When bags of medical refuse and other trash wash up on North Carolina beaches, what state and federal laws can be used to stop the dumping, prosecute the dumpers, and recover cleanup costs, and how far out into the Atlantic does North Carolina's regulatory authority reach?
Plain-English summary
In early August 1988, bags of medical refuse and other discarded material washed ashore in Carteret County, North Carolina. The U.S. Navy eventually confirmed the debris was linked to Navy vessels and helped with cleanup. But the incident exposed regulatory gaps. Lieutenant Governor Robert B. Jordan III asked the AG to map out who could prohibit ocean dumping of waste in NC waters, who could recover cleanup costs, and what authority NC had over dumping that occurred beyond NC's three-mile territorial sea but ended up washing onto NC beaches.
The AG's 1988 opinion is a comprehensive layered-jurisdiction analysis. The short answer is that NC has multiple overlapping prohibitions inside three miles, federal authority dominates from three miles outward, and no single agency owns the whole problem.
Inside the three-mile territorial sea. Several NC statutes apply:
- N.C.G.S. § 76-40(a) makes it a criminal misdemeanor (fine up to $500 or six months in jail) to place, deposit, leave, or cause to be deposited any trash, refuse, garbage, debris, scrapped vehicles, or similar waste material in any navigable waters of the State. Enforced by what was then the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (DNRCD).
- N.C.G.S. § 75A-10(c) is a parallel prohibition keyed to whether the dumping renders the waters "unsightly, noxious or otherwise unwholesome." Wildlife protectors and other law enforcement officers can enforce it, including stopping and inspecting vessels under N.C.G.S. § 75A-17(a). Up to $250 fine for misdemeanor violations.
- N.C.G.S. § 143-214.2(c) is the cleaner one: "Unless permitted by a rule of the [Environmental Management] Commission, the discharge of wastes, including thermal discharges, to the open waters of the Atlantic Ocean over which the State has jurisdiction is prohibited." This is a blanket prohibition. Civil penalties up to $10,000/day; criminal penalties up to $15,000/day or six months in jail; injunctive relief available. The interpretive question the AG flagged is whether "discharge" extends to placing solid objects in the water; the term has traditionally been read narrowly to mean liquid effluent. The AG suggested the EMC could clarify by construing § 143-214.2(c) as an absolute prohibition on solid waste introduction.
- N.C.G.S. § 14-399 is the general littering statute, which applies to littering "in the waters of this State."
- N.C.G.S. § 130A-290 et seq. (Solid Waste Management Article 9) regulates land-based solid waste, and once dumped material washes ashore it falls under the Department of Human Resources solid waste rules (10 NCAC 10G). Infectious waste (cultures, blood, pathological waste) has its own treatment-before-disposal requirements. Hazardous waste violations get up to $10,000/day penalties under N.C.G.S. § 130A-22.
- N.C.G.S. § 143-215.75 (Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Control Act) applies to hazardous-substance discharges to waters under State jurisdiction, with cleanup-and-damages liability.
- Public nuisance at common law remains a backstop. The AG can sue in parens patriae for an injunction and resource damages.
Between three and twelve miles. Beyond the three-mile territorial sea, NC has no inherent regulatory authority. The Ocean Dumping Act (administered by EPA) defines federal authority out to twelve nautical miles. EPA can authorize states to apply additional criteria to transportation-for-dumping in that zone if the dumping may affect waters within the State's jurisdiction, but only with EPA approval and only if state standards are at least as stringent as EPA's. Inside that zone, blanket NC statutory prohibitions like § 76-40(a) continue to operate; the federal Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act, as amended by the 1986 Studds-Jones amendment, was specifically clarified to preserve state authority against preemption.
Beyond twelve miles, or for ship-generated garbage anywhere. The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, implementing MARPOL 73/78, controls. The MARPOL Annex V framework was ratified by Congress in 1987 and became effective January 1, 1988. Plastics may not be disposed anywhere out to 200 miles (the Exclusive Economic Zone); other waste disposed between three and twelve miles must be ground or comminuted. Navy and other military ships were exempt for five years from MARPOL implementation. The State has standing to enforce MARPOL provisions under 33 U.S.C. § 1910 if the Secretary of the Navy fails to act after notice.
