NC NC AG Advisory Opinion (1996-06-13) 1996-06-13

Can a North Carolina airport (or other public-property authority) charge handicapped drivers a fee at a parking meter for using a designated handicapped space, or does state law prohibit any meter use against handicapped placard or plate holders?

Short answer: A fee is allowed, but not a time limit. G.S. § 20-37.6(a) forbids enforcement of time restrictions against properly placarded or plated vehicles, including unlimited-time parking in time-restricted zones. The statute is silent on use fees. So a meter may collect a fee from a qualifying vehicle as long as the meter is genuinely used only to charge for the space, not as a back-door way to limit how long the vehicle can stay. Citations for non-payment are also permitted under the Authority's enabling acts.
Currency note: this opinion is from 1996
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official North Carolina Attorney General advisory opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent like a court ruling. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed North Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked at the bottom of this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

Piedmont Triad International Airport in 1996 wanted to use parking meters at handicapped-designated spaces. Counsel asked the AG whether that was permitted under G.S. § 20-37.6, which governs handicapped parking privileges. The novelty was that the statute did not address whether parking authorities could charge a fee, only whether they could restrict time.

Senior Deputy Attorney General Reginald L. Watkins and Special Deputy Attorney General Hal F. Askins parsed it carefully.

G.S. § 20-37.6(a) said a vehicle driven by or transporting a handicapped person, and displaying the proper distinguishing license plate or removable windshield placard, could "be parked for unlimited periods in parking zones restricted as to the length of time parking is permitted." So a meter cannot be used to enforce a time limit against a qualifying vehicle. If a meter is set up so that the meter expires after two hours and an enforcement officer would then ticket a qualifying vehicle for being there longer, that violates the statute.

But the statute did not say anything about parking fees as such. It addressed length of time, not money. If the meter's only purpose is to collect a fee for the use of the space, with no attempt to bound how long a qualifying vehicle stays, the statute does not prohibit that.

The AG drew a careful line. Parking authorities had to make sure their guidelines did not become "a mere pretext to limit parking time for qualifying vehicles." For example, charging a high enough rate that a qualifying vehicle effectively could not afford to stay all day might cross that line. Or running an enforcement program that ticketed qualifying vehicles for "non-payment" when in reality they had simply exceeded the meter's nominal time would be a violation in substance even though it pretended to be a fee enforcement. The whole point of § 20-37.6 was to make spaces more accessible to handicapped drivers and passengers; the AG would not let a fee structure undermine that goal.

The opinion treated handicapped-designated spaces and time-limited spaces the same way. A handicapped placard holder could not have a time limit enforced against them in either kind of space, but they could be charged a meter fee in either kind, as long as the meter was actually a fee rather than a disguised time enforcer.

For enforcement, the AG pointed to the Authority's enabling acts. Section 5.1 of Chapter 335 of the 1995 Session Laws authorized the PTIA Authority to issue citations and impose civil penalties for rule violations, and § 5.2 authorized court collection of unpaid penalties. So a citation could be written for failure to pay the meter, just not for exceeding nominal time.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. G.S. § 20-37.6 has been amended several times since 1996, and federal disability-rights law (ADA Title II) places additional constraints on how public entities structure handicapped parking. The specific pricing and enforcement model an airport or municipality uses today should be checked against both current state law and ADA accessibility guidelines, as well as any contemporary local ordinance restrictions.

Background and statutory framework

North Carolina's handicapped-parking statute, G.S. § 20-37.6, is part of a national pattern of state laws that grant placard or plate holders exemptions from time-limited parking restrictions, free access to metered spaces in some jurisdictions, and dedicated designated spaces. The North Carolina version focused on the time-limit exemption: a qualifying vehicle gets unlimited parking time wherever time limits otherwise apply.

The pre-1996 enforcement debate had centered mostly on time limits. Municipalities and parking authorities knew they could not enforce a two-hour limit against a placard holder. The unsettled question was whether the time exemption swept fees along with it. The AG read the statute literally: the exemption was for time, not for fees. Other states had adopted varying rules (some require free metered parking for placard holders; some allow fees), so this was a state-by-state question.

The "pretext" guardrail in the opinion is important. The AG was not endorsing a parking-authority game of charging predatory fees against handicapped users to discourage their use of accessible spaces. The opinion required good faith: if a fee program is genuinely a fee program, fine; if it functionally limits the time qualifying vehicles can stay, it is invalid.

