Can a county voter registration official register an eligible voter when the official is physically outside the boundaries of the county where the official was appointed?

Plain-English summary

George A. Goodwyn, chairman of the Edgecombe County Board of Elections, asked the Attorney General whether a county registration official could register a voter when both the official and the voter happened to be physically outside the county at the time of registration. Chapter 163 of the General Statutes (the Elections Code) did not expressly prohibit it. The county was asking whether the absence of an express prohibition meant the registration was valid.

Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten and Deputy AG James Wallace, Jr. answered no. They explained that the question had to be answered by looking past Chapter 163 to common-law rules about officer jurisdiction.

The general common-law rule, quoted from 67 C.J.S. Officers § 190, was: "Ordinarily an officer who holds an office for a particular political subdivision is powerless to perform an official act beyond the territorial limits of the political subdivision. When the law confers on a person powers that he, as a natural person, does not possess, that power cannot accompany his person beyond the bounds of the sovereignty which has conferred the power."

The NC Supreme Court had applied that rule in State v. Scott, 182 N.C. 865 (1921), Dixon v. Robbins, 114 N.C. 102 (1894), and Ferebee v. Hinton, 102 N.C. 99 (1889). The AG concluded that county registration officials are "officials" within the scope of that rule, and their official authority does not follow them across the county line.

The opinion noted that it merely confirmed the State Board of Elections' longstanding policy. The AG was not aware of any improper out-of-county registrations actually having occurred, but advised that to the extent any had, the county boards should notify affected voters and let them re-register correctly. Cross-county registrations would be of doubtful validity.

The opinion expressly carved out one situation: it did not address special registration commissioners who are also DMV drivers-license examiners under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-81. Those officials have a different statutory grant of authority.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1984. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

NC's voter registration system has been completely overhauled since 1984. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and the NC implementing legislation (the SEIMS statewide voter registration database, the 2003-2007 reforms, and later changes) introduced statewide registration mechanisms, motor-voter registration through DMV, online registration, and same-day registration during early voting. The "county registrar" role described in this opinion has largely been replaced. Anyone with a current question about cross-county registration should look at the current G.S. 163-82 series, the State Board of Elections' SEIMS rules, and the federal Voter Registration Act framework.

Common questions

Q: Why didn't the Elections Code spell out the answer?
A: Because the common-law rule is so settled that the General Assembly never bothered to state the rule explicitly. The question of whether a county officer can act outside the county is the kind of background principle the legislature presumes everyone knows. The Edgecombe County board's careful question pushed the AG to articulate the principle rather than just assume it.

Q: What is 67 C.J.S. Officers § 190?
A: Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.) is a legal encyclopedia that summarizes American common law topic by topic. The "Officers" entry restated the general rule about territorial limits on official authority. The AG cited it as the controlling articulation of the common-law principle.

Q: What are the cases the AG cited?
A: All three are NC Supreme Court decisions: State v. Scott (1921), Dixon v. Robbins (1894), and Ferebee v. Hinton (1889). Each applied the general territorial-limits rule to a different category of state or local officer. None squarely addressed county voter registration officials, but the principle is the same.

Q: Were any voters' registrations actually invalidated?
A: No. The AG was not aware of any actual out-of-county registrations. The opinion was issued on a hypothetical to confirm the State Board's existing policy. The AG asked county boards to check and remediate any they discovered.

Q: What about DMV drivers-license examiners?
A: G.S. § 163-81 set up special registration commissioners associated with DMV. Those officials had a different statutory authority than ordinary county registrars, and the opinion explicitly declined to address their territorial authority. The modern motor-voter system has expanded the DMV registration role substantially.

Q: Could a voter still register if both the voter and the registrar were outside the county?
A: Per this opinion, no. The voter would have to register through a properly authorized channel: visit the county elections office, register by mail through the standard procedure, or use any other channel the General Assembly had authorized. (Modern channels include online registration and DMV motor-voter, neither of which existed in 1984.)

Background and statutory framework

North Carolina's voter registration framework is in Chapter 163 of the General Statutes. In 1984, county registration was the dominant model: each county had registrars and registration sites within the county, and voters registered in person before an authorized county official. Chapter 163 also contained the special-registration provisions for DMV drivers-license examiners under G.S. § 163-81.

