If a North Carolina statute (G.S. § 7B-3400) says minors are subject to their parents' supervision and control 'notwithstanding any other provision of law,' does that wipe out the separate minor-consent statute (G.S. § 90-21.5) and let parents stop a county health department from giving birth control to a teenager without their consent?

Plain-English summary

The Rowan County Board of Health had been giving birth control to minors under N.C.G.S. § 90-21.5, the state's minor-consent statute. A question arose: did the recently recodified Juvenile Code provision in G.S. § 7B-3400, which says minors are subject to their parents' supervision and control "notwithstanding any other provision of law," override the minor-consent statute?

The Board's Chairman, Dr. David King, asked the Attorney General for an opinion. AG Mike Easley's office concluded that the parental-control statute did not override the minor-consent statute, for two independent reasons.

Reason one: the statutes don't actually conflict. Sections of the law that are in pari materia (relate to the same subject) are to be read together and reconciled where possible. The opinion analyzed what each statute actually does:

• G.S. § 7B-3400 lives inside Article 34 of the Juvenile Code (Chapter 7B). Article 34 sets up a court procedure for parents to compel a runaway minor to return home. The very next section, § 7B-3404, requires the parent to file a verified complaint alleging that the juvenile "has left home or has left the place where the juvenile has been residing and refuses to return." The court can then order the juvenile to appear, order the sheriff to look for the juvenile, and order other people not to harbor the juvenile. The whole article is about returning runaways. The "notwithstanding any other provision of law" language only operates within that runaway-recovery framework.

• G.S. § 90-21.5 lives in Chapter 90, the medical-practices chapter. It carves out a specific list of medical services for which a minor can give effective consent without parental involvement: treatment of communicable diseases, prevention/diagnosis/treatment of pregnancy, and certain other categories.

The two address completely different real-world situations. A parent's right to drag a runaway home doesn't speak to whether a 16-year-old can lawfully get prescribed birth control.

Reason two: even if there were a conflict, the specific/later statute wins. Under settled canons of construction (citing Town of Pine Knoll Shore v. Evans, 331 N.C. 361), when a general statute and a specific statute appear to conflict, the specific one controls, especially when the specific one is the later enactment.

• G.S. § 7B-3400 is a 1999 recodification of G.S. § 110-44.1, originally enacted in 1969 (Chapter 1080, s.1, 1969 Sess. Laws). The "notwithstanding any other provision of law" clause has been in the original since 1969.

• G.S. § 90-21.5 was enacted in 1971 (Chapter 35, 1971 Sess. Laws) to let minors consent to treatment for communicable diseases, and was expanded in 1977 (Chapter 582, 1977 Sess. Laws) to cover prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of pregnancy.

So the minor-consent statute is both more specific (it deals with one narrow subject: certain medical services) and later in time (1971 and 1977 amendments postdate the 1969 parental-control statute, even though both were technically recodified later). Under standard statutory-construction rules, the later, more specific enactment trumps the earlier, more general one.

Bottom line: Rowan County's health department could continue to provide birth control and the other services listed in G.S. § 90-21.5 to minors who consent to them, without needing parental consent.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Both statutes have continued to exist. The minor-consent statute (G.S. § 90-21.5) and the parental-control statute in Chapter 7B remain on the books. Subsequent court decisions and AG opinions have continued to apply the in-pari-materia reasoning to questions of minor medical consent. But the specific scope of "specified" services in G.S. § 90-21.5, the procedural rules in the Juvenile Code, and constitutional doctrines around parental rights have all evolved. Anyone deciding what services a particular minor may consent to in 2026 should pull the current G.S. § 90-21.5 text and relevant case law rather than rely on the 1999 framing.

Common questions readers actually have

What services can a minor consent to in North Carolina without parental involvement?

As G.S. § 90-21.5 stood at the time of the opinion, the statute listed: treatment of communicable diseases; prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of pregnancy (including contraception); prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of abuse of controlled substances or alcohol; and certain other categories. It does not cover routine health care generally. A 14-year-old cannot, for example, consent to elective surgery on the same theory. The statute is a list, not a presumption.

