Can North Carolina Marine Patrol officers cite civilians for violating state fisheries laws if the violation occurred on the Camp Lejeune Marine Corps base?

Plain-English summary

NC Marine Patrol Captain B.M. Rivenbark wrote with a specific operational problem: state fisheries officers had cited two civilians for fisheries violations that occurred inside Camp Lejeune, a federal military reservation in Onslow County. Did Marine Patrol officers have jurisdiction to do that, or had federal acceptance of the property stripped the state of regulatory authority there?

Senior Deputy AG Daniel Oakley and Associate AG Mary Dee Carraway concluded that the state did not have enforcement jurisdiction on Camp Lejeune. The federal government accepted exclusive jurisdiction over the reservation in 1941, and that acceptance displaced state regulatory enforcement except for the limited residual category of serving civil and criminal court process.

The constitutional framework. Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power of exclusive legislation over places "purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state" for forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful federal buildings. State cession of jurisdiction is the gateway. North Carolina's cession statute is G.S. § 104-7, which gives consent to federal acquisition and cedes exclusive jurisdiction "for all purposes except the service upon such sites of all civil and criminal process of the courts of this State."

The 1940 federal change. Originally, federal acquisition of state land automatically created exclusive federal jurisdiction. In 1940, Congress amended 40 U.S.C. § 255 to require an affirmative federal acceptance of jurisdiction. Without acceptance, "it shall be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted." The amendment turned exclusive jurisdiction into an opt-in regime.

State law remains in default. Under the post-1940 regime, until the federal government accepts jurisdiction, the state retains regulatory authority over the property. The NC Supreme Court confirmed this in State v. Burrell, 256 N.C. 288 (1962), about jurisdiction at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, and the Court of Appeals applied the same reasoning in State v. Graham, 47 N.C. App. 303 (1980), about a federal post office. The rule prevents the creation of "no man's land" where neither sovereign has authority and crimes go unprosecuted.

The Camp Lejeune acceptance. The AG documented a series of letters from Acting Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to Governor J. Melville Broughton dated 1941, accepting jurisdiction over Camp Lejeune "in the manner and form provided by an act of 1907, Ch. 25, N.C. Code 1927, Sec. 8059" (the predecessor to G.S. § 104-7). The NC Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 161 (1991) (cert. denied), held that these letters effected exclusive federal acceptance and that an Onslow County Superior Court therefore lacked jurisdiction over a murder committed on the reservation by a juvenile.

The applied result. Marine Patrol officers cannot enforce state fisheries laws on Camp Lejeune because:

• Federal acceptance was exclusive, not concurrent.
• Once exclusive jurisdiction is accepted, the only state authority that survives is the service of civil and criminal process of NC state courts. § 104-7 says so explicitly.
• Enforcement of state fisheries laws is regulatory enforcement, not service of court process. It does not fit within the residual category.
• The 1961 General Services Administration master list, the latest at the time, confirmed Camp Lejeune as exclusive federal jurisdiction (interview with Robert L. Farb of UNC's Institute of Government).

The two civilians cited by state fisheries officers were therefore cited without jurisdictional authority. If they wanted to challenge the citations, the opinion's analysis would support a motion to dismiss for lack of state jurisdiction over the property.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. The federal jurisdictional landscape on military reservations has evolved. The Department of Defense has, in some instances, retroceded jurisdiction back to states, and some federal-state cooperative arrangements for natural resource enforcement now exist. Anyone facing a current jurisdictional question on a federal military property should check the current jurisdictional status of the specific facility (which can vary parcel by parcel) and any applicable Memorandum of Understanding between DoD and the state.

Background and statutory framework

The jurisdictional architecture for federal property within a state has three layers:

Constitutional foundation. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 ("Enclave Clause") gives Congress exclusive legislative power over places purchased with state consent for federal purposes. This power is exclusive when triggered.

State cession statute. Most states have statutes consenting to federal acquisition and ceding jurisdiction. NC's is § 104-7. These statutes typically reserve a residual category for state-court civil and criminal process service so that the property does not become a sanctuary for fugitives or process-evading parties.

Federal acceptance statute. 40 U.S.C. § 255 (since recodified) governs federal acceptance. Pre-1940, acceptance was automatic; post-1940, it requires an affirmative federal action (filing notice with the state Governor or by another state-prescribed method). Without acceptance, jurisdiction stays with the state, even on federally owned land.

