When someone dedicates a street to a city, and that street ends at a navigable river, who gets the right to build a pier or dock at the water's edge: the original landowner who kept fee title to the soil under the street, or the city that accepted the dedicated easement?

Plain-English summary

Ben Hollowell, the Town Attorney for the Town of Oriental, asked the AG who owns the right to construct a pier where Oriental had a dedicated easement (a street) terminating at the Neuse River, a navigable waterway. Two candidates: the dedicator (the original landowner) or the town that accepted the dedication. Senior Deputy AG Daniel C. Oakley, Special Deputy AG J. Allen Jernigan, and Associate AG Paul Gormley answered that the town has the right.

The riparian rights framework. Property fronting navigable waters in NC comes with a bundle of rights, including the right of access to the water and the right to build a pier or wharf out to the navigable water. In re Protest of Mason, 78 N.C. App. 16, 25 (1985). When a strip of upland land is dedicated to a municipality as a street, the question is whether the riparian "wharf-out" right travels with the dedication to the municipality, or stays with the dedicator who kept fee title to the soil under the street.

Treatise authority. Two leading water-law authorities pull in the municipality's direction.

• Gould, A Treatise on the Law of Waters (3d ed. 1900) at 201: "When a way in a city extends to navigable waters, and is dedicated to the public use as a street, it carries with it, by necessary implication, the right of the city to extend it into the water by the construction of a wharf at the end thereof."
• Farnham, The Law of Waters and Water Rights (1904) at 674: "A public road laid out to a water way becomes a public landing at its termination, and piers at the ends of such streets are mere extensions of the highway the title to which is vested in the public."

Case authority from other jurisdictions.

• Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876): The U.S. Supreme Court held that when an owner dedicated a street ending at a river, the dedication carried a public easement "not only for street purposes, but for the purposes of wharves, landings and levees." The grantor's argument that he had reserved only street use was rejected as "a very narrow and close view."
• McMurray v. Baltimore, 54 Md. 103 (1880): Same conclusion. "The dedication of [a] street to the public use as a street extending to the water, carried with it by necessary implication, the right of the city to extend it into the harbor by the construction of a wharf at the end thereof."
• Backus v. City of Detroit, 49 Mich. 110 (1882): Detroit had the right to construct a wharf from a dedicated public way leading to a navigable river.
• Jacobs v. Lyon Township, 502 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. App. 1993): "Publicly dedicated streets that terminate at the edge of navigable waters are generally deemed to provide public access to the water." The court relied on a presumption that the platter intended water access and structures to aid in that access.
• Thies v. Howland, 380 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1985): Although the specific case denied the city the wharf right because the express grant had specific terms excluding wharf construction, the court noted the general rule that public ways terminating at navigable waters provide public access and that the city is entitled to build wharves at the end of such streets. The right does not depend on whether the public holds fee title.
• Flynn v. Biesel, 102 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1960): A town could erect a dock where a road terminated at a navigable river under common law dedication.
• Lanier v. Jones, 619 So. 2d 387 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1993): The owner of an easement reaching a navigable waterway had the right to construct a dock, where the dock was necessary for or consistent with the easement's purpose.

The cross-jurisdictional consensus: the wharf-out right travels with the dedicated street, because the dedication's whole purpose is water access and access is incomplete without the means to reach the water from the bank.

The NC application. No NC case has addressed the exact question. But NC dedications are subject to general easement principles. Shear v. Stevens Building Co., 107 N.C. App. 154 (1992). And NC easement law recognizes that the easement holder gets the rights necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement. Shingleton v. N.C. Wildlife Resources Commission, 260 N.C. 451, 457 (1963); Keller v. Cochran, 108 N.C. App. 783, 784 (1993).

Applying those principles, the AG concluded:

• The purpose of dedicating a street terminating at a navigable waterway can only be to provide access to the waterway. The construction of a dock is not inconsistent with the reasonable use and enjoyment of that easement.
• It would make little sense to grant the public access to the bank without granting access to the water itself.
• NC has separately held that the right of access to navigable waters is a property right "analogous . . . to an abutting owner's right of access to highways on land." Gaither v. Hospital, 235 N.C. 431, 445 (1952). That analogy supports treating dedicated water-terminating streets and wharf rights as connected.