What's the practical scope of the runaway statute (G.S. § 7B-3400 et seq.)?

It gives a parent a court-supervised tool to recover a runaway child who has left the family home and refuses to come back. The "notwithstanding any other provision of law" language was there because the legislature wanted the runaway-recovery procedure to override any conflicting statute that might let, say, a relative shelter the runaway and refuse to return them. It was a coordination rule for the runaway procedure, not a general supremacy clause over the rest of the General Statutes.

Could a parent still object to a clinic providing birth control to their teenager?

The opinion answers the legal question (does the clinic have authority to provide the service when the minor consents). It does not address what happens between parent and minor at home. The clinic's legal authority to act on the minor's consent is one thing; the parent's separate constitutional interest in directing the upbringing of their child is another. Constitutional family-law doctrine has continued to evolve, and questions about parental notice and consent rights remain politically and legally contested. The 1999 opinion does not resolve those questions; it resolves only the narrow statutory-construction question Dr. King asked.

Why did Rowan County ask?

The opinion does not provide the back-story. The plausible reading is that someone (a parent, a lawyer, or a local board member) had argued that the recodification of the runaway statute into Chapter 7B effectively wiped out the minor-consent statute via the "notwithstanding" clause. The county wanted clarity before changing practice.

What is "in pari materia," exactly?

It is a Latin phrase that translates roughly to "on the same subject." When two statutes deal with related subjects, courts try to read them together as part of one coherent body of law, rather than letting one silently obliterate the other. The doctrine is a tool against drafting accidents; legislatures often pass narrowly targeted statutes containing broad-sounding language that was never meant to reach beyond the immediate context.

Background and statutory framework

G.S. § 90-21.5: the minor-consent statute

Enacted in 1971 and expanded in 1977, this statute lets minors give effective consent to a specific list of medical services. The list reflects public-health policy judgments: communicable diseases (so teens get treated before infecting others), pregnancy prevention and care (so they can avoid unintended outcomes and access prenatal care), and substance-abuse treatment (so they can get help without first having to negotiate with parents).

G.S. § 7B-3400 (formerly G.S. § 110-44.1): the runaway statute

Originally enacted in 1969 and recodified into Chapter 7B (the Juvenile Code) in 1998. Article 34 of Chapter 7B is the runaway-recovery procedure. § 7B-3400 declares that juveniles under 18 are subject to parental supervision and control unless married, in the armed forces, or emancipated. § 7B-3404 sets out the verified-complaint procedure to compel a runaway's return.

The canons of statutory construction in play

In pari materia. Related statutes must be read together; conflict should be resolved by reading them as harmoniously as possible. Howell v. Morton, 508 S.E.2d 894 (N.C. App. 1998).

Specific over general. Where two provisions seem to address the same subject and one is more specific, the specific one controls. Town of Pine Knoll Shore v. Evans, 331 N.C. 361, 416 S.E.2d 4 (1992).

Later enactment over earlier. When two statutes conflict and were enacted at different times, the later one is presumed to govern.

The signing officials

The opinion was signed by Ann Reed, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Gayl M. Manthei, Special Deputy Attorney General.

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/minors-consent-for-health-services/

Original opinion text

Reply to: Gayl M. Manthei
Health & Public Assistance
Tel: (919) 716-6855
Fax: (919) 716-6758

August 25, 1999

Dr. David King, Chairman
Rowan Board of Health
Rowan County Department of Health
2728 Old Concord Road
Salisbury, NC 28146-1338

RE: Advisory Opinion: Minor's Consent for Health Services; G.S. § 90-21.5, G.S. § 7B-3400.

Dear Dr. King:

You have asked whether G.S. § 7B-3400 (formerly G.S. § 110-44.1), which provides that minors are subject to the supervision and control of their parents "notwithstanding any other provision of law", abrogates G.S. § 90-21.5, which specifies the circumstances under which minors can consent to health services. Under the applicable rules of statutory construction, statutes which are in pari materia, i.e., which relate to or are applicable to the same matter or subject, must be construed together in order to ascertain legislative intent, and should be reconciled with each other when possible. Howell v. Morton, _ N.C. App. ___, 508 S.E.2d 894 (1998).

