Does North Carolina's RICO Act treat federal currency-structuring violations (breaking up cash deposits to dodge the $10,000 bank reporting rule) as 'money laundering' activity?
Plain-English summary
The question was about the scope of NC's civil RICO statute. NC Gen. Stat. § 75D-3(c) defines "racketeering activity" to include violations of NC controlled-substance laws, certain Chapter 14 offenses, "[a]ny conduct involved in a 'money laundering' activity," and conduct in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The Act does not define "money laundering." NC's appellate courts had not interpreted the phrase. The specific question presented: does "money laundering activity" reach structuring a currency transaction in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), the federal anti-structuring provision designed to stop people from breaking large cash transactions into sub-$10,000 chunks to evade the Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirement?
Senior Deputy AG Edwin M. Speas, Jr. and Special Deputy W. Dale Talbert said yes. Their analysis ran through standard NC statutory-construction rules:
Remedial statute, liberal construction. § 75D-2(b) declares the legislative purpose of NC RICO: deter organized unlawful activity, prevent unjust enrichment, restore proceeds to the general economy, compensate injured private persons. The AG read this as identifying NC RICO as a remedial civil-forfeiture statute, which under Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236 (1973) and Wilmington Shipyard v. State Highway Commission, 6 N.C. App. 649 (1970), must be construed liberally to bring all cases fairly within the intended scope. Constructions that defeat or impair the object of a remedial Act must be avoided per State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76 (1975).
Ordinary meaning of "money laundering." Under Sellers v. Refrigerators, 283 N.C. 79 (1973), and Cab Company v. Charlotte, 234 N.C. 572 (1951), undefined statutory terms take their ordinary meaning unless context indicates otherwise. The AG defined "money laundering" by its ordinary meaning: "a financial transaction conducted for the purpose of concealing the source or ownership of the proceeds used in the transaction." Currency structuring fits this definition because the effect (and often the purpose) of structuring is to conceal the source or ownership of the proceeds.
The "any conduct involved in" qualifier. § 75D-3(c)(1)c uses the phrase "[a]ny conduct involved in a 'money laundering' activity," not just "money laundering." Under In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90 (1978), and State v. Williams, 286 N.C. 422 (1975), every word of a statute should be given effect. "[A]ny conduct involved in" was deliberate: the legislature was capturing not just laundering itself but conduct connected to laundering. Currency structuring is conduct directly related to laundering even when the underlying transaction is not itself a laundering offense. So § 75D-3(c)(1)c reaches structuring.
The federal-court caveat. The opinion closed with an important limit: the AG could not opine on whether a federal court would adopt this reading in a federal forfeiture proceeding. The opinion controls only NC's own RICO Act analysis. Federal prosecutors and federal forfeiture courts apply their own law.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1993. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. NC RICO has been amended since 1993, and the federal currency-structuring framework in 31 U.S.C. § 5324 has been substantially revised, including changes by the Ratzlaf v. United States (1994) line of cases on willfulness and statutory amendments responding to that case law. NC appellate courts may also have addressed the meaning of "money laundering" in the intervening decades. Anyone analyzing a current NC RICO predicate offense should check current statutes and case law rather than relying on this 1993 opinion.
Background and statutory framework
NC's RICO Act, codified in Chapter 75D, was enacted in 1986 modeled on the federal RICO statute. Unlike federal RICO, NC RICO is purely civil; it provides civil forfeiture, treble damages, and injunctive relief without a parallel criminal racketeering offense. The "racketeering activity" definition in § 75D-3(c) lists predicate offenses that trigger NC RICO jurisdiction.
The "money laundering" entry in § 75D-3(c)(1)c is a standalone subparagraph that does not name a specific statutory provision. This made the scope question both important and ambiguous. The AG's 1993 reading expanded the reach of NC RICO to cover federal currency-structuring violations as predicate offenses, even though structuring itself is not technically "money laundering" in narrow federal terminology.
The federal currency-structuring statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5324, prohibits structuring a financial transaction with the purpose of evading the Bank Secrecy Act's currency transaction reporting requirements. Structuring is conceptually adjacent to money laundering: laundering moves dirty money through legitimate-looking transactions to obscure its source; structuring moves money in chunks below the reporting threshold to keep it off regulatory records. Both serve a concealment function, but they are technically different offenses.