The common-law principle the AG invoked is older than any particular state's election code. It descends from English administrative law: a sheriff has authority only within the county for which he is appointed; a justice of the peace has authority only within the jurisdiction of his commission. American courts adopted the same rule. The NC Supreme Court applied it to a county sheriff in State v. Scott (the sheriff's arrest authority does not cross the county line), to a county tax collector in Dixon v. Robbins, and to a county officer in Ferebee v. Hinton. The application to county registration officials was straightforward.

The AG also relied on a quieter principle: when the legislature confers a power on a public officer and is silent about territorial scope, the courts presume the power is bounded by the political subdivision that the officer serves. The legislature can override this presumption (the AG cited "the legislature may require certain official acts to be done beyond the [jurisdiction's] limits"), but only by express statutory language. Chapter 163 had no such express language for ordinary county registration officials.

Citations

• N.C.G.S. Ch. 163 (Elections and Election Laws)
• N.C.G.S. § 163-81 (special registration commissioners associated with DMV)
• State v. Scott, 182 N.C. 865, 109 SE 789 (1921) (territorial limits on county officer authority)
• Dixon v. Robbins, 114 N.C. 102, 19 SE 239 (1894) (same principle)
• Ferebee v. Hinton, 102 N.C. 99, 8 SE 922 (1889) (same principle)
• 67 C.J.S. Officers § 190 (general rule that a county officer cannot perform official acts beyond county limits)

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/elections-registration-jurisdictional-authority-of-officials/

Original opinion text

Requested By:

George A. Goodwyn, Chairman Edgecombe County Board of Elections

Question:

Are election registration officials authorized to register voters when they are geographically outside the boundaries of the counties in which they are appointed to serve?

Conclusion:

No.

Your question has, for the first time, put squarely before us the issue of whether, when a county registration official is outside the geographical boundaries of his or her county, that official may register an otherwise eligible voter who resides in the county where the official is appointed to serve but is also outside the geographical boundaries of that county at the time the application to register is made. You acknowledge, by way of your inquiry, and we agree, that no provision contained in Chapter 163 of the General Statutes (Elections and Election Laws) states that the activity in question is prohibited under the laws of that Chapter. Previous inquiries presented to this office have been accompanied by the request that we restrict our informal responses to such inquiries to the confines of Chapter 163. Your inquiry is broader, and has led us to conclude that a registration official's authority does not extend beyond that official's county of appointment.

The conclusion is based on an examination of applicable common law. The general rule is as follows:

"Ordinarily an officer who holds an office for a particular political subdivision is powerless to perform an official act beyond the territorial limits of the political subdivision. When the law confers on a person powers that he, as a natural person, does not possess, that power cannot accompany his person beyond the bounds of the sovereignty which has conferred the power, and, although the legislature may require certain official acts to be done beyond the [jurisdiction's] limits, such acts are done by its express permission and the power cannot be implied." 67 C.J.S. Officers § 190.

Further, the Supreme Court of this State has, on numerous occasions, adhered to the general proposition set forth above. See State v. Scott, 182 N.C. 865, 109 SE 789 (1921); Dixon v. Robbins, 114 N.C. 102, 19 SE 239 (1894); Ferebee v. Hinton, 102 N.C. 99, 8 SE 922 (1889).

This office has consistently held that county election registration officials are "officials," and we find no basis whatsoever for concluding that their official activities are any less "delimited" than are the counties in which they are appointed to serve.

This opinion reiterates a long-lasting policy of the State Board of Elections, and in no way constitutes an alteration of any policy, practice, or procedure employed by that agency. This Office is currently aware of no registrations which have been taken in a manner contrary to this Opinion, but to the extent that any registration applications may have been taken outside the proper jurisdiction, and to the extent that such information can be determined by whatever means, we advise and urge that the appropriate boards of election attempt forthwith to notify improperly registered individuals and afford them every reasonable opportunity to register in the manner provided by law. The validity of registration taken under other circumstances is somewhat questionable.

This Opinion is in no way directed to actions of special registration commissioners who are drivers license examiners of the Division of Motor Vehicles. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-81.)

Rufus L. Edmisten

Attorney General

James Wallace, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General for Legal Affairs