In this case, the two statutes in question address different issues and do not conflict with one another. Even if they could be construed to address the same issue and be in conflict, general principles of statutory construction would make it clear that G.S. § 90-21.5 controls the Board's authority on the particular issue you have raised.

As noted above, the two statutes in question do not appear to be in conflict. G.S. § 90-21.5 addresses a minor's right to consent to certain specified medical services. G.S. § 7B-3400, on the other hand, establishes the legal basis by which a parent may compel a child to return to the home under judicial procedures set out in Article 34. There is no indication that the provisions of G.S. § 7B-3400 were intended to apply to situations beyond those delineated in Article 34. Furthermore, the fact that the law generally permits a parent to supervise and control children would not operate to eliminate rights vested in children by the Constitution and the general statutes.

Chapter 7B of the General Statutes contains the North Carolina Juvenile Code. The purpose of the Juvenile Code is to provide procedures for hearing juvenile cases, screening delinquency claims, taking children into temporary custody during investigation of abuse and neglect claims and other similar matters. Within Article 34 of the Code, G.S. § 7B-3400 provides that juveniles under 18 years of age are subject to the supervision and control of their parents unless they are married, serving in the armed forces or emancipated. G.S. § 7B-3404 provides that in order to enforce the provisions of Article 34, a juvenile's parent must file a verified complaint that must allege "that the defendant juvenile has left home or has left the place where the juvenile has been residing and refuses to return and comply with the direction and control of the plaintiff …" G.S. § 7B-3404 (emphasis added). Other provisions of this statute allow the judge to order a juvenile to appear before the court or to order the sheriff to enter other premises to search for the juvenile and serve the order. The court may also order other named defendants not to harbor the juvenile on their premises or in their homes. All of the contemplated actions involve the return of a child who has left home. Thus, Article 34 of the Juvenile Code is intended to provide parents a way to return runaways to their homes and to their general supervision. This does not, in our opinion, conflict in any way with G.S. § 90-21.5, which allows minors to consent to specified medical services.

Even if it could be argued that a conflict exists between the two statutes, the tenets of statutory construction would dictate that G.S. § 90-21.5 controls. Where there are two provisions, one which treats a subject matter in detail and the other which deals more generally with that subject matter, the particular provision controls, especially when the particular provision is the later enactment. Town of Pine Knoll Shore v. Evans, 331 N.C. 361, 416 S.E.2d 4 (1992). G.S. § 90-21.5 is both the more specific statute and the later enactment. G.S. § 7B-3400 speaks to the general supervision and control that parents have over their children. G.S. § 90-21.5 addresses specific exceptions to that general supervision to allow minors to consent to certain types of medical treatment. G.S. § 90-21.5 is clearly a more specific statute intended by the legislature to address the narrower issue of consent for medical services.

G.S. § 7B-3400 is a recodification of G.S. § 110-44.1, which was enacted in 1969 (Chapter 1080, s.1, 1969 Sess. Laws). The language which provides that minors are subject to the supervision and control of their parents "notwithstanding any other provision of law" was contained in the original 1969 version. Subsequent to that enactment, the legislature enacted G.S. § 90-21.5 to allow minors to consent for medical treatment for detection of and treatment of certain communicable diseases. (Chapter 35, 1971 Sess. Laws). The provision which authorizes minors to consent for medical health services for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of pregnancy was added by the legislature in 1977. (Chapter 582, 1977 Sess. Laws). Thus, the enactment of the minor's consent statute postdated the enactment of the statute which subjects minors to the supervision and control of their parents "notwithstanding any other provision of law."

For the foregoing reasons, the legislature has intended for G.S. § 90-21.5 to address specifically the Rowan County Health Department's authority to dispense birth control methods to minors. Even if the provisions of G.S. § 7B-3400 could be interpreted to apply to the facts of the Board's request, the legislature's later enactment of the specific terms found in G.S. § 90-21.5 would serve to supersede G.S. § 7B-3400 and would control the Department's authority on the issue in question.

Very truly yours,

Ann Reed
Senior Deputy Attorney General

Gayl M. Manthei
Special Deputy Attorney General