Does the federal motor carrier preemption law block North Carolina from requiring trucking companies to make sure independent truckers have workers' compensation coverage?

Plain-English summary

The AG addressed whether N.C.G.S. § 97-19.1 conflicted with 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), the federal motor-carrier preemption provision. The opinion discusses an American Trucking Association white paper that argued against the state requirement.

The AG worked through three layers:

What § 97-19.1 does. The statute says that any principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor who contracts with an independent trucker (someone operating a truck or tractor licensed by the U.S. DOT) is liable as an employer under the NC Workers' Compensation Act if the independent trucker hasn't secured workers' compensation coverage under § 97-93. The practical effect: if you are higher up the trucking food chain, you have a real incentive to require proof of workers' compensation coverage from anyone you contract with, because if they don't have it, you do.

What 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) does. The federal preemption rule, generally, bars state laws "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier" of property. But the statute carves out several specific areas where state regulation survives: safety regulatory authority, highway route/size/weight regulation, and "the authority of the State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization."

How the two fit. The AG concluded § 97-19.1 fits squarely in the federal carve-out. The federal courts have read the insurance carve-out broadly enough to cover state insurance requirements applied to motor carriers, including in New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc. v. Rowe (1st Cir. 2006) and Worldwide Moving & Storage v. District of Columbia (D.C. Cir. 2006). Section 97-19.1 is a workers' compensation insurance requirement, which is a form of "financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements." Therefore, the state's authority is preserved by the federal carve-out.

The AG added a policy point: NC's workers' compensation scheme is designed to ensure swift and certain compensation for injured workers (citing Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp.). Occupational accident insurance, which the trucking industry preferred, has caps, triggering-event limitations, and lacks administrative-body backing. It is not a substitute for workers' compensation.

The opinion is signed by Ann Reed (Senior Deputy AG), Robert Hargett (Deputy AG), and Gary A. Scarzafava (Assistant AG).

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2007. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Anyone applying the opinion today should check the current state and federal statutes and later controlling decisions.

Common questions

Q: Who is a "principal contractor" under § 97-19.1?
A: The statute quoted in the opinion names a principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor who contracts with an individual in the carrier industry meeting the stated conditions. The opinion does not classify a particular broker or carrier contract.

Q: What is "occupational accident insurance" and why isn't it good enough?
A: It is a private insurance product the industry preferred over workers' compensation. The AG identified three weaknesses: lower benefit caps (typical $100,000), trigger-event limitations (e.g., disability must occur within 10 days of injury), and lack of an administrative body to ensure swift and certain payment. Workers' compensation has none of these limitations.

Q: Does this mean independent truckers must always have workers' compensation?
A: The opinion says the driver may purchase workers' compensation coverage, or a motor carrier higher in the chain may secure coverage. It reads § 97-19.1 as imposing employer liability on the specified contractor when the individual driver has not secured compensation as the statute requires.

Q: What federal exception did the AG rely on?
A: The AG relied on 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), which preserves state authority to regulate motor carriers concerning minimum financial responsibility related to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization.

Q: Does the opinion discuss a trucker signing a coverage waiver?
A: No. It analyzes federal preemption of § 97-19.1 and does not address waiver or contract language.

Background and statutory framework

The NC Workers' Compensation Act is the foundation of work-injury law in the state. Its policy, articulated in Vause v. Vause Farm Equipment Co. (1951), is that "the wear and tear of human beings in modern industry should be charged to the industry, just as the wear and tear of machinery has always been charged." The Act provides employees with swift and certain compensation in exchange for limited employer liability.

Section 97-19.1 extends that scheme to the trucking industry's contracting structures. It is intended to prevent gaps where an independent trucker, operating outside a traditional employer-employee relationship, ends up with no coverage at all because everyone in the chain points elsewhere.

The federal preemption framework in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) was designed to keep states from balkanizing motor carrier regulation around prices, routes, and services. But Congress understood that state insurance authority and safety authority were too important to preempt. The carve-out for "financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements" is broad enough to save state workers' compensation rules applied to motor carriers.

The opinion cites the First Circuit's 2006 New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc. v. Rowe decision for its discussion of the insurance exception. It does not assess any later decision.

Citations

• N.C.G.S. § 97-19.1 (motor carrier workers comp liability)
• N.C.G.S. § 97-93 (employer compensation security)
• N.C.G.S. § 97-98 (occupational accident insurance vs. workers comp)
• 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) (federal motor carrier preemption)
• 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) (state insurance carve-out)
• New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc. v. Rowe, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 342 (2006)
• Worldwide Moving & Storage v. District of Columbia, 445 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
• Jenkins v. American Enka Corp., 95 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1938)
• Vause v. Vause Farm Equipment Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951)
• Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 345 S.E.2d 374 (1986)

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/workers-compensation-act-n-c-g-s-%ef%bf%bd97-19-1-regulation-of-motor-carriers/

Original opinion text

[Date and addressee header not preserved in source fetch; the opinion was published in the NCDOJ archive under date July 2, 2007.]

Does N.C.G.S. § 97-19.1 violate 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)?

No. N.C.G.S. § 97-19.1, which provides that a motor carrier may be liable for workers' compensation benefits, does not violate 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c).

Section 97-19.1 of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act states in pertinent part:

Any principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor, irrespective of whether such contractor regularly employs three or more employees, who contracts with an individual in the interstate or intrastate carrier industry who operates a truck, tractor, or truck trailer licensed by the United States Department of Transportation and who has not secured the payment of compensation in the manner provided for employers set forth in G.S. 97-93 for himself personally and for his employees and subcontractors, if any, shall be liable as an employer under this Article for the payment of compensation and other benefits ...