The opinion also fit the institutional context. Piedmont Triad International Airport had a state legislative charter (the PTIA Authority's enabling acts) that gave it ordinance-like authority. The opinion confirmed that, within that authority, the airport could lawfully issue citations for non-payment of properly structured fees.

Common questions

Does the AG opinion mean every handicapped placard holder has to pay parking meters in North Carolina?

No. The opinion says state law does not prohibit charging a fee. Local ordinances or specific parking authorities can still choose to provide free parking to placard holders, and many have. The question is what the authority's ordinance or rule says.

What is the difference between a "use fee" and a "time enforcer"?

A use fee charges for occupying the space, period. A time enforcer charges escalating amounts that effectively make staying longer than two hours, four hours, etc. prohibitively expensive, even though the meter does not technically have a hard time limit. The AG opinion flagged that the second pattern would violate the statute even if the first one is permitted.

Can a placard holder be ticketed for not feeding the meter?

Yes, under this opinion. As long as the meter is genuinely a fee and the citation is for non-payment of the fee, not for exceeding nominal time. The placard does not exempt the vehicle from the obligation to pay.

What about today's federal ADA constraints?

The 1996 AG opinion did not address ADA Title II. Federal law has continued to evolve on the issue of fee structures and accessible parking. Anyone designing a current parking-fee program should check ADA guidance in addition to state law.

Source

Citations

  • N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-37.6
  • 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws Ch. 335, §§ 5.1, 5.2

Original opinion text

June 13, 1996

William O. Cooke Counsel to the Piedmont Triad International Airport

P. O. Box 187 Greensboro, N. C. 27402

Re: Advisory Opinion; Parking Meters; Handicapped Parking Spaces; G.S. § 20-37.6

Dear Mr. Cooke:

You request an advisory opinion concerning the use of parking meters on parking spaces designated as reserved for handicapped persons. Specifically, you ask if the Piedmont Triad Airport Authority (Authority) is prohibited from utilizing a parking meter to charge a properly marked handicapped (qualifying) vehicle for using a parking space. The answer to this novel question appears to depend on the purpose of the parking meter's use and the manner in which a meter violation is enforced.

General parking privileges for handicapped drivers and passengers are governed by G.S. § 20-37.6. Subsection (a) of this statute prohibits the enforcement of a parking meter's time restriction on a space used by a vehicle which is driven by or is transporting a handicapped person, and which displays a distinguishing license plate or a removable windshield placard. This interpretation is entirely appropriate because the statute specifically authorizes qualifying vehicles to "be parked for unlimited periods in parking zones restricted as to the length of time parking is permitted." However, the prohibition on time restriction does not exempt qualifying vehicles from use restrictions imposed for other purposes and applicable to all vehicles (e.g., no parking, loading and unloading only, visitors only, etc.).

The statute neither authorizes nor prohibits the charging of a fee to park in a designated space. Accordingly, assuming that a parking meter is used solely for the purpose of assessing a fee for using the designated space and that no attempt is made to otherwise limit the length of time that such space is occupied by a qualifying vehicle, it does not appear that the statute would prohibit charging a fee. Care should be taken by the Authority, however, to ensure that guidelines which may be established governing proposed fees are not viewed as a mere pretext to limit parking time for qualifying vehicles, in violation of G.S. § 20-37.6.

This analysis applies equally to spaces designated as "handicapped", as well as those spaces where only time limitations on parking are in effect. Moreover, it is consistent with the apparent goal of G.S. § 20-27.6 to make parking spaces more accessible by handicapped drivers and passengers.

Your final question asks whether the Authority is prohibited from issuing a citation to the offender for failure to pay the required charge for parking in a designated space. Our review discloses that there is no specific prohibition against collecting a fee, provided that the fee does not otherwise circumvent the statutory prohibition against time limitations for qualifying vehicles. Notably, Section 5.1 of Chapter 335 of the 1995 Session Laws authorizes the Authority to "issue citations charging violations and stating the amount of the civil penalty" in connection with any violation of rules or regulations adopted by the Authority. In addition, § 5.2 recognizes that the Authority may seek collection of unpaid penalties in an appropriate court of this State.

Reginald L. Watkins Senior Deputy Attorney General

Hal F. Askins
Special Deputy Attorney General