When North Carolina's 1984 redistricting bill ended up with contradictory language placing all of Vance County in Senatorial District 11 in one part of the bill but parts of Vance County in District 2 in another part, which version actually controls?

Plain-English summary

NC's 1984 Extra Session legislative redistricting bill (Senate Bill 1) went through a Senate amendment that moved all of Vance County into Senatorial District 11. The amendment touched the District 11 section of the bill but failed to also clean up the District 2 section, which still listed three Vance County townships (Middleburg-Nutbush, Townsville, Williamsboro) as part of District 2. When Chapter 5 of the 1984 Extra Session was enacted, the contradictory language was both in the bill: District 11 had all of Vance County, and District 2 had parts of Vance County.

The Legislative Research director asked the AG how to read the law. AG Rufus L. Edmisten and Revisor of Statutes Charles J. Murray concluded the District 11 placement controls and the District 2 language is surplusage.

The reasoning followed two NC rules. First, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to give effect to legislative intent. Looking at the legislative history, the Senate had specifically amended the District 11 section to add all of Vance County. That amendment was the legislative will. No corresponding amendment touched District 2, so the District 2 language was a remnant of the original (un-amended) text. Reading the bill to give effect to that remnant would defeat the very amendment the Senate had just passed.

Second, NC's State v. Humphries surplusage doctrine. Humphries held that clerical errors that would render a statute "unmeaning or nonsensical, or would defeat its intended operation, will not vitiate the act." Instead, "they will be corrected by the court and the statute read as amended, provided the true reading is obvious and the real meaning of the Legislature is apparent on the face of the whole enactment." That doctrine fit the situation exactly: the true reading was obvious (the amendment intended all of Vance to be in District 11), and reading the residual District 2 language as surplusage corrected the clerical error without judicial overreach.

The opinion is short, but the underlying doctrine is important. NC courts will fix scrivener-style errors in statutes if the legislative intent is clear from the broader enactment.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1984. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. The specific 1984 redistricting at issue has long since been superseded by subsequent redistricting cycles (1990, 2000, 2010, 2020, plus various mid-decade adjustments and federal-court-ordered redrawings). The surplusage doctrine itself continues to apply, but newer cases have refined when courts will read text as surplusage.

Background and statutory framework

NC redraws its legislative districts every ten years following the federal census, plus mid-decade redraws when courts strike down maps or when the General Assembly chooses to revisit them. 1984 was a mid-decade redraw triggered partly by federal Voting Rights Act preclearance concerns and partly by post-1980-census refinements.

Senate Bill 1 of the Extra Session of 1984 was a comprehensive Senate-redistricting bill. The legislative process produced a Senate floor amendment that consolidated all of Vance County into District 11, presumably to address minority representation concerns or community-of-interest groupings. The drafting error meant the Vance County townships were technically listed in both District 2 (residual unamended text) and District 11 (post-amendment text).

The AG's office, in its role as the office responsible for statutory revision and clean-up, was the natural place for this question to land. The Revisor of Statutes is an AG-office function in NC, so the opinion is essentially the Revisor saying "this is how I'll reconcile the conflicting text in the bound General Statutes." The legal authority for that reconciliation is the surplusage doctrine.

The opinion is notable for its clean application of Humphries to a high-stakes redistricting question. If the AG had been wrong, voters in Middleburg-Nutbush, Townsville, and Williamsboro Townships would have been assigned to the wrong senatorial district. The opinion lets NC elections officials assign them correctly to District 11.

Common questions

Did the General Assembly later go back and clean up the District 2 language?

The opinion doesn't say. The standard practice in NC is for the Revisor of Statutes to publish the General Statutes with the surplusage corrected (perhaps with an editor's note), and for the General Assembly to formally repeal the conflicting language in a subsequent session via a technical-corrections act.

Could a voter have challenged the AG's reading?

In theory, yes. A Vance County voter in one of the three named townships could have argued that the explicit District 2 listing controlled. But the AG's reading is supported by the legislative-history evidence (the Senate amendment) and the surplusage doctrine. A challenge would have faced a steep climb.

What's the practical limit of the surplusage doctrine?

The doctrine is limited to clerical errors and inadvertent residues. NC courts will not use it to rewrite substantive statutory choices. The distinguishing question is whether the conflicting language was a deliberate legislative choice or a drafting oversight.

Why does it matter which senatorial district Vance County is in?

