NC NC AG Advisory Opinion (2000-06-14) 2000-06-14

What does 'adequate' mean when North Carolina law requires county commissioners to provide 'adequate' funding to a community college?

Short answer: 'Adequate' meant 'sufficient to meet specific requirements,' a standard imported from a 1951 NC Supreme Court decision and consistent with both Black's Law Dictionary and the American Heritage College Dictionary. The AG explained that because Chapter 115D never defined 'adequate' anywhere, North Carolina courts would interpret it using that ordinary meaning. Applied to G.S. § 115D-32(a), adequacy depended on the degree to which a county's appropriation actually met the community college's needs for the statutory budget items (plant fund, current expenses, certain support services). That was a fact-intensive inquiry, and the AG said it could not and would not pronounce on whether Halifax Community College was actually being funded adequately.

Disclaimer: This is an official North Carolina Attorney General advisory opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent like a court ruling. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed North Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.

About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked at the bottom of this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

Halifax Community College's president, Dr. Ted Gasper, faced a problem common to many community colleges. The law required the county tax-levying authority (the Board of County Commissioners) to provide "adequate funds" to meet the college's financial needs for certain budget items. But the statute, G.S. § 115D-32(a), did not define "adequate." Neither did Chapter 115D anywhere else. In tight budget years, county commissioners and college presidents predictably disagreed about whether a given appropriation was "adequate." Gasper asked the AG to give the word a working meaning.

Senior Deputy AG Grayson Kelley, Special Deputy Thomas Ziko, and Assistant AG Donald Esposito Jr. answered with a definition drawn from a 1951 North Carolina Supreme Court decision, State v. Clark: "adequate" meant "sufficient to meet specific requirements." Two dictionary sources backed up that reading. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defined "adequate" as "sufficient; commensurate; equally efficient; equal to what is required; suitable to the case or occasion; satisfactory." The American Heritage College Dictionary (3d ed. 1993) defined it as "sufficient to meet a need."

The AG concluded that North Carolina courts would give the term in § 115D-32(a) a "similar definition." That meant adequacy was measured by the degree to which the county's appropriation actually met the college's financial needs for the statutory budget categories: the plant fund, certain current expenses, and certain support services. Adequacy was a moving target, not a fixed dollar figure. Whether a given year's appropriation was adequate depended on the actual program needs, the cost environment, and the specific budget items the college had to fund out of county money.

The AG explicitly declined to opine on whether Halifax Community College was actually being adequately funded. That, the AG explained, was "necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry" and outside the proper role of an advisory opinion. The AG could give the term a meaning, but could not run the numbers for a particular college and a particular year. The phrase "this office does not, indeed, cannot, opine on the adequacy of the funds actually being provided" was a careful jurisdictional disclaimer: the AG's office was not an arbiter of county-college funding disputes.

The opinion was short, but useful. It gave both sides a shared definition for negotiation and, if necessary, litigation. A community college that wanted to challenge an appropriation in court now had a legal hook: adequacy was a question of whether the funds met the college's specific requirements, and that question was justiciable as a fact-finding matter.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. Chapter 115D, including the funding sections at G.S. §§ 115D-32, 115D-33, and 115D-34, has been amended multiple times in the 25 years since this opinion was issued. Any current dispute over community college appropriations should be analyzed against the present version of those statutes and any newer NC Supreme Court guidance on what "adequate" requires.

Background and statutory framework

The county-college funding compact. North Carolina's community college system is jointly funded by the State (through the System Office and General Fund appropriations) and the counties served by each individual college. The State pays for instructional salaries and most program operating costs; the counties pay for the local plant, certain current expenses, and certain support services. The split is set by statute and is contentious in lean budget years because counties have other claims on the property-tax base and community colleges have growing capital needs.

The "adequate" mandate. G.S. § 115D-32(a) put the duty on "the tax-levying authority of each institution," meaning the Board of County Commissioners, to provide "adequate funds to meet the financial needs of the institutions for the following budget items" in accordance with G.S. § 115D-33 or 115D-34, as applicable. The statute then listed plant fund, certain current expenses, and certain support services as the categories within the local-funding ambit.

The drafting gap. The legislature did not define "adequate" anywhere in Chapter 115D. G.S. § 115D-2 defined other terms used in the chapter but skipped the adequacy concept. That left a textual gap that community colleges had to live with: a duty on the commissioners, with no statutory yardstick.