Common questions
Why was this question asked of the NC AG and not a federal AG?
NC RICO is a state civil-forfeiture statute. State prosecutors and state plaintiffs need to know whether a defendant's federal currency-structuring violation can serve as a predicate offense for an NC RICO action. The state AG is the authoritative source for that question of state-law interpretation. A federal AG opinion would not bind NC's RICO interpretation.
What does this opinion say about federal court forfeiture proceedings?
It explicitly does not bind them. The AG noted: "whether a federal court has the duty or authority to follow our guidance on this issue in a federal forfeiture proceeding is a question upon which this office cannot and should not render an opinion." A federal court applying NC RICO under supplemental jurisdiction might find the opinion persuasive, but the opinion does not purport to decide federal RICO or federal forfeiture questions.
What did the AG mean by "conduct involved in" money laundering?
The phrase was central. § 75D-3(c)(1)c says "[a]ny conduct involved in a 'money laundering' activity," not just "money laundering activity" itself. The AG read "involved in" as a deliberate expansion meant to capture conduct that is connected to laundering even when the conduct itself is not technically a laundering offense. Structuring fits because it serves the same concealment function and frequently appears as a step in a laundering scheme.
Does this mean every structuring case in NC is a RICO case?
No. NC RICO requires more than a single predicate offense. The statute requires a "pattern" of racketeering activity, typically meaning multiple acts within a time period and a connection among them. A single structuring violation is not enough to trigger NC RICO; the structuring would have to be part of a broader pattern. The 1993 opinion answers only the predicate-offense question.
How is structuring different from money laundering?
Money laundering (under classical federal definitions in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957) involves financial transactions with proceeds of specified unlawful activity, designed to conceal the source. Structuring (31 U.S.C. § 5324) involves breaking up transactions to evade Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements; the source of the funds need not be itself illegal. The conduct is different even though the goal (avoiding scrutiny) overlaps.
Was the AG's reading challenged?
The opinion is by its nature non-binding (AG opinions are persuasive authority, not precedent). Whether NC appellate courts have endorsed or modified this reading in the years since 1993 is a separate question. Anyone relying on the reading in 2026 should check whether NC appellate decisions have addressed it.
Source
Citations
- N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75D-2(b)
- N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75D-3(c)
- N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75D-3(c)(1)c
- 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
- 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3)
- Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electrical Co., 328 N.C. 651, 403 S.E.2d 291 (1991)
- Hunt v. Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 275 S.E.2d 399 (1981)
- Puckett v. Sellars, 235 N.C. 264, 69 S.E.2d 497 (1952)
- Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236, 200 S.E.2d 40 (1973)
- Wilmington Shipyard v. State Highway Commission, 6 N.C. App. 649, 171 S.E.2d 222 (1970)
- State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213 S.E.2d 291 (1975)
- Sellers v. Refrigerators, Inc., 283 N.C. 79, 194 S.E.2d 817 (1973)
- Cab Company v. Charlotte, 234 N.C. 572, 68 S.E.2d 433 (1951)
- In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978)
- In re Hickerson, 235 N.C. 716, 71 S.E.2d 129 (1952)
- State v. Williams, 286 N.C. 422, 212 S.E.2d 113 (1975)
Original opinion text
Best-effort transcription from a scrape that omitted the salutation, addressee block, and opening paragraphs. The linked NCDOJ page is authoritative for the full original.
- a. Article 5 of Chapter 90 of the General Statutes of North Carolina relating to controlled substances and counterfeit controlled substances;
- b. Chapter 14 of the General Statutes of North Carolina except . . . .
- c. Any conduct involved in a "money laundering" activity; and
(2) "Racketeering activity" also includes the description in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1961(1).
G.S. 75D-3(c) (1986). The phrase "'money laundering' activity", is not defined further in the North Carolina RICO Act, nor has it been interpreted in the reported decisions of the appellate courts of this state. It is therefore a matter of statutory interpretation as to whether the term incorporates structuring a currency transaction in violation of federal law.