District assignment determines which senator represents the voters, who their primary opponent might be, and how their interests aggregate within the Senate. For Vance County voters in 1984, being in District 11 versus District 2 affected which neighboring counties they were politically yoked with.

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/statutory-constructions/

Citations

• Chapter 5 of the Extra Session of 1984
• State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028
• In re Duckett, 271 N.C. 430, 156 S.E.2d 838 (1967)
• Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 49 S.E.2d 797 (1948)
• Ikerd v. North Carolina R. Co., 209 N.C. 270, 183 S.E. 402 (1936)
• Milk Commission v. Food Stores, 270 N.C. 323, 154 S.E.2d 548 (1967)
• D & W, Inc. v. Charlotte, 268 N.C. 577, 151 S.E.2d 241 (1966)
• Variety Theatres v. Cleveland County, 15 N.C. App. 512 (1972)
• State v. Humphries, 210 N.C. 406, 186 S.E. 402

Original opinion text

Requested By:

Terrence D. Sullivan
Director
Legislative Research
General Assembly

Question:

Did Chapter 5 of the Extra Session of 1984 place all of Vance County in Senatorial District 11?

Conclusion:

Yes.

Senate Bill 1 of the Extra Session of 1984, as introduced, divided Vance County between Senatorial District 2 and Senatorial District 11. District 2 was to include Middleburg-Nutbush, Townsville and Williamsboro Townships, and District 11 was to include Dabney, Henderson, Kittrell, Sandy Creek and Watkins Townships.

An amendment by the Senate to the provisions relating to District 11 placed all of Vance County in District 11, however, no amendment relating to Vance County was made to the provisions regarding District 2. Therefore as enacted Chapter 5 of the Session Laws for the 1984 Extra Session has contradictory language that places all of Vance County in District 11 and that places parts of Vance County in District 2.

"It is settled law that a statute must be construed as written. State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37 (1967), cert. den. 390 U.S. 1028; In re Duckett, 271 N.C. 430, 156 S.E.2d 838 (1967). However, where a statute is ambiguous, resort must be had to judicial construction to ascertain the legislative will. Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 49 S.E.2d 797 (1948). The courts will control the language to give effect to the legislative intent. Ikerd v. R.R., 209 N.C. 270, 183 S.E. 402 (1936). Where a statute must be construed to carry out the legislative intent, that intent must be found from the language of the act, its legislative history and circumstances surrounding its adoption which will throw light upon the evil sought to be remedied. Milk Commission v. Food Stores, 270 N.C. 323, 154 S.E.2d 548 (1967); D & W, Inc. v. Charlotte, 268 N.C. 577, 151 S.E.2d 241 (1966)." Variety Theatres v. Cleveland County, 15 N.C. App. 512, 513, 514 (1972).

The legislative history of Senate Bill 1, i.e., the amendment to the language regarding District 11, makes it clear that the legislative intent was to place all of Vance County in District 11. Because the legislative intent in regard to the make up of District 11 is so clear that it is equally clear that the contradictory language regarding District 2 was inadvertently left in the act. Because the intent is so clear the language regarding District 2 can be treated as surplusage. Ikerd v. North Carolina R. Co., 209 N.C. 270, 183 S.E. 402 (1936).

"The object of all interpretation is to determine the intent of the law-making body. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative statement. The heart of a statute is the intention of the lawmaking body. Trust Co. v. Hood, Comr., 206 N.C. 268; S. v. Earnhardt, 170 N.C. 725. In the language of Chancellor Kent: 'In the exposition of a statute the intention of the lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the terms, and its reason and intention will prevail over the literal sense of the terms, and its reason and intention will prevail over the strict letter. When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt and the remedy in view, and the intention is to be taken or presumed according to what is consonant with reason and good discretion.' I Kent Com., 461.

Clerical errors, which, if uncorrected, would render the statute unmeaning or nonsensical, or would defeat its intended operation, will not vitiate the act. They will be corrected by the court and the statute read as amended, provided the true reading is obvious and the real meaning of the Legislature is apparent on the face of the whole enactment. Black Int. Laws, p. 157." State v. Humphries, 210 N.C. 406, 410, 186 S.E. 402.

Therefore, Chapter 5 of the 1984 Extra Session can be read as if the words placing part of Vance County in District 2 had been deleted.

RUFUS L. EDMISTEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Charles J. Murray
Special Deputy Attorney General
Revisor of Statutes