State v. Clark and the dictionary definitions. The 1951 State v. Clark decision used "adequate" in a different statutory context but defined the term in plain-English terms: "sufficient to meet specific requirements." The AG concluded that NC courts would use the same definition when interpreting § 115D-32(a). The two dictionary definitions reinforced the conclusion: a thesaurus of "sufficient; commensurate; equally efficient; equal to what is required" pushed in the same direction.

The factual core. Once adequacy was defined as "sufficient to meet specific requirements," the practical question shifted from word definitions to operational facts: what were the college's actual program requirements, what did those requirements cost, what was the county currently providing, and was the gap, if any, indefensible? Each piece of that inquiry was empirical.

Limit of the AG's role. The opinion drew a clear line between defining a statutory term, which the AG could do, and pronouncing on whether a particular appropriation in a particular year satisfied the duty, which it could not. The AG's office issues legal opinions, not factual judgments. A community college that wanted a factual ruling needed to use a different forum (typically a lawsuit in Superior Court).

Common questions

Q: Could a community college sue its county commissioners for inadequate funding under § 115D-32(a)?

A: The opinion did not address remedies. By giving the duty a justiciable definition, however, the AG implicitly opened the door to a declaratory or mandamus action. The college would have to prove the gap between the county's appropriation and the actual program requirements.

Q: Did the AG say what items had to be funded?

A: The statute itself identified the categories: plant fund, certain current expenses, and certain support services. G.S. §§ 115D-33 and 115D-34 specified those items in more detail. The AG did not expand the list.

Q: Could a county refuse to fund a particular community college program it disagreed with?

A: The opinion did not reach that. As written, the duty was to meet financial needs for the statutory budget items. A county that disagreed with a specific program could not unilaterally exclude it from the funding base if the program fell within the statutory categories.

Q: Did this opinion apply to UNC system institutions or public schools?

A: No. The opinion was specific to community colleges under Chapter 115D. UNC and the K-12 public school system had their own funding frameworks.

Citations from the opinion

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-32(a)
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-33
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-34
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-2
State v. Clark, 234 N.C. 192, 194, 66 S.E.2d 669 (1951)
Black's Law Dictionary 38 (6th ed. 1990)
The American Heritage College Dictionary 16 (3d ed. 1993)

Source

Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/definition-of-adequate/

Original opinion text

VIA FACSIMILE – (252) 536-4144 AND REGULAR U.S. MAIL

Dr. Ted H. Gasper, Jr., President, Halifax Community College

P.O. Drawer 809, Weldon, North Carolina 27890

Re: Advisory Opinion; Definition of Term "Adequate;" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-32

Dear Dr. Gasper:

Our office has been informed by Ms. Clay Hines of the North Carolina Community College System of your request for an opinion from our office on the meaning of the word "adequate" as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-32(a). This statute provides: "The tax-levying authority of each institution shall be responsible for providing, in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 115D-33 or 115D-34, as appropriate, adequate funds to meet the financial needs of the institutions for the following budget items." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-32(a) (1999). The statute then identifies these budget items as a plant fund, certain current expenses, and certain support services. Id.

Unfortunately, neither N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-32 (the particular statute in question), Article 3 of Chapter 115D of the General Statutes (which pertains to financial support for community colleges), nor Chapter 115D (which pertains generally to community colleges) defines the term "adequate" as used in § 115D-32(a). Compare, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-2 (1999) (defines certain other terms used in Chapter 115D). In another context, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court has defined "adequate" as meaning "sufficient to meet specific requirements." State v. Clark, 234 N.C. 192, 194, 66 S.E.2d 669 (N.C. 1951). Other secondary sources and references provide a similar definition. Black's Law Dictionary defines "adequate" as "sufficient; commensurate; equally efficient; equal to what is required; suitable to the case or occasion; satisfactory." Black's Law Dictionary 38 (6th ed. 1990). The American Heritage College Dictionary defines "adequate" as "sufficient to meet a need." The American Heritage College Dictionary 16 (3d ed. 1993).

In our opinion, the term "adequate" as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-32(a) would be given a similar definition by the North Carolina courts. The adequacy of the funds provided to a community college pursuant to § 115D-32(a), in our opinion, would be determined by the degree to which these funds meet the financial needs of that college for the budget items identified in the statute, which is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry. Consequently, please note that this office does not — indeed, cannot — opine on the adequacy of the funds actually being provided to Halifax Community College pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115D-32(a).

We hope that this advisory opinion is of assistance.

Signed by:

Grayson G. Kelley, Senior Deputy Attorney General

Thomas J. Ziko, Special Deputy Attorney General

Donald R. Esposito, Jr., Assistant Attorney General

cc: Clay T. Hines, Esq. (via facsimile and regular U.S. mail)