The conclusion. Oriental has the right to construct a pier at the end of the dedicated road. The presumption is in the town's favor; it could be overcome only by a specific grant or dedication that clearly excludes the right of water access (as happened in Thies).

Practical implications for NC municipalities.

• Towns and cities with dedicated streets terminating at navigable waters can build piers, docks, public landings, and similar improvements to extend public access into the water.
• The dedicator (or successor in title to the underlying fee) cannot block such construction unless the dedication's terms specifically reserve the wharf right or otherwise exclude water access.
• The opinion does not address regulatory permitting (CAMA permits, ACOE permits, etc.), which are separate questions; it addresses only the ownership/title question.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

NC riparian rights and easement doctrine remain substantially as described in the opinion. NC courts may have addressed the dedicated-street-end question directly since 1995 (the opinion noted there was no NC case at the time); recent case law should be checked. CAMA permitting requirements have evolved significantly. Anyone building a pier from a dedicated street today must comply with current CAMA, federal Section 404 permitting, and any local coastal-management rules.

Common questions

Q: What is a "dedicated street"?
A: A street that was created by a landowner giving the public (typically through a municipality) the right to use a strip of the landowner's property as a public road. The landowner usually keeps fee title to the soil under the street, but the public has an easement for street purposes. Dedications can be by deed, by recorded plat, or by long usage with public acceptance.

Q: What is "wharfing out"?
A: The traditional term for extending an upland-fronting structure (originally just a wharf or landing) out into navigable water. Modern equivalents include constructing a dock, pier, marina, or public boat ramp.

Q: What is a "navigable waterway"?
A: A water body capable of supporting commercial navigation. Definitions vary across federal, state, and local contexts. For the purposes of this opinion, the Neuse River is clearly navigable, so the categorical question of navigability did not need litigating.

Q: I own land next to a dedicated street that ends at the water. Can I block the town from building a pier?
A: Probably not. The 1995 opinion answers that the town has the wharf-out right. Your fee title to the soil under the street is "bare legal title" subject to the public easement, and that easement includes water access. The only narrow window to block construction is if the dedication's terms specifically reserved the wharf right to you (or excluded it from the town). Most dedications don't have that kind of specific language.

Q: What if the dedication is old and the original documents have specific terms?
A: Pull the documents. If the dedication carved out the wharf right, that carve-out could be enforced. Thies v. Howland (Michigan, 1985) is an example where specific terms in the express grant precluded the wharf right. But generic street dedications without specific water-access language follow the implied-right rule.

Q: Does this opinion apply to streets dedicated to private subdivision associations rather than to towns?
A: The opinion focuses on dedications to municipalities. The same easement principles would likely apply to a private subdivision road dedicated to an association, but the analysis would be more fact-specific (what was the dedication's purpose, who accepted it, what are the association's rights). Modern subdivision plat language often addresses these questions explicitly.

Q: Can the town charge for use of the public pier?
A: That is a separate question not addressed in the opinion. Generally, municipalities have authority to manage their public improvements, including charging reasonable fees for use, subject to their charter authority and general municipal-law rules. But the right to build is what the opinion answers.

Background and statutory framework

NC's coast is dotted with old subdivisions and waterfront towns where streets dedicated decades or even a century ago end at navigable rivers, sounds, or the ocean. The legal status of those street ends has been the subject of recurring disputes between municipalities seeking to develop public access (piers, ramps, parks) and adjacent owners or successor-in-title parties who claim the wharf right.

The 1995 opinion is significant because it provides clear AG guidance for the recurring question, even in the absence of direct NC case law. Towns relying on the opinion would be on solid legal footing in building public piers and docks at dedicated street ends, with the risk of challenge limited to fact-specific situations where the original dedication had unusual terms.