Cleanup-cost recovery. When the responsible party is a private ship operator, recovery typically goes through admiralty court, which can stay other suits. The Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 caps liability at the value of the vessel plus freight charges for accidental spills, but not for deliberate dumping or unreasonable negligence in design or operation. State statutes allowing recovery of cleanup costs survived preemption challenge in Askew v. American Waterways Operator, 411 U.S. 325 (1973). Private cleanup costs are typically only recoverable by commercial fishermen under maritime tort law (M/V TEST BANK, Pruitt v. Allied Chemical).
Enforcement responsibility. Inside three miles, NC's authority is split among the Department of Human Resources (solid waste after it comes ashore), DNRCD (ocean discharges, hazardous substances), and law enforcement (criminal littering and dumping). The AG noted that "no single state agency has comprehensive responsibility for ocean affairs."
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1988. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. The Department of Human Resources and DNRCD have been reorganized; current responsibility is split among the NC Department of Environmental Quality, the NC Department of Health and Human Services, and the Wildlife Resources Commission. MARPOL Annex V was amended substantially in 2013 (effective 2014) to broaden the prohibition on at-sea garbage disposal. The Ocean Dumping Act has been amended multiple times, and federal jurisdiction over the Exclusive Economic Zone was further clarified by the 1988 Ocean Dumping Ban Act and subsequent legislation. The cap in the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 has also been modified by later federal statutes.
Background and statutory framework
The 1988 incident in Carteret County happened against a national backdrop of growing concern about ocean dumping. Major hospital-waste washups occurred on East Coast beaches that summer, and Congress was actively legislating. The Marine Plastic Pollution Research and Control Act of 1987 had just ratified MARPOL Annex V. The Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988 was about to pass.
NC's framework had developed in pieces over decades. The criminal-littering statutes (§ 76-40, § 75A-10, § 14-399) come from a pre-environmental-regulation era when "in the waters" was understood mostly as a freshwater concept. The discharge-permitting framework (§ 143-214.2 and the EMC rules at 15 NCAC 2H) came from the Clean Water Act federal-cooperative era and was built for effluent pipes, not floating debris. The solid-waste statutes (§ 130A-290 et seq.) were built for landfills, not the ocean. So when the medical refuse came ashore, the AG had to identify which fragment of NC law applied to each link of the chain (dumping, transport, washup, cleanup, recovery).
The federal layer added complexity. The Ocean Dumping Act (Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act) governs transportation-for-the-purpose-of-dumping. The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, implementing MARPOL, governs operational discharges from ships during normal operation. The Clean Water Act governs point-source effluent. Each carries its own preemption logic, and Congress had to clarify in the 1986 Studds-Jones amendment that state law was not preempted by the Ocean Dumping Act.
Liability law was where it got really messy. Admiralty courts cap shipowner liability for accidental spills, define damages narrowly (often only to commercial fishermen), and stay parallel suits. The State has parens patriae standing to sue for resource damages and cleanup costs, but private parties (county governments, local businesses) often have no remedy at all. The AG flagged this asymmetry as a structural feature of the system, not something the State could fix unilaterally.
The opinion's practical guidance for prosecutors and environmental enforcers was: pick your statute based on the type of waste and the location of the act. For trash dumped within three miles, use § 76-40(a). For waste rendering waters unwholesome, add § 75A-10(c). For hazardous substances, layer in § 143-215.75. For washed-ashore waste, the solid-waste regulators take over under Chapter 130A. For cleanup costs from spills, use parens patriae nuisance suits in admiralty court. For dumping beyond three miles where the State has no enforcement reach, ask EPA to act under MARPOL or the Ocean Dumping Act.
Common questions
Could North Carolina prosecute a foreign-flagged ship that dumped medical waste 50 miles offshore?
Directly, no. NC's jurisdiction stops at three miles. Beyond that, federal statutes (the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, the Ocean Dumping Act) and admiralty jurisdiction govern. NC could potentially file suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1910 if the federal government failed to act after notice, but the proceeding would be in federal court applying federal law.