The three-step rule (federal acquisition + state cession + federal acceptance = exclusive federal jurisdiction) is the framework State v. Smith applied to Camp Lejeune in 1991. The Forrestal letters supplied the acceptance, the 1907 NC statute supplied the cession, and the federal purchase supplied the acquisition.

For Marine Patrol enforcement purposes, the analytical question is whether their enforcement activity fits within the § 104-7 residual category of "service of civil and criminal process of the courts of this State." Writing a state fisheries citation is not service of process; it is the initiation of regulatory enforcement that produces process at a later step. The fit is poor. The state's residual authority does not stretch to cover patrol-and-cite functions on exclusively federal land.

Common questions

Did this apply to other military bases in NC?

The same three-step analysis applies to each base. The opinion specifically documented Camp Lejeune's exclusive-acceptance status. Cherry Point (Marine Corps Air Station) was the subject of State v. Burrell and is also exclusive-federal-jurisdiction. Fort Bragg has a different and more complex jurisdictional history (parts are exclusive, parts are concurrent, parts retain state jurisdiction). Each base must be analyzed individually.

Could federal authorities enforce state fisheries laws?

Federal authorities generally enforce federal laws. The federal government has its own conservation and fisheries laws (Lacey Act, Magnuson-Stevens Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act, base-specific regulations) that may apply on Camp Lejeune. If state and federal authorities want state laws enforced on the base, the typical mechanism is a cooperative arrangement (MOU, retrocession of partial jurisdiction, or special deputation). The opinion does not address whether any such arrangement existed for Camp Lejeune fisheries enforcement in 1997.

What about civilians fishing on Camp Lejeune?

Civilians fishing on the reservation would have to comply with whatever fisheries rules the federal government (or the base commander) imposes. They might also have to comply with state law as a matter of background fact (state limits apply in nearby state waters), but state enforcement could not reach them on the reservation. A civilian who left the reservation to land or sell a catch could then be subject to state enforcement at that point.

What was the Adams v. United States point?

Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312 (1943), is a U.S. Supreme Court decision applying 40 U.S.C. § 255 to a criminal prosecution at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. The federal government had not formally accepted jurisdiction over the camp, so the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the rape prosecution. The case is the foundational precedent for the post-1940 affirmative-acceptance requirement.

Why does state criminal/civil process service survive?

Process service is the limited window through which the state can reach onto federal property to summon people back into the state-court system for state-court matters. Without it, federal land would be a sanctuary for parties evading state lawsuits, divorces, debt collections, etc. The carve-out is narrow (service only) and does not encompass regulatory enforcement.

Did this opinion address waterways adjacent to Camp Lejeune?

The opinion was about the reservation itself. The status of waterways depends on where the federal jurisdictional boundary lies. Tidal waters and navigable waters often have separate jurisdictional rules. Marine Patrol would have authority in clearly state waters adjacent to the base; the question is where the base's exclusive-jurisdiction boundary stops.

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/marine-patrol-jurisdiction-on-the-federal-military-reservation-at-camp-lejeune/

Citations

• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7
• 40 U.S.C. § 255
• U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17
• 1907 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 25 (former)
• Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312 (1943)
• State v. Deberry, 224 N.C. 834 (1945)
• State v. Burrell, 256 N.C. 288 (1962)
• State v. Graham, 47 N.C. App. 303 (1980)
• State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 161 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 956 (1991)
• Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963)
• Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885)
• Supply Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930)

Original opinion text

February 4, 1997

Captain B. M. Rivenbark
N.C. Marine Patrol
Division of Marine Fisheries
127 Cardinal Drive Extension
Wilmington, North Carolina 28405-3845

ADVISORY OPINION: Marine Patrol Jurisdiction on the Federal Military Reservation at Camp Lejeune; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7

Dear Captain Rivenbark:

You request an opinion on the question of whether North Carolina Marine Patrol officers have jurisdiction to enforce state fisheries laws on federal military reservations located within North Carolina. The particular site in question is Camp Lejeune, a federal military reservation in Onslow County, where state fisheries officers issued citations to two civilians for violations of North Carolina fisheries laws. For reasons which follow, it is our opinion that state fisheries officers do not have jurisdiction to enforce state fisheries laws on Camp Lejeune.

Questions:

I. What is the scope of federal and state jurisdiction on lands within the state of North Carolina that have been acquired by the United States government?

The authority of the federal government to accept and govern lands within state boundaries is found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution. This section provides:

The congress shall have power [t]o exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings.