The opinion is also a model of careful comparative-law reasoning. NC courts often look to treatises and out-of-state authority when filling gaps in NC doctrine. The AG's tour through Gould, Farnham, the U.S. Supreme Court (Barney v. Keokuk), and several state supreme courts (Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Florida) showed the broad cross-jurisdictional consensus, then applied NC's general easement doctrine to reach the same result.

The opinion connects to the broader NC doctrine of public trust rights in navigable waters. The state holds navigable waters in public trust for public use, including navigation, fishing, and access. Municipalities seeking to extend public access through dedicated streets are acting consistently with that public trust framework, not against it. That alignment helps explain why the AG's reading came out so favorably for the town.

Citations

• In re Protest of Mason, 78 N.C. App. 16, 25 (1985) (NC Court of Appeals; riparian rights include right of access to water and right to build pier or wharf out to navigable water)
• Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876) (U.S. Supreme Court; dedicated street ending at river carries public easement for street purposes and for wharves, landings, and levees)
• McMurray v. Baltimore, 54 Md. 103 (1880) (Maryland Supreme Court; dedication of street extending to water carries implied right of city to extend it into harbor by constructing wharf)
• Backus v. City of Detroit, 49 Mich. 110, 13 N.W. Rep. 380 (1882) (Michigan Supreme Court; Detroit had right to construct wharf from dedicated public way leading to navigable river)
• Jacobs v. Lyon Township, 502 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. App. 1993) (Michigan Court of Appeals; publicly dedicated streets terminating at edge of navigable waters generally provide public access to the water)
• Thies v. Howland, 380 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1985) (Michigan Supreme Court; general rule that city may build wharves at end of public ways terminating at navigable waters, although specific express grant in this case excluded that right)
• Flynn v. Biesel, 102 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1960) (Minnesota Supreme Court; town could erect dock where road terminated at navigable river under common law dedication)
• Lanier v. Jones, 619 So. 2d 387 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1993) (Florida District Court of Appeal; easement owner had right to construct dock where consistent with easement's purposes)
• Shear v. Stevens Building Co., 107 N.C. App. 154 (1992) (NC Court of Appeals; easement by dedication subject to same rules as easements generally)
• Shingleton v. N.C. Wildlife Resources Commission, 260 N.C. 451 (1963) (NC Supreme Court; scope of easement determined by purpose for which granted; servient owners may make any use not inconsistent with reasonable use and enjoyment of easement)
• Keller v. Cochran, 108 N.C. App. 783 (1993) (NC Court of Appeals; easement possessor has all rights necessary to reasonable and proper enjoyment)
• Gaither v. Hospital, 235 N.C. 431, 445 (1952) (NC Supreme Court; right of access to navigable waters is property right analogous to abutting owner's right of access to highways)
• John M. Gould, A Treatise on the Law of Waters (3d ed. 1900)
• Henry Philip Farnham, The Law of Waters and Water Rights (1904)
• Robert E. Beck, ed., Water and Water Rights § 6.01(a) (1991)

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/municipal-corporations-right-to-construct-docks-or-piers-at-dedicated-street-ends/

Original opinion text

June 19, 1995

Mr. Ben Hollowell
Town Attorney
Town of Oriental
P.O. Box 218
Bayboro, North Carolina 28515

RE: Advisory Opinion; Municipal Corporations/Right to Construct Docks or Piers at Dedicated Street Ends.

Dear Mr. Hollowell,

You contacted our office recently to request an opinion concerning ownership of the right to construct a pier where the city of Oriental has a dedicated easement terminating at the Neuse River, a navigable waterway. We hope that this letter will answer your question.

I. Introduction

In North Carolina, courts recognize that there are various rights which attach to property on public waters. These rights include "[t]he right of access to the water . . . [and t]he right to build a pier or wharf out to the navigable water . . . ." In re Protest of Mason, 78 N.C. App. 16, 25 (1985) (quoting from Lewis, Eminent Domain § 83); see also Robert E. Beck, ed., Water and Water Rights § 6.01(a) (1991) (explaining that riparian rights consist of a bundle of rights, including the right of access and the right to build a wharf).