What was the role of public nuisance law if the statutory framework was already so dense?
Two main roles. First, it filled gaps: where statutes did not clearly apply to a particular fact pattern, common-law nuisance could still ground an action. Second, it gave the AG parens patriae standing to seek cleanup orders, abatement, and resource damages on behalf of the State's citizens, even when individual citizens lacked statutory remedies. The AG could go into court as the public's guardian, not just as the State's lawyer.
Why did the AG suggest construing § 143-214.2(c) as an absolute prohibition on solid waste in the ocean?
Because the statute's term "discharge" was being read narrowly to mean liquid effluent (consistent with the rule at 15 NCAC 2B .0202(6)). That narrow reading left solid waste (medical refuse, plastic, debris) outside DNRCD's water-quality enforcement program. The AG suggested that broadening the construction would close the gap. The legislative or rulemaking fix was for the EMC; the AG could only flag the interpretive choice.
What was the Studds-Jones amendment, and why did it matter?
It was a 1986 amendment to the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, sponsored by Reps. Gerry Studds and Walter Jones of North Carolina. Its purpose was to settle the preemption debate by establishing a general rule that state laws, standards, and limitations are not preempted by the federal Ocean Dumping Act. Where state and federal law potentially conflicted under 33 U.S.C. § 1416(d), the amendment created a "presumption against preemption" that required narrow construction of federal preemption claims. For NC, this meant § 76-40(a), § 75A-10(c), and § 143-214.2(c) all survived federal scrutiny within the three-mile zone.
Source
Citations
- N.C.G.S. § 76-40(a), § 75A-10(c), § 143-214.2(c), § 130A-290 et seq., § 130A-22, § 130A-303, § 143-215.75 et seq., § 141-6, § 14-399, § 113-131
- Ocean Dumping Act (Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.
- Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.
- Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
- MARPOL 73/78, Annex V
- Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. § 183
- Askew v. American Waterways Operator, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973)
- Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TEST BANK, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)
- Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981)
- Wilcher v. Sharpe, 236 N.C. 308 (1952)
Original opinion text
Requested By:
Lieutenant Governor Robert B. Jordan, III
Questions:
(1) Do the North Carolina General Statutes specifically prohibit the dumping of waste materials such as bags of medical refuse, especially that which may be hazardous or infectious, into the Atlantic Ocean?
(2) Are other forms of ocean dumping or the introduction of other pollutants in coastal waters currently prohibited?
(3) What authority does North Carolina have with respect to the dumping of such waste which occurs beyond North Carolina waters and which results in wastes entering our waters or being deposited on our shores?
(4) To the extent any laws apply to such events, which state departments are responsible for enforcing such laws?
Conclusions:
(1) Yes. If the waste materials were dumped within three miles of the Atlantic seashore, there are several North Carolina statutes which will have varying degrees of applicability, depending on the type of waste involved, the method of introduction to the waters, and the health and environmental effects of the action. There is also a probability that the action will result in a public nuisance, under common law. Once the waste materials wash ashore, the provisions of the State's waste management program would apply. The impact of various federal programs must also be considered.
(2) Yes.
(3) Jurisdictional ambiguities prevent a specific answer to this question, but North Carolina would generally attempt to apply its laws regardless of the point of origin of the wastes. The State's authority again varies depending on the waste and the activity involved. The State may seek significant authority from EPA under the federal Ocean Dumping Act to regulate the transportation of waste for dumping; but for events involving the disposal of ship-generated garbage beyond the three mile territorial sea, the State is limited to the recovery of clean-up costs and damages.
(4) The specific North Carolina departments with enforcement authority are delineated in the discussion of applicable laws. No single state agency has comprehensive responsibility for ocean affairs, including activities discussed in this opinion.
