Does a NY town have to pay for a town board member's defense in a defamation suit by the police chief?

Short answer The opinion does not decide whether this board member is owed a defense; the town board must determine the relevant facts. Under Public Officers Law § 18, an allegation that conduct occurred within the scope of duties establishes a duty to defend. If the complaint lacks that allegation, the board must review the actual facts. It cannot automatically refuse a defense while awaiting a court ruling.
State
New York
Opinion
1995-06
Issued
February 2, 1995
Issued by
Office of the New York State Attorney General
Requested by
John C. Jilnicki, Deputy Town Attorney, Town of East Hampton

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This page answers the general question as of 1995. Ask about yours and see what current New York law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official New York Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed New York attorney for advice on your specific situation.
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Subject

Defense is owed if the complaint alleges behavior within scope of employment

Plain-English summary

A member of the East Hampton Town Board was sued in state court for defamation by the police chief, based on statements the board member allegedly made to newspaper reporters. The town had adopted a local code that paralleled Public Officers Law § 18, which is the municipal defense-and-indemnification statute. The deputy town attorney asked three questions about how the town board should handle the request for defense.

The AG worked through each. First, the trigger for the duty to defend under § 18 is the complaint. Citing the Second Circuit's reading of § 18 in Hassan v Fraccola, the AG concluded that if the complaint alleges that the defendant was acting within the scope of employment, the town must defend, full stop. The complaint's allegations control at that stage.

Second, if the complaint does not itself allege scope, the town board must make its own factual determination. It reviews whether the alleged act or omission occurred within the scope of duties (Polak v Schenectady; Beare v Byrne). The AG left the factual question about this board member to the town board; the town attorney's view does not bind it.

Third, the AG concluded that a town board cannot automatically refuse a defense or defense costs while waiting for a court to decide scope. Section 18 calls for a decision when litigation begins, using the complaint or the board's factual review. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify (Giordano v O'Neill). The opinion does not decide whether this official's statements were within the scope of duties.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Why is the duty to defend broader than the duty to indemnify?

Section 18 permits a defense based on allegations in the complaint or on a factual determination at the start of litigation. Indemnification requires that the act actually occurred within the scope of public duties. The opinion cites Giordano v O'Neill for the broader duty to defend.

What did the Hassan v Fraccola case actually decide?

The Second Circuit held that an allegation in the complaint that the defendant was acting within the scope of employment is sufficient to trigger the municipality's duty to defend under § 18. The court relied on the statute's reference to acts that "allegedly occurred" within scope, and on the legislative history showing that § 18 was meant to parallel § 17's complaint-driven duty.

Can the town board override the town attorney's opinion on scope?

Yes. The opinion is clear that the town attorney can advise, but Town Law § 65 makes the town board the ultimate decisionmaker on whether to provide a defense. The AG cites 1980 Op Atty Gen (Inf) 152 for that proposition.

What if the court eventually finds the officer was acting outside scope?

Indemnification under § 18(4)(a) requires that the act occurred within the scope of duties. The opinion distinguishes that requirement from the earlier defense decision; it does not decide whether defense costs already paid could be recovered.

Does this apply to all public employees or just elected officials?

Section 18 applies to "employees" of a local government that has opted into its provisions. That category includes elected officials, appointed officers, and ordinary employees. The key requirement is that the local governing body has affirmatively adopted § 18 (or a parallel local provision). East Hampton had done so.

Statutory framework

Public Officers Law § 18 is the elective defense-and-indemnification statute for local governments. A municipality opts in by resolution or local law (East Hampton had a parallel town code). Once opted in:

  • § 18(3)(a) requires the town to defend an employee in any civil action arising out of any act or omission that occurred or "allegedly occurred" while acting within the scope of public duties.
  • § 18(4)(a) requires the town to indemnify the employee for any judgment or settlement if the act occurred within scope.

Public Officers Law § 17 is the parallel statute for state employees, and its complaint-triggered defense rule informed Hassan's reading of § 18.

Town Law § 65 establishes the town board's authority over town legal affairs, including the call on whether the duty to defend applies.

Source

Original opinion text

PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW §§ 17, 18; TOWN LAW § 65. Under section 18 of the Public Officers Law and the town code, a town is authorized to provide defense to one of its employees if the complaint alleges behavior within the scope of the employee's duties or upon a factual determination that this is the case by the town board.

