When calculating an NC Supreme Court Justice's longevity pay, does service as Administrative Office of the Courts director or assistant director count? What about service as an assistant district attorney?

Plain-English summary

NC Supreme Court Justices, like superior court judges, receive "longevity pay" in lieu of merit raises. The amount steps up at five-year service milestones: 4.8% of base salary after 5 years, 9.6% after 10, 14.4% after 15, 19.2% after 20. The statute (G.S. 7A-10(c)) defines what "service" counts.

The AG was asked, in connection with calculating the longevity pay of a former Justice (referred to in the opinion as "Mr. Freeman," likely Justice Franklin E. Freeman, Jr.), whether his pre-Justice service in three roles counted:

1. Director and assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts. Yes. G.S. 7A-44(b), the parallel statute for superior court longevity, expressly included AOC director and assistant director time as service. Reading 7A-10(c) (Supreme Court longevity) consistently with 7A-44(b) made sense because both statutes use the same "service as a justice or judge of the General Court of Justice" formula. The AG also leaned on a statutory-construction principle: where a statute is susceptible of more than one construction, courts avoid undesirable consequences. The undesirable result here would have been that the same person's AOC service counted if he later sat on the superior court bench but not if he later sat on the Supreme Court.

2. District attorney. Yes, by explicit statutory text. Both G.S. 7A-10(c) and 7A-44(b) listed "service as a district attorney" as qualifying.

3. Assistant district attorney. No. The AG applied the negative implication. The legislature wrote "district attorney" in both statutes but never wrote "assistant district attorney" anywhere in either, even though it knew how to specify subordinate positions (it had specifically added "assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts" to G.S. 7A-44(b)). The omission was deliberate.

The opinion cited Stanley v. Retirement and Health Benefits Division for the proposition that NC courts construe state-employee benefit statutes to include rather than exclude where ambiguous, and Comm'r of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office for the canon that courts avoid absurd or bizarre consequences.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The judicial-compensation statutes have been amended multiple times since 1999. Anyone calculating longevity pay today must pull the current text of G.S. 7A-10(c), 7A-44(b), and 7A-341 and check whether the legislature has since added (or removed) any of the subordinate positions referenced in this opinion. The construction methodology (read parallel statutes consistently; explicit listing implies exclusion of unlisted items; benefit statutes lean inclusive) survives as standard NC doctrine.

Common questions

Q: What is longevity pay for NC judges?
A: A statutory step-up in compensation tied to total years of service "as a justice or judge of the General Court of Justice or as a member of the Utilities Commission" (per G.S. 7A-44(b)). The General Court of Justice in NC includes both appellate (Supreme Court, Court of Appeals) and trial (superior, district) courts.

Q: Why does AOC service count toward judicial longevity?
A: Because the legislature said so in G.S. 7A-44(b). The statute equates AOC director and assistant director service with judicial service for superior-court longevity purposes. The AG concluded the same equation must apply at the Supreme Court level, because the underlying definition of "service" in 7A-10(c) is the same formula, and treating it differently would produce the absurd result of an AOC director's time counting if he later became a trial judge but not if he later became a Justice.

Q: Why doesn't assistant DA service count?
A: The statutes explicitly mention "district attorney" but never "assistant district attorney." The legislature elsewhere demonstrated it knew how to include subordinate positions (it specifically named "assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts"). The omission of "assistant district attorney" is treated as deliberate under the negative-implication canon.

Q: How do AG opinions on benefit statutes weigh in?
A: The opinion notes that NC courts construe state-employee benefit statutes inclusively when the text is genuinely ambiguous. Stanley v. Retirement and Health Benefits Division was cited for the "include rather than exclude" leaning. But that leaning applies to ambiguity, not to deliberate legislative silence. Here the silence about assistant DAs was deliberate, so the inclusive presumption did not override.

Q: Is this a binding ruling?
A: No. AG opinions are advisory. They are persuasive in court but not binding precedent. Anyone disputing a longevity calculation would still need to litigate the statutory question, and the court would not be bound by this opinion (though it would consider it).

Background and statutory framework

NC's judicial compensation system uses base salaries set in the biennial appropriations act, with longevity step-ups in lieu of merit raises. The longevity provisions sit in Chapter 7A of the General Statutes (the Judicial Department chapter). Two parallel sections govern:

• G.S. 7A-10(c) sets longevity for Justices of the Supreme Court (and Court of Appeals judges, by reference). Service includes service as a justice or judge of the General Court of Justice or as a member of the Utilities Commission.
• G.S. 7A-44(b) sets longevity for superior court judges. Service includes the same plus expressly named additional categories: AOC director and assistant director, district attorney, clerk of superior court.