During the first few days of August, 1988, bags of medical refuse and other discarded material washed ashore in Carteret County. At the time of this writing, the U.S. Navy has confirmed that the debris is linked to Navy vessels and it has cooperated in the investigation and cleanup of the incident. However, the early phases of discovery and response to the incident revealed possible regulatory gaps in the State's health and environmental protection programs which should be clarified. While your questions were triggered by the specific Carteret County events, they may be more completely analyzed from a general perspective, which this opinion attempts. The special problems encountered when the party responsible for the discharge or dumping is an agency of the federal government will not be addressed herein, although this office will continue to explore those issues. In addition, the questions will be combined for convenience of discussion. Please note the distinctions made between our ability to regulate and comprehensively manage an activity, and our straight-forward prohibitions of an activity.
I. STATE LAW
The general problem described is the introduction of a solid waste material into the Atlantic Ocean. North Carolina statutes are clear in the regulation of such material when it reaches a land surface. Article 9 of Chapter 130A of the General Statutes governs solid waste management in North Carolina. The Department of Human Resources is designated as the single state agency for purposes of the federal Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) or any State or federal legislation enacted to promote the proper management of solid waste. N.C.G.S. 130A-299. However, G.S. 130A-300 provides that Article 9 does not abridge the statutory authority of the Environmental Management Commission relative to the control of water pollution. Article 9 authorizes and directs two regulatory schemes: one for hazardous waste, and the other for nonhazardous waste, corresponding with Subtitles C and D, respectively, of RCRA. North Carolina operates the hazardous waste program under authorization from the Environmental Protection Agency. North Carolina statutes and rules regarding hazardous waste management must be substantially equivalent to federal law in the area. On the other hand, regulation of nonhazardous solid waste has generally been left to the states.
G.S. 130A-294(a) directs the Department of Human Resources to establish a statewide solid waste program for implementation of safe and sanitary practices for management of nonhazardous solid wastes. G.S. 130A-294(a)(4) authorizes development of a permit program governing the establishment and operation of solid waste management facilities. G.S. 130A-294(b) directs the Health Services Commission to adopt, and the Department to enforce, "rules for the establishment, location, operation, maintenance use and discontinuance of solid waste management sites and facilities." The Solid Waste Management Rules are codified at 10 NCAC 10G.
Once solid waste dumped off-shore comes ashore on the North Carolina coast the Solid Waste Management Section of the Division of Health Services has jurisdiction over the waste. There are two solid waste management rules which apply: the prohibition against establishment of unpermitted waste disposal sites (open dumps), 10 NCAC 10G .0502, and the requirements placed on the generator to ensure that his waste is disposed at a site or facility which is permitted to receive the waste, 10 NCAC 10G .0106. These rules are applied to large disposal activities by a single source, but not to occasional dumpings by many sources. Clean-up from such activities would be the responsibility of local governments. The usual remedy for violations of the rules is a notice of violation, followed by an administrative compliance order requiring the generator and/or operator to remove the waste and dispose of it at a permitted facility.
An administrative penalty of up to $500.00 per day is authorized by G.S. 130A-22 for nonhazardous waste violations of Article 9, rules adopted pursuant to Article 9, or any order issued under Article 9. G.S. 130A-18 authorizes an action for injunctive relief in the superior court of the county where the violation occurred (or where a defendant resides).
Infectious wastes must be treated prior to disposal in sanitary landfills, according to 10 NCAC 10G .0107. Microbiological wastes, defined as cultures and stocks of etiologic agents, require steam sterilization or incineration prior to disposal. Pathological wastes require pathological incineration or steam sterilization followed by incineration. Pathological waste, defined at 10 NCAC 10G .0101 (22), includes "human tissues, organs, body parts, secretions and excretions, blood and body fluids that are removed during surgery and autopsies; and the carcasses and body parts of all animals that were exposed to pathogens in research, were used in the pharmaceuticals, or that died of known or suspected infectious disease." Blood products must be incinerated prior to disposal in sanitary landfills. The rule also provides for approval by the Division of other methods of treatment of infectious waste upon determination that the method effectively renders them non-infectious.
The administrative penalty authorized by N.C.G.S. 130A-22 for violations of statutes, rules or orders issued thereunder involving hazardous waste is up to $10,000.00 per day. The definition of "hazardous waste" in N.C.G.S. 130A-290(4) is broader than the corresponding federal definition of hazardous waste in that it also includes waste which, because of its quantity, concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may:
(a) Cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness; or
(b) Pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Thus, if it can be shown that waste, at the time it comes ashore, has infectious characteristics which meet any of the above criteria, it is possible to fine the generator for improper disposal of hazardous (infectious) waste.