February 2, 1995

John C. Jilnicki, Esq.
Deputy Town Attorney
Town of East Hampton
159 Pantigo Road
East Hampton, NY 11937

Informal Opinion
No. 95-6

Dear Mr. Jilnicki:
You have asked several questions relating to the defense of a town official under section 18 of the Public Officers Law (your town code parallels its provisions). You have explained that a member of the town board was sued for defamation in State court by the chief of police arising out of statements allegedly made by the defendant to newspaper reporters. You have described the context in which the statements were made. This, however, is a question of fact which need not be defined for purposes of answering the questions of law that you have raised and is appropriately left to the town board which ultimately must decide whether provision of defense is appropriate. You have asked whether the town board has discretion under Public Officers Law § 18 to provide the town officer with a defense in the defamation action where the complaint fails to allege unlawful conduct within the scope of the defendant's employment. Second, in these circumstances, you ask whether the town board must accept the opinion of its town attorney as to whether the officer is entitled to a defense. Finally, you ask whether the town board has discretion under section 18 to refuse to pay defense costs pending a determination as to whether the defendant was acting within the scope of his employment. Section 18 of the Public Officers Law authorizes and establishes the procedure for defense and indemnification of local government officers and employees. It applies upon the affirmative decision of the local governing body to confer its benefits upon its employees. Under section 18, a local government must provide for the defense of an employee

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in any civil action or proceeding, state or federal, arising out of any alleged act or omission which occurred or allegedly occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his public employment or duties.

Public Officers Law § 18(3)(a). A local government is required to indemnify and save harmless its employees in the amount of any judgment obtained in a State or Federal court or in the amount of any settlement of a claim, provided that the act or omission occurred while the employee "was acting within the scope of his public employment or duties". Id., § 18(4)(a). In Hassan v Fraccola, 851 F2d 602 (2d Cir 1988), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with the question whether an allegation in the complaint that the act occurred within the defendant's scope of employment established an obligation of defense by the municipality. The Court traced the history of section 18 and focused on the language that the act "allegedly occurred" within the scope of employment. It concluded that an allegation in the complaint that the defendant was acting within the scope of his employment is sufficient to establish the duty of the local government to provide a defense. This interpretation is consistent with section 18's legislative history, which indicates that its defense and indemnification provisions were intended to be the same as those of section 17, in which the duty to defend is triggered by the complaint.

Hassan, supra, at p 605.
If the complaint fails to allege that the defendant acted within the scope of his duties, the second test authorized by section 18 is applied in which the local government investigates whether the alleged act or omission occurred within the scope of the employee's duties. Polak v Schenectady, 181 AD2d 233, 236 (3d Dept 1992). This determination is made regardless of the allegations made in the complaint. Ibid. This second test is required by the language of section 18 which authorizes a defense where the alleged act or omission "occurred" while the employee was acting within the scope of his duties. This determination should be an objective one based on the actual facts of the case. Beare v Byrne, 103 AD2d 814, 815 (2d Dept 1984); Informal Opinion No. 92-12. The duty to defend is broader than the ultimate obligation to indemnify. Informal Opinion No. 92-12; Giordano v O'Neill, 131 AD2d 722, 723 (2d Dept 1987). In the event the local government fails to demonstrate conclusively that the employee was acting outside the scope of his or her employment, it is required to provide a defense. Giordano, supra, at p 724. Returning to your inquiries, if the complaint fails to allege conduct within the scope of employment, under section 18 the town board must review the actual facts relating to the

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lawsuit. If the facts indicate conduct within the scope of employment, a defense must be provided. Second, the town board need not accept the opinion of the town attorney as to whether the town must provide a defense. The town board has responsibility for making this decision. Town Law § 65; 1980 Op Atty Gen (Inf) 152. Finally, in our view the town board does not have authority automatically to refuse to provide a defense or pay for defense costs pending a judicial determination as to whether the employee acted within the scope of his duties. Such action would be inconsistent with section 18 of the Public Officers Law which requires the provision of a defense based upon allegations in the complaint or upon the making of certain factual determinations at the time the litigation is commenced. Giordano, supra, at p 723. We conclude that under section 18 of the Public Officers Law a town is authorized to provide a defense to one of its employees if the complaint alleges behavior within the scope of the employee's duties or upon a factual determination that this is the case by the town board. The Attorney General renders formal opinions only to officers and departments of State government. This perforce is an informal and unofficial expression of the views of this office. Very truly yours,

JAMES D. COLE
Assistant Attorney General
in Charge of Opinions

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