The intent of this provision is to make it more likely that the independent trucker, his employees and subcontractors are afforded the protection of the Workers' Compensation Act through the purchase of workers' compensation insurance or other financial safeguards established in Section 97-93 of the Act. Section 97-19.1 allows the independent driver to purchase insurance or for the motor carriers up the chain of command to have secured coverage for the truckers below them in the chain. Thus, Section 97-19.1 establishes a requirement for workers' compensation insurance applicable to the trucking industry.

The United States Congress has specifically limited state and local government regulation of motor carriers. Section 14501(c) provides, in pertinent part:

Motor carriers of property (1) General rule. Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier (other than a carrier affiliated with a direct air carrier covered by section 41713(b)(4) [49 USC § 41713(b)(4)]) or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property. (2) Matters not covered. Paragraph (1) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of the State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization.

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) (emphasis added); see New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc. v. Rowe, 448 F.3d 66, 76 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 342, 166 L.Ed.2d 14 (2006); Worldwide Moving & Storage v. District of Columbia, 445 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Under this Federal regulation, "insurance requirements" is a specific exception. New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc., 448 F.3d at 76; Worldwide Moving & Storage, 445 F.3d at 426.

The effect of the "insurance requirements" exception has only been addressed in a few cases. In New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc. v. Rowe, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 342, 166 L.Ed.2d 14 (2006), one of the cases cited in the American Trucking Association "white paper," the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a statute enacted by the State of Maine to regulate the sale and delivery of tobacco products violated 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), stating:

These provisions combine to bar states (subject to certain exceptions discussed later) from enacting laws related to prices, routes, or services of air or motor carriers of property.

New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc., 448 F.3d at 69 (referencing 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501, 41713). The exceptions, or areas that the State is allowed to regulate, specifically include insurance regulations:

the authority of the State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self insurance authorization.

New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc., 448 F.3d at 76. The First Circuit concluded that the statutory exceptions are to be interpreted narrowly and do not include the ability to broadly regulate "health and safety," but specifically allow States to pass laws relating to insurance requirements.

The insurance exclusion from the Federal Motor Carrier regulation was also discussed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Worldwide Moving & Storage v. District of Columbia, 445 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In this case, Worldwide challenged a District of Columbia regulation requiring a surety bond asserting that the federal regulation preempted the local regulation. Worldwide Moving & Storage, 445 F.3d at 424. More specifically, Worldwide asserted that it complied with federal bonding requirements for interstate carriers, and thereby, the additional bonding requirements of the local ordinance violate 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c). The Court of Appeals rejected the moving company's arguments stating:

Worldwide contends the Superior Court's enforcement proceedings is preempted under two federal statutes. ... The second statute is 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), which prohibits a state from enacting or enforcing laws or regulations governing aspects of interstate transportation. Section 14501(c)(2)(A), however, expressly states that the prohibition "shall not restrict ... the authority of a State to regulate carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization," which appears to exempt from the prohibition the surety bond requirement imposed on Worldwide.

Id. At 426. Thus, the D.C. Circuit refused to enjoin the enforcement of a District of Columbia surety bond ordinance.

The "white paper" presents numerous decisions, which address the broad reach of the federal regulations prohibiting local laws that relate "to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier." These cases, however, do not address the specific exception presented by Section 97-19.1 of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act; to wit, Section 14501(c)(2)(A)'s specific permission for the State "to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization." Because Section 97-19.1 appears to fall clearly within the exception to the Federal legislation, Section 97-19.1 should not be precluded by the Federal legislation. See New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc., 448 F.3d at 76; Worldwide Moving & Storage, 445 F.3d at 426; 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(A)(2) (States permitted to regulate insurance).

North Carolina has an interest in protecting the health and financial security of employees who are subject to its jurisdiction. See Jenkins v. American Enka Corp., 95 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1938) (N.C. Workers' Compensation Act is constitutional). The philosophy of the Workers' Compensation Act is that the wear and tear of human beings in modern industry should be charged to the industry, just as the wear and tear of machinery has always been charged. Vause v. Vause Farm Equipment Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951). The social policy behind the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act is two-fold: First, the Act provides employees with a swift and certain compensation for the loss of earning capacity and Second, the Act provides limited liability for employers. Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 190, 345 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1986).

North Carolina, consistent with other States, has chosen to protect employees through workers' compensation insurance. On Page h of the "white paper," the American Trucking Association suggests that its preferred coverage is "occupational accident insurance." This coverage provides some of the benefits available through the Workers' Compensation Act; however, occupational accident insurance is not a replacement for workers' compensation insurance. Occupational accident insurance policies often have limitations on triggering events (such as disability within 10 days of injury) and limitations on the benefits provided (i.e., $100,000 cap). Further, the occupational accident insurance policies are not administered by an administrative body and thereby do not assure the injured employee a swift and certain compensation for injuries received on the job. See Hendrix, 317 N.C. at 190, 345 S.E.2d at 381 (one of the purposes of workers' compensation is to provide swift and certain benefits). Moreover, occupational accident insurance policies do not comply with the insurance requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act, and thereby do not necessarily afford the employer the protections of the Act. See N.C.G.S. § 97-98.

The current requirements expressed in Section 97-19.1 do not appear to violate 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c). See New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc., 448 F.3d at 76; Worldwide Moving & Storage, 445 F.3d at 426; 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(A)(2) (States permitted to regulate insurance).

Respectfully yours,

Ann Reed
Senior Deputy Attorney General

Robert Hargett
Deputy Attorney General

Gary A. Scarzafava
Assistant Attorney General