Another potential remedy is the imminent hazard authority conferred upon the Secretary of Human Resources (or his delegate) by N.C.G.S. 130A-303. The Secretary, upon finding that an imminent hazard exists, may issue an order requiring that immediate action be taken to protect the public health or the environment. The order may be directed to a generator or transporter of solid waste or to the owner or operator of a solid waste management facility. Violations of Chapter 130A or rules adopted by the Health Services Commission are misdemeanors under N.C.G.S. 130A-25.
The discharge of hazardous substances to the waters of the Atlantic Ocean within the State's territorial sea would also violate the Oil Pollution and Hazardous Substances Act Control Act, N.C.G.S. 143-215.75, et seq. The purpose of this Act is "to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this State by protecting the land and the waters over which this State has jurisdiction from pollution by . . . hazardous substances." N.C.G.S. 143-215.76. Briefly, the Act would prohibit unpermitted discharges of defined hazardous substances to land or waters, and require removal by the responsible party. In addition, there is liability for damages to public resources. The responsible state agency under this Act is the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (DNRCD).
In situations where the discharged or dumped material is not hazardous, but is more loosely characterized as solid types of "garbage", the extent of the State's ability to comprehensively regulate such activities taking place in the Atlantic Ocean is less clear. While DHR has primary responsibility for the management of such waste, it does not regulate such activities in the ocean. It would require an amendment to G.S. 130A-290(1a), the definition of "disposal" in our solid waste management statutes, to support such regulation. The current definition limits covered "disposal" to "the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking or placing of any solid waste into or on any land . . . ." (emphasis supplied). DNRCD does not regulate such activities historically, as it has focused on the introduction of liquid or semi-liquid forms of wastes to the waters of the State. Those type of wastes are not allowed to be introduced to the Atlantic Ocean, except in accordance with federal Ocean Dumping Criteria adopted by reference by the State at 15 NCAC 2H.0404(d). Other discharges are specifically prohibited by the operation of N.C.G.S. 143-214.2(c). While the addition of trash or garbage items to our waters, including the Atlantic Ocean, has apparently not been a serious problem in the past, recent events illustrate a need to reexamine the water quality program for ways to more effectively address the problems of solid waste. The first step in that re-examination would be to construe N.C.G.S. 143-214.2(c) to impose an absolute prohibition on the introduction of such solid materials into the ocean. The section reads as follows:
Unless permitted by a rule of the [Environmental Management] Commission, the discharge of wastes, including thermal discharges, to the open waters of the Atlantic Ocean over which the State has jurisdiction is prohibited.
"Wastes" is defined comprehensively in N.C.G.S. 143-213(18), and could include forms of discarded material such as medical refuse. However, the term "discharge" has a term-of-art connotation which focuses on a conveyance to waters of waste material in liquid or semi-liquid form. The placement of objects in the waters thus has not been a part of the DNRCD water quality program to date. Indeed, "discharge" is defined by rule to be "the addition of any man-induced waste effluent either directly or indirectly to state surface waters." (emphasis supplied) 15 NCAC 2B .0202(6). This dichotomy is continued somewhat in federal law, as the federal Clean Water Act, 33 USC § 1251, et seq., generally governs point source discharges of effluents, while the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1971 (Titles I and II of which are known as the Ocean Dumping Act), 33 USC § 1401, et seq., and the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 USC § 1901, et seq. govern the dumping of waste materials in the ocean. Thus, "discharges" and "dumpings" have been considered separately for regulatory purposes.
