
statute's protection. 73 NY2d at 32-33.
Similar analysis was employed in Reale v Kiepper, 204 AD2d
72 (1st Dept 1994), lv denied, 84 NY2d 813 (1995). There, the
court declined to enjoin publication of disciplinary
determinations concerning New York City Transit Police officers
in department bulletins distributed only within the department.
The court first held that section 50-a does not create a private
right of action for police officers, and that the officers,
therefore, were not entitled to seek injunctive relief. 204 AD2d
at 72-73. The court went on to hold that, in any event, the

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proposed publication would not violate the statute. It concluded
that the section was not intended to create a blanket exemption
from any disclosure of any personnel record. Rather, it noted,
the statute was meant to preclude a specific abuse of information
from such records. Thus, the court held, disclosure of the
disciplinary determinations in a nonlitigation context and in
furtherance of the Transit Authority's official function would
not violate the statute. 204 AD2d at 73-74. See also,
Poughkeepsie Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v City of
Poughkeepsie, 184 AD2d 501 (2d Dept 1992), in which the court
declined to enjoin release of a summary of internal
investigations of police misconduct because the purpose of the
statute was not to bar use of the information by the department
in furtherance of its official functions.
Under the rationale discussed above, the limited publication
of disciplinary determinations within the police department would
not violate the statute. The information is not made available
to the public or to counsel for criminal defendants or other
parties who could use it in litigation. The information is being
disseminated in order to further the department's official
function. Disclosure is limited to final determinations.
Unsubstantiated complaints are not revealed.
The Attorney General renders formal opinions only to
officers and departments of State government. This perforce is
an informal and unofficial expression of the views of this
office.
Very truly yours,

SIOBHAN S. CRARY
Assistant Attorney General