Can a NC Chief District Court Judge issue a standing order forbidding juvenile court counselors from diverting any juvenile case that came out of the public schools?

Plain-English summary

A district attorney asked whether a chief district court judge could issue a standing order forbidding diversion of juvenile cases arising from the public schools. The Attorney General answered no. The opinion says the order would usurp authority the General Assembly assigned to the chief court counselor.

Under the juvenile intake statutes discussed in the opinion, the counselor must evaluate the evidence and decide whether each complaint should lead to a petition, diversion, or closure without action. Each complaint requires its own evaluation. The opinion notes that G.S. 7A-531 lists offenses that cannot be diverted. It reads that list as leaving other offenses outside the categorical prohibition, citing Evans v. Diaz, 333 N.C. 774, 430 S.E.2d 244 (1993).

The opinion also describes a role for the district attorney: upon the complainant's appeal, the district attorney may overrule the counselor's judgment. It cites In re Register, 84 N.C. App. 336, 352 S.E.2d 889 (1987), for the requirement that the record affirmatively show approval of a petition's filing by either the counselor or the district attorney. A blanket judicial order would bypass the individual evaluation and review required by that framework, even if the parties agreed to it.

For a school-related complaint, the opinion calls for the statutory intake process to be followed. It does not decide whether diversion is the right outcome in any particular case or advise a prosecutor to disregard an existing court order.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The opinion also refers to Chapter 7B provisions that were soon to take effect at the time. Check current juvenile intake law before applying its analysis to a present-day complaint.

Common questions

Q: Could a judge ban diversion for every juvenile complaint from a public school?
A: The Attorney General said a blanket administrative order of that kind would conflict with the statutory requirement for individual evaluation by the chief court counselor.

Q: Does the statute bar diversion for some offenses?
A: Yes. The opinion says G.S. 7A-531 listed offenses the intake counselor could not divert. It did not treat all school-originated complaints as part of that list.

Q: Who may challenge a counselor's decision under the opinion?
A: The opinion says the district attorney may overrule the counselor's judgment upon an appeal by the complainant. It does not say the district attorney initiates that appeal.

Q: Does this opinion tell a prosecutor to ignore a court order?
A: No. It concludes the blanket order is inconsistent with the statutory scheme, but gives no instruction to disregard an order in a particular case.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion discusses G.S. 7A-530 and following provisions, G.S. 7A-561, and soon-effective Chapter 7B provisions. Its central point is who makes the initial decision about each juvenile complaint. The General Assembly assigned case-by-case evaluation to the chief court counselor, with a district attorney's review upon a complainant's appeal. The proposed standing order would replace that process with a categorical rule for complaints from public schools.

Citations from the opinion

• G.S. 7A-530 et seq.
• G.S. 7A-531
• G.S. 7A-561
• G.S. 7B-1700, 1703 et seq.
• Evans v. Diaz, 333 N.C. 774, 430 S.E.2d 244 (1993)
• In re Register, 84 N.C. App. 336, 352 S.E.2d 889 (1987)

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/local-rule-prohibiting-diversions-in-juvenile-cases-arising-from-the-public-school-system/

Original opinion text

Reply to: Robert J. Blum Health and Public Assistance Tele: (919) 716-6855 Fax: (919) 716-6758

June 9, 1999

Joel H. Brewer, District Attorney 9A Prosecutorial District Post Office Box 1143 Person County Courthouse Roxboro, NC 27573

Re: Advisory Opinion: Local Rule Prohibiting Diversions in Juvenile Cases Arising From the Public School System; G.S. 7A-530 through 7A-536, 7A-561; G.S. 7B-1700, 1703 et seq. (references to Chapter 7B in brackets)

Dear Mr. Brewer:

You have asked whether a local administrative order issued by the Chief District Court Judge prohibiting the diversion of juveniles from the juvenile justice system in cases arising from the Public School System is consistent with G.S. 7A-530 et seq., G.S. 7A-561 and the soon to be effective G.S. 7B-1700, 1703 et seq. (references to Chapter 7B in brackets). In our opinion such a blanket administrative order would not be consistent with the law in that it usurps the statutory authority provided to the chief court counselor by our General Assembly.

A fair reading of G.S. 7A-530 et seq., [G.S. 7B-1700 et seq.] presents a clear statement that the chief court counselor is required by law to evaluate evidence and exercise discretion as to whether a complaint against a juvenile should be filed, diverted or closed without action. The statutory scheme requires that every juvenile complaint must be evaluated by the intake counselor on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, since G.S. 7A-531 [G.S. 7B1701] lists offenses which the intake counselor cannot divert, it implies the exclusion of crimes not contained in the list. Evans v. Diaz, 333 N.C. 774, 430 S.E.2d 244 (1993). Although, upon appeal of the complainant, the district attorney may overrule the judgment of the intake counselor, the record in such a case must affirmatively show that either the intake counselor or the district attorney has approved the filing of the petition. In re Register, 84 N.C.App. 336, 352 S.E.2d 889 (1987). Thus, a blanket administrative order issued by the court which bypasses the above requirements, regardless of whether the parties agree to it, usurps the evaluation process and exercise of discretion the General Assembly requires of the chief court counselor and the district attorney.

Very truly yours,

Ann Reed, Senior Deputy Attorney General

Robert J. Blum, Special Deputy Attorney General

cc: Chief Judge Patti S. Harrison