Those problems of definitions within our state system aside, DNRCD could enforce the prohibition of N.C.G.S. 143-214.2(c) in the situation you describe. This would not involve a management concept until governing rules were adopted, but rather a straight-forward prohibition. If the activity also caused a degradation of water quality below applicable standards or a loss of a designated water use (such as swimming or wading), successful enforcement is more likely. Possible penalties include civil assessment of up to $10,000.00 per day, injunctive relief, and criminal prosecution with penalties of up to $15,000.00 per day (a $200,000.00 maximum applies within a 30-day period), or six months imprisonment, or both. See, N.C.G.S. 143-215.6(a), (b) and (c). Having noted the application of N.C.G.S. 143-214.2(c), I direct your attention to federal pre-emption questions, infra, and their effect on a comprehensive management program.
N.C.G.S. 76-40(a) has the broadest application in this area. This statute makes it a criminal misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $500.00 or six months imprisonment, or both, for any person to:
. . . place, deposit, leave or cause to be placed, deposited or left, either temporarily or permanently, any trash, refuse, rubbish, garbage, debris, rubble, scrapped vehicle or equipment or other similar waste material in or upon any body of navigable waters in this State . . . .
This prohibition is enforced by DNRCD in the coastal waters of the State. N.C.G.S. 76-40(e). There is nothing in the statute to reconcile N.C.G.S. 76-40(a) with N.C.G.S. 143-214.2(c) should the EMC, by rule, attempt to allow some solid waste dumping or discharge. This should be clarified.
N.C.G.S. 75A-10(c) also prohibits the placement of such solid waste materials in the waters of the State if the activity "render[s] the waters unsightly, noxious or otherwise unwholesome . . .", and authorizes wildlife protectors and other law enforcement officers to enforce the provisions. Such enforcement authority includes the authority to stop and inspect vessels as defined in the Boating Safety Act. N.C.G.S. 75A-17(a). The violations are criminal misdemeanors subject to a fine of up to $250.00.
You should also note the provisions of N.C.G.S. 113-131, which, inter alia, charge DNRCD with the stewardship of marine and estuarine resources. Civil actions for injunctive relief to prohibit activities which interfere with public trust rights or legal access thereto, and to obtain restoration of damaged resources, are possible under that statute.
Lastly, the actions described in many instances will constitute a public nuisance at common law. "A nuisance was defined in Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, as follows: 'That is a nuisance, which annoys and disturbs one in the possession of his property, rendering its ordinary use or occupation physically uncomfortable to him.'" Wilcher v. Sharpe, 236 N.C. 308, 311 (1952). Generally, such an action would be brought to address a continuing activity, but it may prove useful to accomplish a cleanup or abatement of the events described. A common law public nuisance action on behalf of the citizens of the State would be brought by the Attorney General in his parens patriae capacity.
II. FEDERAL LAW
Since the Congress has adopted several federal statutes involving ocean disposal of discarded materials, they must be examined to ascertain whether state regulatory and statutory authority within the three mile limit has been preempted or limited. The federal regulatory scheme generally recognizes three categories of discarded material: (1) those transported from land to sea for disposal; (2) those which are ship-generated from at-sea operations; and (3) those piped to sea for disposal. The primary federal statutes which govern ocean disposal of discarded materials are the Ocean Dumping Act (ODA), the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships and the Clean Water Act. The ODA regulates the first category; the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, the second; and the Clean Water Act, the third.
The ODA is administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which has issued regulations defining the limit of its authority as a line twelve nautical miles seaward of the mean high water mark. 40 CFR § 220.1(a)(3)(ii). For ship-generated wastes, disposal of discarded materials is controlled by an international treaty known as the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships, 1973 (MARPOL 73/78) which is implemented through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships.
To determine the effect of the ODA on state law, we must first review the exemptions therein. One of the three listed exemptions to the ODA concerns the ability to control the location of outfall structures for effluent under the provisions of the Clean Water Act. 33 USC § 1402(f). As previously stated, N.C.G.S. 143-214.2(c) is a statute which prohibits such outfalls into the ocean, except where the Environmental Management Commission adopts a rule stating otherwise. This is therefore a subject area not covered by the ODA, and the state's authority to so regulate is preserved.