The textual asymmetry (7A-44(b) had a longer list than 7A-10(c)) created the question. Read literally, an AOC director who later became a trial judge would get longevity credit for the AOC years, but the same person ascending to the Supreme Court would not. The AG's solution was to harmonize the two statutes through the General Assembly's structural intent rather than read the words in strict isolation.

The opinion's reasoning matters beyond Justice Freeman's check. It is a useful illustration of how the AG handles parallel-statute construction when literal text yields anomalies. The methodology (read both statutes together, identify shared formula, apply equally where the legislative purpose is clearly equal) is durable.

The reverse side of the methodology is the assistant-DA result. Where the legislature was silent across both statutes despite knowing how to include subordinate positions, silence means exclusion.

Citations

• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-10(c) (Supreme Court longevity)
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-44(b) (superior court longevity; explicit list of qualifying service categories)
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-341 (judicial compensation generally)
• Little v. Stevens, 267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966) (statutory construction; consequences of competing constructions)
• Comm'r of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978) (avoid absurd or bizarre consequences)
• Stanley v. Retirement and Health Benefits Division, 55 N.C. App. 588, 591, 286 S.E.2d 643, 645, cert. denied 305 N.C. 587, 292 S.E.2d 571 (1982) (benefit statutes construed to include rather than exclude)

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/longevity-pay/

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned/markdown-converted source. Minor errors may remain — the linked landing page is authoritative.

• N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-341. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-44(b), in turn, states: In lieu of merit and other increment raises paid to regular State employees, a judge of the superior court, regular or special, shall receive as longevity pay an annual amount equal to four and eight-tenths percent (4.8%) of the annual salary set forth in the Current Operations Appropriations Act payable monthly after five years of service, nine and six-tenths percent (9.6%) after 10 years of service, fourteen and four-tenths percent (14.4%) after 15 years of service, and nineteen and two-tenths percent (19.2%) after 20 years of service. "Service" means service as a justice or judge of the General Court of Justice or as a member of the Utilities Commission

• N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-44(b) (emphasis added).

As a general rule of statutory construction, if a statute is susceptible to more than one construction, the consequences of each possible construction will be considered, and undesirable consequences will be avoided if possible.

• N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-44(b) and -341 make clear that service as the director or assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts is to be treated as service as a superior court judge or as director or assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts. Service shall also mean service as a district attorney or as a clerk of superior court.

See, e.g., Little v. Stevens, 267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966). Similarly, "[i]n construing statutes courts normally adopt an interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results."

Comr. of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978).

The Honorable Thomas W. Ross
September 8, 1999
Page 3

for longevity purposes. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that the legislature intended the result that a former director or assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts would be allowed to have that service taken into consideration for longevity purposes should he be appointed or elected to the superior court bench, but not if he should be appointed or elected to the Supreme Court. Rather, we believe that service for purposes of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-10(c), which includes "service as a justice or judge of the General Court of Justice," should be interpreted to include service as director or assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, inasmuch as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-44(b) and -341 specifically make such service equivalent to service as a judge of the General Court of Justice for longevity purposes. We believe that this is particularly true in light of the fact that the North Carolina courts have held that statutes providing for benefit schemes for State employees should be interpreted so as to include rather than exclude employees. See, e.g., Stanley v. Retirement and Health Benefits Division, 55 N.C. App. 588, 591, 286 S.E.2d 643, 645, cert. denied 305 N.C. 587, 292 S.E.2d 571 (1982) (addressing "overall policies of the retirement, disability, and death benefit scheme" for State employees).

As for whether service as an assistant district attorney can be included in calculating Mr. Freeman's longevity, however, we must conclude that it cannot. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-10(c) and 44(b) both provide that service includes service as a district attorney. No mention is made of service as an assistant district attorney, while N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-44(b) does specifically include service as assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts. We conclude that, had the General Assembly intended service as an assistant district attorney to be considered service within the meaning of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-10(c), it could and would have said so specifically. Inasmuch as there is no indication of such legislative intent in any of the relevant statutes, we do not believe that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-10(c) can be interpreted to include service as an assistant district attorney.

For the foregoing reasons, it is our opinion that the calculation of Mr. Freeman's longevity pay as a Supreme Court Justice should include his service as director and assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts as well as his service as district attorney, but not his service as assistant district attorney.

Very truly yours,

Ann Reed
Senior Deputy Attorney General

The Honorable Thomas W. Ross
September 8, 1999
Page 4

Alexander McC. Peters
Special Deputy Attorney General

AMP/hs