With regard to the right to construct a pier, however, an interesting question arises when a street leading to a navigable waterway is dedicated to a municipality for public use. In this situation, there are two possible options: (1) the dedicator retains the right to build a pier; or (2) the town which has accepted the dedication has that right. While there is no case law on this precise issue from North Carolina, the weight of authority provides that the town may construct a pier in order to exercise its right of access.

II. The town has the right to build a pier

As a starting point, two leading authorities believe that the city or town to which the road has been dedicated possesses the right to build a wharf or pier. First, one author states: When a way in a city extends to navigable waters, and is dedicated to the public use as a street, it carries with it, by necessary implication, the right of the city to extend it into the water by the construction of a wharf at the end thereof.

John M. Gould, Treatise on the Law of Waters 201 (3d ed. 1900). Similarly, another scholar has noted that:

A public road laid out to a water way becomes a public landing at its termination, and piers at the ends of such streets are mere extensions of the highway the title to which is vested in the public.

Henry Philip Farnham, The Law of Waters and Water Rights 674 (1904).

In support of these statements, Farnham and Gould relied on several nineteenth century cases. For example, in Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 340 (1876), a fee owner argued that he had dedicated property to the city for a street only, not for a wharf. The United States Supreme Court began by stating its belief that the dedication of the street was at common law, and by agreeing with the lower court that when they made the dedication the owners reserved title to the soil in the street. Id. at 336. The Court then noted that the title of the grantor "was bare legal title, subject to the public easement and use, not only for street purposes, but for the purposes of wharves, landings and levees." Id. at 339-40. Such a street "must be regarded as intended to be used for the purposes of access to the river, and the usual accommodations of navigation in such a connection." Id. at 340. The Court quoted with approval the language of the court below, the Iowa Supreme Court, which believed that to accept the landowner's argument would be to take "a very narrow and close view." Id.

Additionally, in McMurray v. Baltimore, 54 Md. 103 (1880), the Maryland Supreme Court determined that "the dedication of [a] street to the public use as a street extending to the water, carried with it by necessary implication, the right of the city to extend it into the harbor by the construction of a wharf at the end thereof." Id. at 112. The court "entertain[ed] no doubt of the right of the city to construct the wharf . . . ." Id. Similarly, in Backus v. City of Detroit, 49 Mich. 110, 13 N.W. Rep. 380 (1882), the Michigan Supreme Court found that Detroit had a right to construct a wharf from a dedicated public way which led to a navigable river.

Several modern cases lend additional support to the argument that the city to which a street easement is dedicated also has the right to construct a wharf. For example, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that "[p]ublicly dedicated streets that terminate at the edge of navigable waters are generally deemed to provide public access to the water." Jacobs v. Lyon Township, 502 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. App. 1993), appeal denied, 512 N.W.2d 834 (1994). The court grounded this decision in its belief that a street terminating at the edge of a navigable waterway carried a "presumption that the platter intended to give access to the water and permit the building of structures to aid in that access." Id. In another Michigan case, Thies v. Howland, 380 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1985), the Michigan Supreme Court considered whether a city had the right to construct a wharf at the end of an easement. The court found that the city could not do so because the easement was created by an express grant which had very specific provisions and did not include the right to construct a wharf. However, the court noted that:

Public ways which terminate at the edge of navigable waters are generally deemed to provide public access to the water. A city, on behalf of its citizens, is entitled to build wharves at the end of such streets to aid the public's access. Id. at 470 (citations omitted). The court further noted that the right to build a wharf in such a situation does not depend on whether the public owns the fee in the way. Id.

Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that a town could erect a dock where a road terminated at a navigable river. Flynn v. Biesel, 102 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1960). The road had been established by common law dedication of an easement. Id. at 292. In support of its holding, that court quoted from a Pennsylvania case as follows:

Where one road commences or terminates at another road, it is intended to furnish a passage from and to that other, and the same rule applies to a road terminating at a navigable river. This road, terminating at such a river, is intended as a means of public communication between the river and the country adjoining. Id. at 290 (quoting Balliet v. Commonwealth, 17 Pa. 509, 513).