More troublesome perhaps is the status of N.C.G.S. 76-40(a) and N.C.G.S. 75A-10(c). Their general prohibitions against depositing trash or rubbish in or upon navigable waters of this State were enacted long before the ODA and the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships. To the extent the ODA limits state authority to control such activities, it does so only as to the promulgation of rules or regulations. See, 33 USC § 1416(d) and (g). Thus, the blanket statutory prohibitions in N.C.G.S. 76-40(a) and N.C.G.S. 75A-10(c) against dumping trash or wastes in the State's ocean waters continue to apply, within the three-mile zone. Between three and twelve miles the dumping permit program of EPA may operate to allow some deposition of wastes. You should also note an ambiguity in the coverage of the ODA. Its scope is not clearly defined to include "littering" type activities, but apparently is limited to specific transportation "for the purpose of dumping." 33 USC § 1401(c)(1).
By 1986, a serious debate had emerged about the preemptive effect of the ODA on state regulations and standards. In response to that debate and to settle it, Congressman Walter Jones of North Carolina introduced an amendment to the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act. The purpose of the amendment was stated by Congressman Jones and Congressman Gerry Studds in the floor explanations of the bill:
The amendment establishes the general rule that State laws, standards or limitations are not preempted by the act. . . . The presumption against preemption requires a correspondingly narrow construction of the reach of section 106(d) of the MPRSA [33 USC § 1416(d)], which prohibits states from regulating ocean dumping. Where there is a potential conflict between a State authority governing environmental quality, public health, or public welfare and the prohibitions in section 106(d), the preemption favors the continuing validity of State law. CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 2005, SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986, 132 Cong. Rec. H. 9561-03; H 9596 by Studds and H 9613 by Jones.
The State's authority to control transportation for the purpose of dumping beyond its three mile limit in the Atlantic Ocean is entirely dependent on the enabling authority found in the ODA at 33 USC § 1416(d). States have no general ability to regulate beyond their boundaries unless the Congress so authorizes. The Congressional authorization in the ODA requires prior approval by the Administrator of the EPA, a finding by EPA that the dumping may affect waters within the State's jurisdiction, and State standards which are no less stringent than EPA standards.
The final source of federal authority is the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (33 USC § 1901, et seq.). Through it, the Coast Guard has primary responsibility for the implementation of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships, supra. Annex V of MARPOL 73/78 dealt with the issue of ship-generated garbage. It was ratified by the Congress in 1987 and became effective January 1, 1988. The implementing regulations are currently being developed. See, Federal Register, Vol. 53, No. 122, June 24, 1988.
Under MARPOL, wastes or discarded materials are categorized and treated separately. The disposal of plastics is prohibited to the edge of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), i.e. 200 miles. Any wastes disposed between three and twelve miles must be either comminuted or ground. The MARPOL regulations proposed to be specifically adopted by the Coast Guard apply to U.S. ships operating anywhere and to foreign ships operating within the EEZ. They apply to recreational craft as well as commercial ships. However, the Navy and other military ships are to be exempt for the first five years of the regulation. (A table entitled "Summary of Garbage Disposal Restrictions" taken from the MARPOL Annex V, and found at 53 F.R. 122, p. 23887, is a useful guide to the federal restrictions and is included for your ready reference.)
Like other state and federal statutes discussed earlier, this legislation prohibits all disposal of wastes within three miles. Thus, it is the opinion of this office that N.C.G.S. 76-40(a) and N.C.G.S. 75A-10(c) continue to apply since the federal statute and state law are compatible. See, also 33 USC § 1907(d) which provides that the remedies of the Act supplement, and do not amend or repeal, other laws. In addition, 33 USC § 1910 allows action to enforce the provisions of the Act by persons adversely affected, if the Secretary of the Navy has failed to act and has been notified of the violation; and "person" is defined in 33 USC § 1901(6) to include the State.
III. CLEAN-UP LIABILITY
While your queries did not directly address the issue of clean-up responsibilities and recovery of those costs, this office examined those matters as well. Except for express provisions regarding clean-up costs recovery, actions to recoup those state expenditures will be dependent on common law, nuisance law and tort. It must also be expected that some of these actions will be tried in admiralty court.