U. S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.

Pursuant to this section, many states, including North Carolina have enacted statutes that govern the cession of jurisdiction of such lands to the federal government. North Carolina's statute pertaining to the federal acquisition of lands for public buildings and cession of jurisdiction is found at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7 and states in part:

The consent of the State is hereby given, in accordance with the seventeenth clause, eighth section, of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, to acquisition by the United States, by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, of any land in the State required for the sites for customhouses, courthouses, post offices, arsenals, or other public buildings whatsoever, or for any other purposes of the government.

Exclusive jurisdiction in and over any land so acquired by the United States shall be and the same is hereby ceded to the United States for all purposes except the service upon such sites of all civil and criminal process of the courts of this State; but the jurisdiction so ceded shall continue no longer than the said United States shall own such lands. The jurisdiction shall not vest until the United States shall have acquired title to said lands by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7 (1995).

After a reading of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States constitution and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7, it would appear that the federal government would have exclusive jurisdiction over federal lands acquired within North Carolina. However, 40 U.S.C. § 255 which deals with federal jurisdiction over acquisitions of land makes it clear that federal jurisdiction is not always exclusive, and the sovereign states can in some cases retain jurisdiction over federal lands within their boundaries. 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1994). The relevant portion of this statute provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the obtaining of exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over lands or interest therein which have been or shall hereafter be acquired by it shall not be required; but the head or other authorized officer of any department or independent establishment or agency of the Government may, in such cases and at such times as he may deem desirable, accept or secure from the State in which any lands or interests therein under his immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control are situated, consent to or cession of such jurisdiction, exclusive or partial, not theretofore obtained, over any such lands or interests as he may deem desirable and indicate acceptance of such jurisdiction on behalf of the United States by filing a notice of such acceptance with the Governor of such State or in such manner as may be prescribed by the laws of the State where such lands are situated. Unless and until the United States has accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted. Id.

The language of this statute is unambiguous, ensuring that unless an authorized officer of the United States government accepts or secures jurisdiction from the state by "filing notice of acceptance with the Governor of the state where the acquired federal land is located, or by such other manner prescribed by state law," there is a presumption that federal jurisdiction has not been accepted. Id. Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that a state has jurisdiction over federal lands within state boundaries until the federal government overtly accepts either exclusive or partial jurisdiction over the specific area of land required. Therefore, North Carolina fisheries officers have jurisdiction on federal lands and may enforce the state fisheries laws on federal military reservations unless the Secretary of the Department of the Navy or other qualified representative of the United States has accepted exclusive jurisdiction for that area. This proposition is supported by both federal and North Carolina case law.

In Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312 (1943), a case which is directly on point, three defendants were convicted for the rape of a civilian woman within the boundaries of a federal military base, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. The U.S. Supreme Court was charged with deciding whether the federal military base was within the federal criminal jurisdiction. Id. The Court relied on 40 U.S.C. § 255 to conclude that the federal government must give notice of acceptance to the state where the federal lands are located if the federal government is to obtain jurisdiction. The Court went further and noted that this acceptance procedure is necessary for either exclusive or partial jurisdiction to be obtained. The Court concluded that since the proper formal acceptance had not been given by the United States, the federal court did not have jurisdiction over the criminal proceeding. Id.

II. If the federal government has not formally accepted either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over federal military reservations, does N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7 effectively relinquish state sovereignty over such lands acquired by the United States since the statute expressly cedes to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over all land it acquires within the state?

"The purchase of lands by the United States, within the limits of a State, does not of itself oust the jurisdiction of the State over the lands so purchased; but where the purchase is with the full consent of the legislature of the State, the jurisdiction of the United States then becomes exclusive." State v. Deberry, 224 N.C. 834 (1945) (citing Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); Supply Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930)). The North Carolina Supreme Court held in State v. Deberry that the consent of the legislature of a state to the acquisition by the United States of land within state boundaries may not be revoked or withdrawn after given, unless federal jurisdiction has not been accepted. State v. Deberry, 224 N.C. 834, 836 (1945). Although N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7 cedes exclusive jurisdiction to the United States over land that is acquired within North Carolina boundaries, the state cannot require the federal government to accept such jurisdiction over such areas. State v. Burrell, 256 N.C. 288, 297 (1962). In State v. Burrell, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in determining whether a North Carolina state court had jurisdiction over a criminal trial involving a rape that occurred on the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point, North Carolina, offered its interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7. Id. at 289. The court concluded that the only reasonable interpretation of this section, consistent with its words and legislative purpose is that when the United States has not accepted exclusive jurisdiction over the area ceded by the statute, "the statute is not applicable and the State retains its territorial jurisdiction over the area in question so far as its exercise involved no interference with the carrying out of the federal project." Id. at 297. To allow N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7 to divest state courts of jurisdiction in situations where the federal government has not formally accepted jurisdiction over the acquired federal land would create a "no-man's land" where persons could commit crimes with immunity, since neither federal nor state courts would have any jurisdiction over crimes committed within these areas. Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals applied this reasoning in State v. Graham and found that a state court had jurisdiction over a crime committed in a federal post office located within North Carolina since there was no evidence that the federal government had accepted either exclusive or partial jurisdiction over the property on which the post office was located. State v. Graham, 47 N.C. App. 303, 306 (1980).