The primary principle of statutory construction is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature in enacting the law, the legislative intent, is accomplished. Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electrical Co., 328 N.C. 651, 403 S.E.2d 291 (1991); Hunt v. Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 275 S.E.2d 399 (1981). To determine the legislative intent, the purpose of a statute and the evils it was designed to remedy may be considered. Puckett v. Sellars, 235 N.C. 264, 69 S.E.2d 497 (1952). The North Carolina RICO Act contains the following statement of legislative purpose and intent.
The General Assembly declares that the purpose and intent of this Chapter is: to deter organized unlawful activity by imposing civil equitable sanctions against this subversion of the economy by organized unlawful elements; to prevent the unjust enrichment of those engaged in organized unlawful activity; to restore to the general economy of the State all proceeds, money, profits, and property both real and personal of every kind and description which is owned, used or acquired through organized unlawful activity. . . ; and to provide compensation to private persons injured by organized unlawful activity.
G.S. 75D-2(b) (1986). This language clearly reflects the legislature's intent to create a remedial civil forfeiture statute designed to deter a broad range of organized unlawful activity. The RICO Act, being remedial, should be construed liberally in a manner which assures fulfillment of the beneficial goals for which it was enacted and which brings within it all cases fairly falling within its intended scope. Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236, 200 S.E.2d 40 (1973); Wilmington Shipyard v. State Highway Commission, 6 N.C. App. 649, 171 S.E.2d 222 (1970). A construction which operates to defeat or impair the object of the RICO Act must be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language. State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213 S.E.2d 291 (1975).
The phrase "'money laundering' activity" is ambiguous and susceptible to a wide range of meaning. However, application of the standard principles of statutory construction leads us to conclude the legislature intended the phrase to include structuring a currency transaction in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3).
It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that where the words of a statute have not acquired a technical meaning, their common and ordinary meaning prevails unless a different meaning is apparent or definitely indicated by the context. Sellers v. Refrigerators, Inc., 283 N.C. 79, 194 S.E.2d 817 (1973); Cab Company v. Charlotte, 234 N.C. 572, 68 S.E.2d 433 (1951). The phrase "'money laundering' activity" has not acquired a technical meaning in this state because the offense is not recognized under North Carolina law. However, its ordinary and commonly accepted meaning is a financial transaction conducted for the purpose of concealing the source or ownership of the proceeds used in the transaction. Given the broad scope and remedial purpose of the RICO Act, structuring a currency transaction in violation of federal law reasonably is encompassed within the ordinary meaning of the phrase "'money laundering' activity". This is so because the effect, and possibly the purpose, of structuring is to conceal the source or ownership of the proceeds used in the financial transaction.
Our conclusion also is supported by the rules of construction that statutory language must be interpreted contextually in a manner which harmonizes with the other provisions of the statute and that subsections of the same statute are to be construed together as a whole with every part being given effect. In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978); In re Hickerson, 235 N.C. 716, 71 S.E.2d 129 (1952). It also is supported by the presumptions that the legislature inserted every part of a provision for a purpose and that no part is redundant. State v. Williams, 286 N.C. 422, 212 S.E.2d 113 (1975). "[S]ignificance and effect should, if possible, . . . be accorded every part of the act, including every section, paragraph, sentence or clause, and word." Id. at 432. Here, the two subparagraphs preceding the one under consideration bring within the definition of "racketeering activity" specified unlawful activity in violation of the State's criminal law. The separate subparagraph in which the phrase under consideration is found reads "[a]ny conduct involved in a 'money laundering' activity." G.S. 75D-3(c)(1)c (Emphasis added.) Application of the aforesaid principles of statutory construction leads us to conclude that the legislature intended the language of G.S. 75D-3(c)(1)c to include within its scope not only the specified unlawful activity of "money laundering", but any other conduct directly related to that activity. Again, structuring a currency transaction in violation of federal law reasonably is included within the meaning of "[a]ny conduct involved in a 'money laundering' activity" notwithstanding the absence of a specified unlawful activity. Any other interpretation would defeat or impair the object of the RICO Act.
We are pleased to provide this advisory opinion to you. However, whether a federal court has the duty or authority to follow our guidance on this issue in a federal forfeiture proceeding is a question upon which this office cannot and should not render an opinion.
Edwin M. Speas, Jr.
Senior Deputy Attorney General
W. Dale Talbert
Special Deputy Attorney General