The law regarding liability of ship owners for clean-up costs and natural resources damages is similar in complexity to the earlier discussion. It also tends to be divided according to the categories described earlier. Generally, certain principles must be acknowledged: (1) liability of the ship owners for accidental spills will not exceed the value of the vessel and the revenue from hauling its cargo; (2) the liability limitation applies to foreign vessels as well as U.S. Government vessels; (3) the ship owners can bring an action in admiralty courts to so limit liability and the admiralty court will then stay all other pending suits; and (4) certain federal statutes may also otherwise reduce the amount of liability.
Federal law regarding clean-up liability is more specific for oil or gas related activities and hazardous substances than for garbage. In the former categories, there are specific limits on liability and the primary duty for clean-up is vested in the federal government. The remedies for such discharges, under the Clean Water Act and RCRA, are exclusive; claims under the Refuse Act of 1899, public nuisance and maritime tort are barred. However, state statutes allowing recovery of state cleanup costs in the case of spills of oil or hazardous substances have been upheld when challenged as pre-empted by the Federal statutes. Askew v. American Waterways Operator, Inc. 411 US 325, 93 S Ct 1590, 36 LEd 2d 280 (1973), reh. den., 412 US 933, 93 S Ct 2746, 37 LEd 2d 162 (1973). Our Oil and Hazardous Substances Act, supra, is the state counterpart to federal scheme. States can also recover cleanup costs under the Clean Water Act for violation thereunder. If the discharge does not violate these program standards, there are no federal or state statutes specifically authorizing recovery of clean-up costs. The Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 limits recovery to the value of the vessel and any freight charges it earned.
When the discharge is deliberate or other than accidental, the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 is not applicable. The Act would not apply, for example, when the owner or operator was unreasonably negligent in design or operation. Generally the Act has been narrowly applied in this country. The primary vehicle for recovery will then be public nuisance law and maritime tort. Under admiralty tort law, the liability for environmental pollution is generally limited to the damages incurred by commercial fishermen. The same result will generally occur under state law as admiralty law. As the guardian of public trust resources adversely impacted by the discharge, the State has standing, in its parens patriae role, to recovery for resource damages and for clean-up costs expended under its statutes. That same status does not extend to private litigants or local governments who incur clean-up costs or damages associated with marine pollution.
To summarize these liability principles, the State has the best standing to sue for damages incurred in a clean-up of, or for associated damages from, marine pollution when no Federal agency will conduct a clean-up. The proceeding would usually be tried in Federal court rather than state court. Damages may be limited by Federal law or admiralty law in accidental spills, but not in deliberate spills. There is little law on liability when the spill occurs miles from land and in accordance with applicable Federal law, such as the disposal standards under the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships.
IV. SUMMARY
The general problem addressed herein is the introduction of solid waste materials of various kinds of various methods to the waters of the Atlantic Ocean, and to the shoreline areas. The following principles are apparent from this discussion: (1) N.C.G.S. 76-40 prohibits the dumping of trash and garbage in those waters, and punishes offenses by fine of $500.00 or six months imprisonment, or both; (2) N.C.G.S. 75A-10(c) prohibits trash and garbage dumping in the waters of the State if it creates a nuisance condition, and punishes offenses by a fine of $250.00. (3) N.C.G.S. 143-214.2(c) may be construed to prohibit such solid waste dumping in the waters of the State, unless permitted by a rule of the Environmental Management Commission, and addresses violations in the same manner as our water quality program; (4) once covered solid wastes wash ashore, the Department of Human Resources or local governments, as the case may be, regulate its handling and disposal; (5) liquid or semi-liquid forms of wastes may not be discharged, except as allowed by rule of the Environmental Management Commission; (6) North Carolina's jurisdiction extends three miles, or one marine league; (7) North Carolina may seek approval from EPA to adopt additional criteria to govern the transportation of materials for dumping at sea outside the three mile zone, if our waters are affected thereby; (8) sporadic "littering" of the Atlantic Ocean is regulated by the federal government, and a notice outlining a significant new regulatory process was issued on June 24, 1988; and (9) if activities cause such litter to wash ashore, North Carolina would attempt enforcement of statutory and common law.
LACY H. THORNBURG
Attorney General