Under North Carolina's state-law definition of 'handicapped person' in Chapter 168, did substance abuse count as a handicap, so that a substance-abuse halfway house would qualify as a protected 'family care home' under § 168-21(1)?

Substance Abuse and North Carolina's Family Care Home Definition (NC AG, March 14, 1995)

Plain-English summary

The surviving portion of this opinion concludes that substance abuse is not a handicapping condition under G.S. 168-21(2) and that a substance abuse halfway house therefore does not qualify as a family care home under G.S. 168-21(1). The stored original text begins partway through the analysis, so the opening request and any earlier reasoning are unavailable here.

The AG said it found no medical or legal authority for treating substance abuse as the kind of present, non-correctible loss of function described by the statute. It compared substance abuse with the conditions enumerated in G.S. 168-21(2) and said substance abuse did not necessarily involve an uncorrectable condition, a loss of body function, or a substantial impairment of normal functioning. The opinion also discussed other protections in Chapter 168 as context for interpreting the family care home provision.

The opinion expressly limits itself to the cited North Carolina statutes. It says it does not include any federal law or regulation that might apply to substance abusers, giving the Fair Housing Act as an example. It does not decide whether a municipality could exclude a particular halfway house from a residential district or whether federal law would affect that question.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995, and the stored text is missing its opening. Check the full source and current state and federal law before relying on it for a present housing or zoning decision.

Background and statutory framework

The surviving text describes G.S. 168-1 et seq. as a remedial statute to be construed liberally for cases within its intended scope. It also says statutory words must be read in context and compared with the other provisions. The AG identified the enumerated conditions in G.S. 168-21(2), compared them with substance abuse, and concluded substance abuse did not fit the definition. That conclusion was the basis for its family care home answer under G.S. 168-21(1).

Common questions

Q: Did the AG classify a substance abuse halfway house as a family care home under the cited North Carolina statute?
A: No. The surviving text expressly says such a halfway house would not qualify under G.S. 168-21(1) because substance abuse was not a handicapping condition under G.S. 168-21(2).

Q: Did this opinion authorize local officials to zone halfway houses out of residential neighborhoods?
A: It did not answer that question. Its conclusion concerns family care home status under the cited state statutes. The stored text contains no ruling on a particular local zoning ordinance.

Q: Did the AG decide how the Fair Housing Act applied?
A: No. The opinion expressly excludes federal law from its analysis and names the Fair Housing Act as an example of law it did not address.

Q: Does the stored original text contain the whole opinion?
A: No. It begins with numbered examples from cases and lacks the opinion's opening. The missing text should be checked against the official source when it becomes available.

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/whether-substance-abuse-is-included-in-definition-of-handicapped-person/

Citations

• G.S. 168-21(2)
• G.S. 168-21(1)
• Pressman v. University of North Carolina, 78 N.C App 296, 337 S.E.2d 644(1985)
• GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979)
• In Re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978)
• Underwood v Howland, Commr. of Motor Vehicles, 274 N.C. 473, 164 S.E.2d 2 (1968)

Original opinion text

• (1) a person suffering glaucoma, who has 20/20 vision with eyeglasses, is not handicapped. Burgess, 528.
• (2) a person suffering from occasional episodes of stress, depression and mental exhaustion did not have a mental disability, and thus was not a handicapped person. Pressman v. University of North Carolina, 78 N.C App 296, 337 S.E.2d 644(1985).
• (3) people suffering pulmonary problems and all people who are harmed or irritated by tobacco smoke are not handicapped persons. GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979).

We find no medical legal authority to include substance abuse as a present, non-correctible loss of function which substantially impairs a person's ability to function. Therefore, our opinion is that substance abuse is not a handicapping condition under G.S. 168-21(2). Accordingly, it also is our opinion that a substance abuse halfway house would not qualify as a family care home under G.S. 168-21(1).

We recognize that G.S. 168-1 et seq. is a remedial statute which should be construed liberally in a manner which assures fulfillment of the beneficial goals for which it was enacted and which brings within it all cases fairly falling within its intended scope. Burgess, supra. However, the words and phrases of a statute must be interpreted contextually, in a manner which harmonizes with the other provisions of the statute and which gives effect to the reason and purpose of the statute. In Re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978); Underwood v Howland, Commr. of Motor Vehicles, 274 N.C. 473, 164 S.E.2d 2 (1968).

When looking at the enumerated handicaps in G.S. 168-21(2), there appears to be a contextual dissonance with substance abuse. Compare substance abuse with "mental retardation, cerebal palsy, epilepsy, autism, hearing and sight impairments, emotional disturbances and orthopedic impairments but not including mentally ill persons who are dangerous to others as defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)b." These latter conditions meet the requirements of a present, non-correctible loss of body function, which substantially impairs a person's ability to function normally. Substance abuse is not necessarily a condition which is non-correctible, includes a loss of body function, or which substantially impairs a person's ability to function normally.

Looking at the other areas of statutory protection for handicapped persons under G.S. 168-1 et seq., we see rights of access to and use of public places, G.S. 168-2; rights to use public conveyances, G.S. 168-3; rights to habilitation and rehabilitation services, G.S. 168-8; rights to housing, G.S. 168-9; rights to equal treatment and consideration in accident and health insurance coverage, G.S. 168-10. While these sections are not directly connected with family care homes under Article 3, they are under Chapter 168, so they provide a contextual backdrop for the entire Chapter and some additional guidance on whether the legislature intended to include substance abuse as a handicapping condition.

This opinion is limited to analysis of the North Carolina statutes cited, and does not include any federal laws or regulations which may apply to substance abusers (e.g. The Fair Housing Act).

Please do not hesitate to contact us for clarification or additional questions on this matter.

Ann Reed
Senior Deputy Attorney General

Bruce S. Ambrose
Associate Attorney General