III. Has the United States accepted jurisdiction of the federal military reservation of Camp Lejeune as required by 40 U.S.C. § 255, so as to prevent North Carolina Marine Patrol officers from enforcing state fisheries laws?

The United States has officially accepted jurisdiction over the federal military reservation of Camp Lejeune as required by 40 U.S.C. § 255. This acceptance was accomplished by a series of letters dating from June of 1941 to March of 1941 from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal to the Governor of North Carolina, J. Melville Broughton. In these letters, jurisdiction was officially accepted for the areas of land that together comprise the entirety of the Camp Lejeune military reservation. A separate acceptance letter was written for each area of Camp Lejeune. These documents are attached to this memorandum.

In State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 161 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 956 (1991), the N.C. Supreme Court noted the acceptance of federal jurisdiction over Camp Lejeune and held that an Onslow County Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over a criminal case involving a murder committed by a juvenile on the military reservation. The court cited Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7, and 40 U.S.C. § 255 for authority. Id. After a review of these sections the Court stated that the federal government acquires jurisdiction over lands it owns within a state if (1) it acquires the lands by condemnation or otherwise, (2) the state cedes jurisdiction to the federal government, and (3) the government accepts jurisdiction. Id. at 165. If the federal government complies with these three requirements, the state no longer has jurisdiction over this territory. Id. (citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963)). In Smith, the facts showed that the Acting Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had in fact, on June 9, 1941 notified the Governor of North Carolina, J. Melville Broughton, that the federal government accepted jurisdiction over the Camp Lejeune military reservation "in the manner and form provided by an act of 1907, Ch. 25, N.C. Code 1927, Sec. 8059," which is now N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7. Id. at 161. The Court in Smith denied the state's claim that jurisdiction was concurrent between the state and federal governments and held that the Secretary of the Navy's accepting language "that jurisdiction was accepted on behalf of the United States in the manner and form provided by an act of 1907, Ch. 25 . . ." and the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7 "exclusive jurisdiction . . . shall be and the same is hereby ceded to the U.S. for all purposes except the service upon such sites of all civil and criminal process of the courts of this State" had the effect of ceding all jurisdiction to the federal government, which did in fact accept such jurisdiction. Therefore, the state court had no jurisdiction over juvenile criminal matters.

IV. Conclusion

Whether or not the state of North Carolina has jurisdiction to enforce its state fisheries laws on Camp Lejeune, a federal military reservation in Onslow County, depends on whether the federal government (pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 255) expressly accepted jurisdiction over these lands by either filing a notice of acceptance with the Governor or by such other method prescribed by state law. The official letters from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal to the Governor of North Carolina, J. Melville Broughton clearly show that the federal government accepted jurisdiction over the Camp Lejeune military reservation. In addition, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Smith interpreted the jurisdiction that was accepted through these letters to be exclusive. This is re-inforced by the United States General Services Administration's "master list" which denotes the type of jurisdiction that the federal government has over each parcel of federally-owned land. (Institute of Government, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Robert L. Farb, Arrest, Search, and Investigation in North Carolina 17 (1986)). The most recent list was compiled and published in 1961 and indicates that federal jurisdiction on Camp Lejeune is exclusive. (Telephone interview with Robert L. Farb of the Institute of Government at UNC-Chapel Hill (December 19, 1997)). Once the federal government accepts jurisdiction, as in this instance, the only jurisdiction that remains for the state is that involving civil or criminal process of courts of the state. Since the enforcement of state fisheries laws falls into neither category and exclusive jurisdiction for Camp Lejeune has been accepted by the Secretary of the Navy, state fisheries officers do not have jurisdiction on this federal military reservation.

Daniel C. Oakley
Senior Deputy Attorney General

Mary Dee Carraway
Associate Attorney General