Finally, at least one Florida court has found that the owner of an easement which reached a navigable waterway had the right to construct a dock. Lanier v. Jones, 619 So. 2d 387 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1993) (en banc). The court noted that "[i]nsofar as riparian rights are necessary to or consistent with the purposes of the easement, they are impliedly granted to appellees and, as a corollary, reserved from the appellant fee owners." Id. at 388 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). However, in order to show that the dock was necessary for or consistent with enjoyment of the easement, the Florida court found it relevant that neighboring landowners had docks. Id. at 388. Applying the reasoning above, we believe it is clear that the town of Oriental has the right to construct a wharf at the end of the dedicated road. Essentially, the dedication of a road which leads to the bank of a navigable waterway carries with it "by necessary implication" the right to construct a wharf. Stated differently, the public way which ends at a navigable waterway carries a presumption that the town may construct a means of access to the water. This presumption can be overcome only if there is a specific grant of the dedication which clearly does not include the right of access to the water, as was found in Thies.

III. North Carolina Law

While other jurisdictions seem to be unanimous in their view that the recipient of the dedication may wharf out, no North Carolina court has addressed the question. However, applying our case law on dedication and easements, it is likely that North Carolina courts would find that the city has the right to construct a pier.

Initially, an easement by dedication is subject to the same rules of law that apply to easements in general. See Patrick Hetrick, Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina 616 (4th ed. 1994); Shear v. Stevens Building Co., 107 N.C. App. 154 (1992) (applying general easement rules to a controversy involving an implied dedication). Applying rules concerning the scope of easements, a North Carolina court would find that the town may construct a wharf.

In Shingleton v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, 260 N.C. 451 (1963), the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the scope of an easement for ingress and egress. In that case, the court stated that when deciding the scope of an easement "consideration must be given to the purposes for which the easement was granted. The owners of the servient estate may make any use of their property and road not inconsistent with the reasonable use and enjoyment of the easement granted." Id. at 457 (citations omitted); see also Keller v. Cochran, 108 N.C. App. 783, 784 (1993) ("In North Carolina, it is an established principle that the possessor of an easement has all the rights that are necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of that easement"); Hetrick, supra, at 634 (if there is no express guidance as to the scope of an easement, a reasonable use is implied). Additionally, the court noted that the reasonable use and enjoyment of an easement is to be determined "in light of the situation of the property and the surrounding circumstances." Shingleton, 260 N.C. at 457.

Following the reasoning in Shingleton, the court would find that the purpose of the dedication in Oriental could only be to provide access to the waterway. Therefore, the construction of a dock is "not inconsistent with the reasonable use and enjoyment of the easement granted." Shingleton, 260 N.C. at 457. It would make little sense to grant the public access to the bank of the water without granting access to the water itself.

Finally, the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that the right of access to navigable waters is a property right, "analogous . . . to an abutting owner's right of access to highways on land." Gaither v. Hospital, 235 N.C. 431, 445 (1952). The Minnesota Supreme Court used this same analogy to justify its conclusion that a town could build a dock where a road terminated at a navigable waterway. Flynn, 102 N.W.2d at 290, discussed supra. Therefore, a North Carolina court would find that this reasoning supports the view that construction of the dock is consistent with, or perhaps even necessary for, the reasonable use and enjoyment of the dedication.

IV. Conclusion

In order to remain consistent with North Carolina law and with the law of other jurisdictions, it is our opinion that a court would find that the town of Oriental has the right to construct a pier at the end of a dedicated road which terminates at a navigable river.

We hope that this letter answers your inquiry regarding the town's right to construct a pier. If you have any questions about this matter, please call Allen Jernigan [(919) 733-7247].

Daniel C. Oakley
Senior Deputy Attorney General

J. Allen Jernigan
Special Deputy Attorney General

Paul Gormley
Associate Attorney General